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Russia wont deploy hypersonic missiles

Andrew Reddie, 1-13-2020. Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project for Nuclear Gaming. “Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/ //jsam

Speaking on December 24, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin marked the deployment of Russia’s first nuclear-capable hypersonic missile system, noting, “Today, we have a unique situation in our new and recent history. [Other countries] are trying to catch up with us. Not a single country possesses hypersonic weapons, let alone continental-range hypersonic weapons.”

The question that is now facing policy makers in Washington, Beijing, London, and elsewhere is whether and how this deployment reshapes strategic stability.

The answer, perhaps counterintuitive amid the hand-wringing over Moscow’s announcement, is not much. In reality, the systemic consequences of hypersonic missiles will be minimal to nil, and the narrative that Washington is “behind” in a hypersonic arms race fails to take into account the different strategic challenges facing China, Russia, and the United States—not least that the United States need not overcome an adversary’s missile defense systems.

Maneuverable missiles. Hypersonic missiles travel faster than Mach 5 (approximately 3,800 miles per hour) and have the ability to maneuver during flight. Existing research and design efforts associated with hypersonic weapons have focused on two types of missile technologies. The first, a boost-glide vehicle, is designed to sit on top of an existing ICBM and to be launched on a normal ballistic trajectory before being released and maneuvering to a target without any additional propulsion. Russia’s recently-deployed Avangard system serves as an example of this type of hypersonic weapon. The second type, perhaps more complex to develop and deploy, is a hypersonic cruise missile. This type of weapon involves a supersonic combustion ramjet or turboramjet engine that would provide in-flight propulsion, and this feature would allow it to travel at significantly lower altitude than its boost-glide counterpart. In both cases, though these missiles are named for their speed, it is their potential maneuverability that represents the central concern surrounding the effects of their deployment.

Hypersonics and missile defense. Just as missile defense systems represent an antidote to traditional nuclear missiles that travel on a ballistic trajectory, hypersonic weapons represent an innovation to overcome these defenses. As a result, it is difficult to discuss the strategic effects of hypersonic weapons without taking into account the current state missile defense capabilities.

Among those who frame hypersonic weapons as a strategic game-changer, there are three aspects of missile defense that are too often ignored. First, missile defense technologies remain in their infancy, with the United States the only country possessing significant numbers of deployed missile defense systems. Second, US capabilities are explicitly deployed to deter North Korea and Iran—not peer or near-peer competitors like Russia or China. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes, “Today’s US missile defenses provide significant protection against potential North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile strikes against the US homeland, and will improve as necessary to stay ahead of missile threats from rogue states.” Finally, amid a mixed test record with debates surrounding the appropriateness of test conditions, it remains unclear whether existing US missile defense technologies are as successful as policy makers might like.

In light of the above and in the near term, Moscow’s deployment of hypersonic nuclear weapons changes little. Given that US missile defense systems are not designed to address the threat posed by peer competitors with large numbers of nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of the United States to a nuclear attack from Russia is the same in January 2020 as it was in November 2019, prior to Russia fielding this class of weapon. The fact that both Washington and Moscow rely on their respective mutual vulnerability—not missile defense technologies—to deter nuclear warfare remains unchanged. Among those who theorize that missile defense itself is destabilizing, hypersonic missiles may actually strengthen strategic stability by reinforcing rather than degrading the mutual vulnerability upon which nuclear deterrence rests.

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