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Hypersonics are just hedges against U.S. and NATO missile defense improvemets.

Andrew W. Reddie 1-13-2020, "Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/

Characterizing the hypersonic “arms race.” Alongside concerns surrounding strategic stability, US policy makers have also expressed concern that the United States is “behind” in a hypersonic arms race—with deployment of US hypersonic capabilities currently  for 2022. To the extent to which there is a “race” surrounding hypersonic weapon systems at all, Russia and China do enjoy an  in the development of hypersonic technology—measured by the number of successful hypersonic weapon tests. Prior to Putin’s announcement, China’s DF-ZF boost-glide vehicle had  the most success in testing, while India and France are  to be close behind. Against the backdrop of a historical record in which Moscow has long had more  compared to the United States, what should military analysts make of the US failure to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons first? The answer: very little. As noted above, the United States is the primary developer of missile defense technologies, with Moscow and Beijing registering their objections to various US deployments in Europe and East Asia over the past two decades. Amid concerns that US missile defense systems might eventually be used against them—and particularly in the absence of their own missile defense capabilities—investment in hypersonic weapons makes sense for both Moscow and Beijing. In the language of strategists, research and development of hypersonic weapons represent a “hedge” against future advancements in US missile defense technologies. This driver is  for the United States. As such, nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons would provide  appreciable benefits to the existing US nuclear capabilities encapsulated in the nuclear triad. This reality is also reflected in the fact that the current research and development programs in the United States focus on  rather than nuclear payloads for hypersonic weapon systems. Others have also  that this conventional focus increases the accuracy requirements of US hypersonic weapons—which may explain some of the delay in their deployment. Commentary suggesting that increased US investment in hypersonic weapons is needed to “match” or “lead” are also incongruous with the various offset strategies used by the United States to engage in military competition over the past six decades. For example, faced with superior Russian conventional forces in Europe in the 1950s, Eisenhower  a much smaller US ground force with battlefield nuclear weapons—using a technological solution to asymmetrically compensate for a strategic disadvantage. More recently, the third offset strategy  to “include autonomous learning systems for handling big data and determining patterns, human-machine collaboration for more timely relevant decision making, and assisted human operations”—and using these technological capabilities as a force multiplier. In both cases, military planners did not seek to match an adversary capability for capability. Instead, they sought a policy solution that addressed the underlying strategic threat. These offset strategies offer benefits both in terms of flexibility and reducing the resource cost of strategic competition, and it is unclear why this logic would be abandoned in the context of hypersonic missile threats.

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