Russian Hacks Threatens Nuclear Stability
Schneider 22 [Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. “The Biggest Cyber Risk in Ukraine?” Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-07/biggest-cyber-risk-ukraine?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220628] - NAAh
Just as many military experts predicted that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be quick and decisive, so many cyber-experts expected that Moscow would fortify its conventional onslaught with a devastating cyberattack. Ukrainian forces would be blinded, critical infrastructure broken, and Russian disinformation rampant. But just as the military experts have been surprised by Russia’s stalled invasion, so have the cyber-experts by the lack of major digital attacks. In the first few days of conflict, cyber-operations seem to be more fizzle than bang. Some Russian cyber-activity has been discovered, but it seems to have done little to invigorate the Russian military campaign or hinder the Ukrainian response. In the run-up to the invasion, Russia launched wiper malware attacks, which deleted data from computers at Ukrainian government agencies. Russia also appears to have conducted some distributed denial-of-service attacks, which bombarded websites with so much information they became paralyzed, and a series of cybernetwork exploitation attempts on Ukrainian government and military systems. But Ukrainian air defense and aircraft didn’t appear to be affected by cyber-disruptions, and there are no reports of critical infrastructure damage from cyberattacks. Even the Internet seems to be up and running in Ukraine. Why the apparent restraint? It is almost impossible to know exactly why (or if) the Russians have indeed held back. Perhaps cyber-operations have been attempted and failed; perhaps Russian President Vladimir Putin has held his cyber-capabilities in reserve, saving them for later. Or maybe cyber-operations have taken place, but their effect—which is often virtual and not clearly attributed—will take longer to materialize. What is known is that the conflict is far from over, and the next question becomes whether cyber-operations could play a larger role as the war turns more violent. It is likely that the next stage of conflict will more than ever be defined by planes, tanks, artillery, and soldiers. It seems unlikely, given the amount of indiscriminate damage currently being inflicted by Russia, that cyber-operations will escalate the violence of the campaign within Ukraine. That said, could cyber-operations lead to horizontal escalation, drawing NATO into the fight, for example? Or, given that the United States and Russia are the world’s largest nuclear powers, could cyber-operations escalate to the worst possible outcome—nuclear war? Recent wargaming research suggests that cyber-exploits into nuclear command and control may be enticing for states looking to neutralize a nuclear escalation threat in the midst of a conventional war, and that actors may underestimate the danger of these exploits and vulnerabilities to nuclear stability.