Philippines shifting towards deterrence of China – US support key.
Javier 22 (Erick Neilson C Javier, research officer at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). The views expressed in this article are his alone, and do not represent the views of the NDCP, the Department of National Defense, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or the Philippine Government, ‘Rethinking the Philippines’ Deterrence in the South China Sea’, MHT Corporation, March 26, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/rethinking-the-philippines-deterrence-in-the-south-china-sea/)
Manila should change the narrative from a focus on “how to defend” against China toward a more active strategy of deterring China. This is not mere semantics, but a change of mindset in how the Philippines frames its defense and security policies. The former concedes all initiative to China and puts the Philippines in a position where it may be forced to compromise on its interests. This was demonstrated by attempting to resupply Philippine troops in Second Thomas Shoal in November 2021. Resupply eventually resumed, but with the . Short-term relief for the shoal may have been bought at the cost of long-term risk, should Chinese forces again block resupply to the Philippine outpost. Chinese military vessels continue to test Philippine sovereignty over even internal archipelagic waters, with the most recent on March 14, 2022. A more active strategy of deterrence posits that the Philippines can influence Chinese decision-making, if not compelling Beijing to renounce its claims, then at least pushing it to reconsider its gray zone operations and other forms of aggression. The urgency for improving the Philippines’ posture has only increased since the Whitsun Reef incident, as due to the Chinese insistence on excluding other extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, as part of the CoC’s provisions. In conceptualizing deterrence, Manila must be able to explain how and why planned military capabilities affect the adversary’s decision-making. Developing a , particularly for the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea, can be crucial in this task. A “theory of victory” comprises coherent ideas that guide the Philippines in utilizing its defense resources to achieve the desired conditions, whether that is preserving Philippine holdings in the disputed sea, deterring coercive actions against Philippine vessels and citizens in the waters of the West Philippine Sea, or compelling and/or incentivizing Chinese recognition of and compliance to the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award. In crafting a theory of victory, Manila must conduct a thorough appraisal of the likely adversary, accounting for their unique , , and exercise of military and coercion. The theory must also include considerations of the Philippines’ allies, including their limitations and situations where they may not be able to extend aid. A theory of victory gives intellectual foundations to devise Philippine deterrence concepts and objectives, generating more policy options for Manila to respond to current and future aggression. This can support AFP modernization efforts either by reinforcing or re-examining the logic to procure and . Developing a theory of victory can show that the Philippines is purposeful in preparing for long-term defense of its interests, reducing the impact of defeatist and that aim to sow confusion and doubt in the country’s resolve.