Growth or decline doesn’t matter --- it’s how the regime frames the issue, which proves it’s resilient
Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, Academia]
As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, there is no empirical evidence to prove that the CCP’s legitimacy solely relies on economic success. Arguably, there are two major problems in the relevant literature: the exclusion of ideological factors and the narrow focus of government performance. The major problem with the socioeconomic performance approach lies in its exclusion of ideological factors, which leads to many problematic arguments and predictions. The performance legitimacy approach implies a problematic relationship between economy and politics (White, 1986). The argument – that legitimacy of the CCP primarily relies on economic performance – implies that economic crisis or the slowdown of economic growth would lead to some kinds of legitimacy crises or major disasters in China. This is also explicitly warned by many who argue that economic deterioration will unavoidably lead to political crisis (Krugman, 2013; Zhao, 2009). This kind of argument implies that economic factors are the independent or dominant variables, while political factors are subordinate or dependent variables. It is flawed to contend that the regime is helpless in an economic crisis. This book endorses White’s assertion (1986) on the primacy of politics – that proper political actions can fill the deficit in legitimacy created by economic difficulties. As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, legitimacy directly comes from neither economic crisis nor economic growth per se (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). Ideological factors will transform economic performance into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance, and regime legitimacy is based on “those perceptions” rather than on economic performance per se. As such, an economic crisis is not a direct threat to a regime – its impacts on political legitimacy depend on people’s perceptions of the crisis and the regime; thus, how the government frames this crisis is crucial (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). In other words, how political actors use ideological factors to frame people’s perceptions of the crisis (i.e., discourse) is key to deciding the impact of the crisis on legitimacy. Proper political actions and effective crisis management will contribute to minimize legitimacy loss or even sometimes enhance legitimacy. As discussed below, there is much room to manipulate people’s dependency on the government and on its irreplaceable role during a crisis. This is especially true in China, where people’s dependency on the government is more obvious because of historical traditions (Tong, 2011). The CCP has abundant experience and the capability to market its authoritarian rule through information control and powerful propaganda campaigns. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the Chinese government actually won, rather than lost, legitimacy credits. The regime strategically manipulated this crisis as an opportunity to achieve its political purposes including the promotion of Scientific Outlook of Development (Holbig, 2011). The Chinese media highlighted China’s good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically in contrast with the disaster that this crisis caused in other countries, and the official media also made efforts to project international recognition onto China’s crisis management. By using those propaganda strategies, the CCP successfully transformed its performance during this crisis into positive perceptions, thus legitimacy (Holbig, 2011).