The CP facilitates necessary autonomy for Europe
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf. Accessed 6-24-2022; MJen]
In the summer and early fall of 2021, two incidents cast doubt on the United States’ future commitment to European security. The first was the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan despite the objections of NATO allies. The second was United States’ negotiation of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal with Australia and the United Kingdom without informing France. (France had an agreement with the Australian government to build diesel-propelled submarines.)1 Europeans were furious. Charles Michel, president of the European Council, said, “What does it mean America is back? Is America back in America or somewhere else? We don’t know… We are observing a clear lack of transparency and loyalty.”2 European Commissioner Thierry Breton, who is French, spoke of “a growing feeling in Europe… that something is broken in our transatlantic relations” and called for a “pause and a reset.”3 These twin shocks created a new demand for what is intermittently called European strategic autonomy — the notion that the European Union should be more capable of acting on its own in pursuit of Europe’s interests. While France champions this idea, other European nations are more reluctant, especially those physically closer to Russia who see the United States as the key security provider. France argues that a greater role for the European Union is compatible with a continuing vital role for NATO in European security, but this begs the question of how the two organizations — NATO and the EU — relate to each other.