Latin America is key to successful sanctions on Russia. Russian influence in the region allows them to evade and also opens up the option for forward missile deployment.
Carlos Malamud, Rogelio Nuñez, Mira Milosevich-Juaristi 03 march 2022 "Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: a pawn in the game for Putin’s resurgent Russia," Real Instituto Elcano, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-in-the-ukraine-crisis-a-pawn-in-the-game-for-putins-resurgent-russia/
As the tensions over Ukraine continue to rise between Russia and the West (defined by the Kremlin here as the US, NATO and the EU), Moscow has hinted at plans to deploy military forces in Latin America, specifically in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ryabkov, recently remarked that ‘I don’t want to confirm anything… or rule anything out’. The Kremlin’s thinly veiled threat to send troops (or perhaps even a more substantial deployment) highlights the importance of understanding the role played by Latin America in Moscow’s strategy. Such declarations can be interpreted as a way of setting boundaries for Washington, sending a clear signal on the need for mutual respect and to refrain from meddling in each other’s respective sphere of influence. If the US continues its expansion in the former Soviet republics, Russia will respond by increasing its presence in Washington’s own back yard. Against the backdrop of rising tensions with the US and the EU, in January 2022 the Russian government announced it was strengthening strategic cooperation with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua ‘in all areas’. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, communicated that Vladimir Putin had agreed to reinforce bilateral ties in recent conversations with the three countries’ leaders, citing Russia’s ‘close relations and strategic cooperation in all areas: economic, cultural, education and technical-military’. The rivalry between Russia and the US in their respective geographic neighbourhoods shares the same underlying dynamic, based on a strategy of ‘supporting resilience’. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has cultivated relations with countries in the post-Soviet space, supporting their sovereignty and independence from Russia. For its part, Moscow has sought to preserve and increase its influence among the historic allies of the USSR (Cuba and Nicaragua) and –much to Washington’s chagrin– has become a fundamental source of support for the regimes of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Even if the Biden Administration believes Russia lacks the military capacity to follow through on its threats in the region (National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has accused the Kremlin of grandstanding), there are nonetheless historic and modern precedents that mean they must be taken seriously. During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, for the first time, Moscow sent two nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, alongside four warships, including the nuclear battlecruiser Peter the Great. This pattern was repeated in 2013 and again in 2018, when the Russian government declared its intention to establish an air base on the Venezuelan island of La Orchilla. In an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, it is impossible to ignore events on the other side of the globe, especially when one of the parties involved (in this case Russia), threatens to deploy troops in Cuba and Venezuela, alongside other ‘technical and military measures’. Going by past experience, such measures could range from the deployment of military specialists and technical experts (as has been the case in Venezuela) through support for new hybrid forms of warfare (including cyber-attacks) and even the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, Venezuela or potentially Nicaragua, mirroring the situation in Kaliningrad and other border zones. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 shows this threat must be taken seriously, even if the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 sought to avoid a repeat of the crisis by transforming Latin America into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, this is not the only nuclear option available to Moscow: another, less costly alternative (in financial terms) would be to deploy its Zircon hypersonic missiles in submarines stationed off the US coast. The spectre of a nuclear deployment in Latin American territory would bring an end to over half a century of regional consensus on the need to avoid the presence of nuclear arms. If there is one lesson that can be learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is that when two major powers negotiate to avoid war, the associated allies –voiceless players like Castro’s Cuba– have no say in the final outcome. Castro was incensed when he discovered that the USSR had agreed behind his back to withdraw its missiles in exchange for the US doing likewise Turkey. However, governments in the region should not need the materialisation of a nuclear threat to spur them into action. They must stand up and be counted on their immediate concerns, a case in point being rising energy costs, which –except in producer countries– increase the burden on families and are forcing governments to increase fiscal spending via subsidies. The truth is that a coordinated regional response is simply not feasible at present, not only because it would be unprecedented, but also because of the level of fragmentation and divergence, the broad spectrum of positions on the crisis, and the preferences of the parties involved.
