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Western encirclement, aging populations, and attempted expansion prove China is a volatile revisionist power on the verge of lash-out

Beckley and Brands 21– *Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University; **resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. (*Michael and **Hal, January 1, 2021, “Into the Danger Zone - Coming Crisis in US-China Relations," American Enterprise Institute, Targeted News Service, ProQuest via UMich Libraries, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27632?seq=1)//KH

Red Flags Most debate on America's China policy focuses on the dangers of a rising and confident China.3 But the United States actually faces a more complex and volatile threat: an already powerful but increasingly insecure China beset by internal problems and a brewing international backlash. China already has the money and muscle to challenge the United States in key areas. Thanks to decades of rapid growth, China boasts the world's largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity), manufacturing output, trade surplus, financial reserves, navy by number of ships, and conventional missile force. Chinese nationals lead four of the 15 United Nations specialized agencies.4 Chinese investments and loans span the globe, and Beijing is pushing for primacy in key technologies such as 5G telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI).5 Add in that the American-led world order has experienced four years of geopolitical disarray under President Donald Trump and that much of the world has suffered through many months of a crippling COVID-19 pandemic, and it is hardly surprising that Beijing is testing the status quo everywhere from the South China Sea to the border with China. But China's geopolitical window of opportunity may be closing as fast as it opened. Since 2007, China's annual economic growth rate has dropped by more than half, and productivity has declined by nearly 10 percent, meaning that China is spending more to produce less.6 Meanwhile, debt has ballooned eightfold and is on pace to total 335 percent of gross domestic product by the end of 2020.7 No country has racked up so much debt so fast in peacetime. China has little hope of reversing these trends, because it is about to suffer the worst aging crisis in history. Over the next 30 years, China will lose 200 million working-age adults and gain 300 million senior citizens./8 Any country that has aged, accu-mulated debt, or lost productivity at anything close to China's current pace has lost at least one decade to near-zero economic growth. And as economic growth falls, the dangers of social and political unrest rise./9 China's leaders are well aware of these trends./10 President Xi Jinping has given multiple internal speeches warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style collapse./11 China's gov-ernment has outlawed negative economic news, and Chinese elites are moving their money and children out of the country en masse./12 Meanwhile, China faces a rising wave of foreign hostility. According to leaked Chinese government reports and independent Western analyses, nega-tive views of China have soared to highs not seen since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989./13 This surge of anti-China sentiment is a response to Beijing's internal repression and external assertiveness, and it is now manifesting in ways that threaten to crush China's geopolitical ambitions. Nearly a dozen countries have suspended or canceled their participation in Belt and Road Initiative projects./14 Another 16 countries, including eight of the world's 10 largest economies, have banned or severely restricted use of Huawei products in their 5G networks./15 India has been turning hard against China, since a clash between the two countries killed 20 soldiers in June. Japan has ramped up military spending, turned amphibious ships into aircraft carriers, and strung missile launchers along the Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan, where a record number of citizens now identify solely as Taiwanese, not Chinese./16 The European Union has labeled China a "systemic rival," and Europe's three great powers--France, Germany, and the United Kingdom--are sending naval patrols to counter Beijing's expansion in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean./17 These intensifying headwinds will make China a less competitive long-term rival to the United States but a more explosive near-term threat. Simply put, it is hard to see how a country facing so many severe challenges can ultimately outpace America and its many allies. Yet whereas a rising China could afford to shelve disputes and deescalate crises--confident that its wealth, power, and status were growing and that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) legitimacy was secure--a slowing and increasingly encircled China will be eager to score geopolitical wins while it still can. There is no mystery about what China's ambitions are, because the CCP has enshrined them in national law: to make the Chinese nation whole again; reunite Taiwan with the mainland; control the East and South China Seas, thereby turning the western Pacific into a Chinese lake; and restore China's status as a great power. The looming danger is that China will act more aggressively to achieve them as its future prospects dim. History Rhymes If China goes down this ugly path, it wouldn't be the first great power to do so. We tend to think that rising revisionists pose the greatest danger to the existing order. "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable," Thucydides wrote. But historically, the most desperate dashes have often come from dissatisfied powers that had been on the ascent but grew worried that their time was running short./18 World War I is the classic example. The growing German challenge to the United Kingdom provided the strategic background to that conflict. Yet in the foreground in the run-up to 1914 were nagging German fears of decline. The growth of Russian military power and strategic mobility was menacing the eastern flank. New French conscription laws were changing the balance in the west. A tightening Franco-Russian-British entente was leaving Germany surrounded. If Berlin did not act quickly, its military strategy--based on fighting a two-front war--would collapse, its dreams of world power and geopolitical greatness would vanish, and the internal strains caused by intensifying political clashes might become unmanageable. This was a principal reason Berlin acted so recklessly during the July crisis--by issuing its "blank check" to Austria-Hungary and then enacting its plan for a rapid, two-front war--despite the obvious peril, as Chief of General Staff Helmut von Moltke acknowledged, of a continental war that might "annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."/19 The same decision-making dynamics were present in other cases. