Inherency – NATO guidelines for combating disinformation remain placed on the backburner to national-level response and relies on E.U. rapid response infrastructure.
Chlon 2022 [Amb. Tomasz Chłoń Ambassador of Poland to Estonia (2005-2010) and to Slovakia (2013-2015) Director of NATO Information Office Moscow (2017-2020) “NATO and Countering Disinformation: The Need for a More Proactive Approach from the Member States” GlobeSec https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NATO-and-Countering-Disinformation-ver1-spreads.pdf]
Tackling disinformation remains an essential part of NATO’s communication strategies and day-to-day operations, which includes media monitoring, analysis of the information space and proactive communication in a coordinated and fact-based manner. Its goal is to inoculate or “pre-bunk” the mediasphere rather than debunk each false claim, i.a. through “Setting the Record Straight” narratives and activities which counter the Kremlin’s myths about NATO. In 2019, NATO adopted an updated and systematic package of appropriate objectives and measures to combat disinformation. The following year, NATO’s Response to Disinformation on COVID-19 became realised in an Action Plan issued to Allies by the Secretary General. This document sought to bring together multiple strands of work on countering hostile disinformation surrounding COVID-19. In 2021, NATO’s Toolbox for Countering Hostile Information Activities was created; it reflects the Alliance’s twin-track model to respond to hostile information activities: “understand” and “engage”, underpinned by “coordination”. The document aims to provide Allies with a toolbox to assess hostile information activities, including disinformation, and to assist in determining possible courses of action. Furthermore, NATO IS staff holds biweekly briefings on Russian and other disinformation activities at various relevant committees. Within the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, as part of a long-term effort, and covering resilience baselines – spanning across many domains including communications – Allies share information about how prepared they are to face various key civil security challenges, including disinformation. The organisation supports member and partner states by providing guidance as well as co-financing for social and scientific projects that strengthen their resilience to disinformation. Rapid-reaction teams have been made available to member states as part of NATO’s strategy to fight hybrid threats. The organisation is also cooperating more closely with the European Union to ensure that NATO benefits from the EU’s Rapid Alert System set up to counter disinformation. At the same time, the West has yet to prepare a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated response to Russian disinformation. It is up to nations to fully utilise NATO’s potential. A response practice has been developed and seen partial success within some states and Euro-Atlantic institutions, but it has not yet been translated into a real common policy or strategy. At national levels, political declarations and agreed action plans are still not fully implemented in too many instances. Western states approach disinformation in varied ways due to differences in history, regional security, wealth, education, media quality, political and legal culture and – most importantly – the current state of their relations with Russia. As a rule, some states prefer bilateral approaches that safeguard national prerogatives. This may change now following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the challenge of disinformation has begun to attract higher political attention. In the European Union, this has transpired through the adoption of the European Democracy Action Plan4 and the presentation of new regulations on digital services in December 2020. These regulations aim to address the core issue of the business model developed by disinformation organisers who instrumentalise social media platforms. The report by the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE), has also promised that other means of influence will be addressed5 . In an effort to combat disinformation, the Digital Services Act (DSA)6 is a breakthrough legal instrument that will fundamentally change the rules of the game for the information environment in the European Union, member states and partner countries; it will also have an impact on national approaches worldwide.7 The DSA will impose numerous legal obligations on operators of online platforms that are more demanding than the previous voluntary commitments outlined in the Code of Practice for Fighting Disinformation. Companies will be obliged to cooperate with independent researchers and allow them to access their data. They will also participate in complaint and appeal procedures regarding content moderation and dispute resolution. The DSA will provide for the companies’ obligatory consultations, including with civil society organisations. It will also introduce the institution of trusted whistle blowers, who, among other things, will notify the companies about suspected crimes online. The act will correspondingly establish a European Digital Services Council and advisory body made up of national digital service coordinators responsible for implementing legislation at the national level. It will impose specific additional duties on exceptionally large online platforms with more than fortyfive million users per month. These obligations will include assessing systemic risks resulting from their services, identifying actions to reduce such risks, conducting independent audits, setting appropriate conditions for algorithmic recommendations of user content and ensuring additional transparency in advertising (including political ads). Among international organisations and institutions, the European Union plays a leading role in counteracting disinformation and introducing new effective measures against it. The future regulations on transparency in financing political parties and election campaigns gives hope for limiting corruption and external influence in the affairs of the member states.8 NATO and the EU share similar membership compositions and were created based on comparable value systems, so it is reasonable to assume that counteracting disinformation will be more prominently reflected in NATO’s new Strategic Concept. A need for this has been suggested by the authors of the NATO2030 expert group report prepared ahead of the Madrid Summit in June 20229 . As a result, countering disinformation could be given a more visible place on the agenda of NATO ministerial meetings and summits, and more proposals with clear commitments by member states to tackle disinformation may be unveiled. NATO also has the opportunity to strengthen the mandates of existing committees to better coordinate national efforts.