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US Presence in China not as large as though

Van Jackson, 10-26-2021,( senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington,)"America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/09/us-southeast-asia-china-biden-economic-strategy-geopolitics/ --MV

In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, detailed the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But absent from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was any meaningful statement about political economy—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are as bland as the rhetoric itself. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s military-first Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a heavily militarized agenda. Consequently, the United States is misallocating its attention and influence relative to what would actually benefit the region most. Economic policy, not defense policy, is the only way to address the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: The United States has no economic strategy for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints. First, Washington must obviously prioritize economic statecraft and stop thinking with its missiles. It is clear from the way U.S. leaders talk about their country’s role in Asia that trade, aid, finance, and development are not as privileged in their minds as the Pentagon; economic equality outside U.S. borders does not even appear to register as a problem needing attention. If that does not change, the United States will continue to place itself on the wrong side of trends—including defense spending, naval expansion, nuclear modernization, and missile proliferation—that are turning the region into a powder keg, which serves no one except the defense industry. Second, Washington needs an economic policy for Asia—one that tries to do actual good for the region instead of furthering only abstract U.S. interests. And there is much the United States can do to do right by Asia. For instance, U.S. officials could use the United States’ privileged position in the global economy to negotiate various forms of debt relief on behalf of low- and middle-income countries in the region that have been hit particularly hard by the pandemic, such as the Philippines and Malaysia. (The United States did this for Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion.) Washington could also grant these countries preferential trade access, which would be a boon to Asia’s export-dependent economies.

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