Holding the line against Russia is imperative. Russian perception of success is a risk in and of itself.
Pavel, Engelke, Cimmino ‘22 (Berry Pavel, senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, Peter Engelke, a deputy director and senior fellow within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with the Global Energy Center, Jeffrey Cimmino, associate director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Four ways the war in Ukraine might end,” blog, issue, 03/01/22, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-ways-the-war-in-ukraine-might-end/) – KN
The most dangerous scenario for the future of Europe and the global order is one in which the Ukraine conflict sets the stage for a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia. There are multiple pathways toward such an outcome, including:
NATO could decide to escalate its involvement in Ukraine by, for example, attempting to implement a no-fly zone or another form of direct intervention. For now, the United States and other NATO allies have rejected implementing a no-fly zone—but that calculus could change if Russia continues to escalate its bombardment of civilians. Russia would be forced to decide whether to back down or directly engage alliance military forces. If it chooses the latter, the risk of an escalating armed conflict between NATO and Russia would increase substantially.
Russia could inadvertently strike a NATO member’s territory—for example, through imprecise targeting or erroneous identification of friend and foe—prompting countermeasures from the alliance. (Russia already has attacked targets close to the Polish border.) As the Russian military’s stock of precision-guided munitions starts to dwindle, the risk of such an accident leading to an inadvertent escalation with NATO rises. This scenario would see the beginnings of direct conflict, perhaps air-to-air or air-to-ground, in border regions of Ukraine. In turn, this could set off a tit-for-tat cycle of strike and counterstrike leading to open hostilities.
A fearful prospect concerns the possibility that Putin has broader designs well beyond Ukraine. If Russian forces make rapid progress in Ukraine and achieve effective control over the country, Putin may turn his attention to states that he covets as part of a desire to reconstitute a sphere of influence that broadly aligns with the territory of the former Soviet Union. The obvious candidates to test his designs, and the resolve of NATO itself, would be the Baltic states (all of which are members of the Alliance). Putin might harbor a belief that NATO will back down if pushed; NATO insists it will fight any Russian military incursion on a member state.