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Without NATO-level response, disinformation responses are patchwork and ineffective.

McInnis Starling 21 [Kathleen J. McInnis is an author and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2006 to 2009, she served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working primarily on NATO’s Afghanistan operations. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, where she worked on NATO and transatlantic security matters. McInnis also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), working NATO-Afghanistan matters and stability operations capability development. Prior to joining the Pentagon, McInnis spent several years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzing US nuclear weapons strategy, strategic capabilities, NATO, European security, and transatlantic relations. Before joining CSIS, she was a researcher in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, working on NATO, the European Union, and US-UK political-military relations Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the initiative’s programming and research and leads on the defense policy and European security practice areas. Her own research focuses on great-power competition with China and Russia, deterrence and US force posture, and transatlantic security. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has produced and contributed to reports on Russia’s nuclear strategy, space security, military mobility, political warfare, Europe-China relations, and the US-UK relationship. Starling’s analysis has been featured in a range of publications, and she has provided commentary for NPR, the BBC, and ABC News, among others. Within the Transatlantic Security Initiative team, she played a leading role in managing NATO’s official public diplomacy efforts (“NATO Engages”) around the Alliance’s 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting and other summits. Starling was also the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Starling worked in the UK Parliament with the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, providing analysis on UK defense, Middle East security, and technology. Originally from the United Kingdom, she also worked for the Britain Stronger in Europe (BREMAIN) campaign. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and historyhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021_final.pdf]

One of the dominant challenges of contemporary statecraft is the “cylinders of excellence” problem: the stovepiping of key policies, activities, and even worldviews by bureaucracies that, practically speaking, limits the ability of nations to design and implement holistic strategies to address current and emerging threats.12 To date, NATO allies and partners have generally muddled through on countering political warfare with discrete efforts to identify and counter disinformation, improve cyber defenses, and sanction Russia and other actors in response to below-threshold attacks. Yet, these counterefforts have been mixed in terms of effectiveness, scope of response, and the actors involved. China and Russia’s authoritarian political warfare campaigns are neither siloed, piecemeal, nor singular in nature. Accordingly, these challenges demand a much more robust and comprehensive approach from NATO allies and—crucially—they require a reimagined response that better incorporates external partners (including partner states, multilateral organizations, civil society, and private sector actors). Ultimately, political warfare is a matter that NATO allies and partners must attend to with more urgency and intentionality lest they be at risk of becoming the orb spider: having mindlessly, inadvertently contributed to the design of a world that is no longer compatible with transatlantic security and the democratic values and freedoms that are central to our way of life. This paper argues that NATO has both a designated strategic role to play due to its mandate in the 1949 Washington Treaty, and an operational-level toolkit to utilize, when it comes to developing and implementing an urgently needed Comprehensive Approach to countering authoritarian political warfare.13 Political warfare can be difficult to pinpoint, as both malign and non-malign activities can be blended together as part of an ultimately coercive influence campaign. Political warfare is, therefore, most readily discerned at the strategic level, where a clearer picture of overall behaviors and trends can be aggregated and analyzed—a task that NATO headquarters is well positioned to take on. NATO convenes not only heads of state and government, military leaders, and ministers of defense, but also ministers of foreign affairs and others civilian leaders 13 This paper uses the terms political warfare, authoritarian political warfare, coercion, and authoritarian coercion interchangeably. The key difference this paper highlights is the distinction between hybrid and political warfare/coercion. Parsing these terms from the overall conceptual umbrella of “hybrid warfare” enables an analysis of what, specifically, NATO might do to counter the political warfare components of hybrid warfare. on a regular basis. With multiple divisions and directorates, NATO headquarters has the ability to engage with outside actors, including nongovernment actors and civil society. NATO has the platform to further dialogue and coordinate action among multiple stakeholders in a way that is necessary to spur cross-national and multinational counter-political warfare efforts in the transatlantic community. For NATO to get a handle on countering political warfare, it can also benefit from its various partnership frameworks to learn from and employ the capabilities of partner nations and nongovernment actors. Partners like Finland and Sweden have often led the way on countering political warfare nationally, while partners like Georgia and Ukraine have much experience to share. Civil society and commercial actors also have a part to play in any proposed counterstrategies and in developing potential solutions. A whole-of-system approach is required to combat whole-ofsystem attacks. NATO is well positioned to help build that holistic approach and it should do so with greater urgency.

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