Familiar faces and emerging powers: China, Russia, Iran, India and Turkey on the Latin American chessboard
Latin America plays a bit part on the global chessboard. Even if it is not fully removed from the Ukraine crisis, it nonetheless occupies a peripheral position. This can primarily be attributed to the paralysis of the regional integration process, limiting Latin America’s presence on the global stage and preventing it from speaking up with a single voice in multilateral forums. Let us not forget that the majority of countries in the region do not have a robust and coherent foreign policy (Brazil, Chile and Mexico are a few rare exceptions). In general, foreign policies are focused on regional relations, especially with neighbouring countries, largely leaving Latin America’s international presence to be scripted by the world’s major powers. This was particularly evident during the Cold War, from the 1950s to the 1980s. Latin America was a key stage for the conflict between the US and the USSR (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba since 1959, South America in the 1960s and Central America in the 1980s) but in the bigger picture the region was just another battleground in the clash between capitalism and communism. Its role in this global struggle was driven by historical continuity and its relations with the various international centres of power. However, since the 1990s, particularly in the wake of the 2007-08 Financial Crisis and repeated signs of weakness in the US presence in the region, powers from outside it have sought to bolster their role and even challenge US hegemony. The process has been facilitated by the anti-imperialist and post-colonial policies of the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA, Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) and its partners. The consolidation of a multipolar world, particularly in the aftermath of 2008, has had a number of consequences for Latin America. In economic terms, the region has diversified its markets, allowing China to consolidate its position as a major trading partner since the start of the 21st century. In geopolitical terms, some emerging international players have spotted the opportunity to gain influence, economic power, prestige and allies at the expense of traditional powers like the US, the EU and Spain. This gradual erosion of the presence, influence and reputation of old powers has allowed the rise of new ones (China), as well as the resurgence of familiar faces (Russia). Beginning in the first decade of the 21st century, and intensifying in the second, China and Russia have both expanded their presence in Latin America, alongside Iran and, to a lesser extent, Turkey. India is also present, with its own agenda, for now less pronounced but with greater capacity for expansion in the medium term. Almost all these countries are acting in support of a multipolar world, challenging US hegemony and trying to displace it economically, technologically, militarily and commercially. China’s strategy was consolidated under the presidency of Hu Jintao, when the country produced its first White Book on regional policy. Xi Jinping has furthered its Latin American projection, presiding over a quantitative and qualitative leap forward in Beijing’s presence in the region, transforming the Asian Giant into its second trade partner overall and the main partner of some countries. Despite its limited ties to Latin America, Turkey has also sought to expand not only its economic and commercial projection but its political one too. An increasingly authoritarian President Erdoğan is seeking allies to counterbalance his isolation on the global stage. El Salvador, which is also opposed to the US, has made advances to Ankara in search of support for its decision to make Bitcoin an official currency. Turkey is following the path of Iran, which has had a strong trade and political presence in the region since the 1990s, including murky links to terrorist attacks. Iran has become a key international ally for Venezuela under the presidencies of both Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. In January this year, the two countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Denis Moncada and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, agreed in a phone call to strengthen ties between their governments. Latin America has provided Iran, whose shadow has hung over the 1994 terrorist attack on the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA, Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina), with space to break free from its international isolation. A key factor has been its entente with regimes such as that of Chávez in Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua. Venezuela has signed over 270 agreements with Iran and the death of Chávez in 2013 prompted Ahmadinejad to label him a messiah. It is an unlikely alliance, forged in the first decade of the 21st century between the ultra-conservative regime of the ayatollahs and the ‘Bolivarian socialists’, grounded in oil and the rejection of US hegemony. Shared anti-imperialist sentiment has also led to close relations between the Iranian regime and Bolivia.
Putin’s objective: key aspects and methods of the international strategy of post-soviet Russia
In stark contrast to China, the Kremlin’s Latin American policy is linked to the personality-driven and authoritarian leadership of Vladimir Putin. Since his rise to power in 1999 and particularly over the past decade, one of Putin’s objectives has been to restore Russia’s status as a global power, lost with the collapse of the USSR. His path to restore this status has gone beyond his country’s immediate neighbourhood comprising the former Soviet republics to seek out new strategic niches. The countries of Latin America have offered fertile ground for this expansion. However, Russia’s strategy lacks the ideological conditioning of the USSR and is more pragmatic in its approach to diversifying the country’s foreign relations. Its roots can be traced back to the Primakov Doctrine (named after Yevgeny Primakov, who served first as Foreign Minister and then as Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999). Primakov was highly critical of Boris Yeltsin’s idea of ‘abandoning’ regions like Latin America, where Russia had exerted significant influence during the Cold War, in favour of closer ties with the West. His ideas constitute a common thread running through Putin’s ‘assertive’ strategy in Syria, his rapprochement with Beijing and his support for Maduro and Ortega. Russia’s influence in Latin America is different from China’s. One of the key factors that explains this difference is historic precedent. In some senses, Russia is the heir to the USSR, whose presence in the region grew during the Cold War, especially after the Cuban Revolution. Although its behaviour may have changed –more in form than in substance– there is nonetheless a certain continuity. The ideological factor of communism may no longer be present but other elements remain, such as the geopolitical rivalry with the US and a longstanding Soviet aspiration to be a world power, first by the tsars and now by Russia. Moscow is using Latin America to counter US influence in other areas. If Washington seeks to expand its presence in zones of Russian influence, such as Ukraine, the Kremlin will increase its military presence in the Caribbean. The region is just another part of Putin’s global strategy. As a revisionist power, Russia is challenging the idea of a ‘unipolar’ world, led by the US and backed by the EU. Together with NATO, the US and the EU are the main obstacles to rebuilding Russian influence in its hinterland (Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) and restoring its status as a regional and global power. This has led the Kremlin to seek out foreign partners to build other alliances, both geopolitical, to counter US hegemony, and economic and commercial, to offset the sanctions imposed by Washington and Brussels following the crises in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014 and 2022). Three main reasons explain why Latin America is important to Russia: (1) the potential of alliances with Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua to undermine US hegemony; (2) as a tool to allow Putin to present himself as a global actor (instead of just a local one), using Latin America as a platform to build a new, multipolar order (for example, Nicaragua was the first Latin American country to bestow diplomatic recognition on South Ossetia and Abkhazia following their separation from Georgia in 2008); and (3) as part of a strategy of deterrence towards further US advances into Russia’s hinterland. The Ukraine crisis has shown how US imposition in zones that are key to Russian interests, such as Ukraine, will be met with shows of strength or threats to do likewise in Latin America. Through its pragmatic, non-ideological stance, Russia is seeking to expand its presence in Latin America, strengthening its position in various areas, including trade, energy and arms sales. The Kremlin initially sought to take advantage of Bolivarian regional integration initiatives, such as ALBA, to forge alliances against the US. In 2014 Putin sent a message to the ALBA summit, expressing his desire to deepen ties and expand ‘our dialogue and practical interaction, both bilaterally and multilaterally’. However, like Bush’s attempts to push the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005, he soon discovered how regional division, lack of leadership and patchy integration prevent the achievement of regional goals. Similarly, the paralysis of ALBA following the loss of Chávez’ leadership and Venezuelan petrodollars laid bare its limitations.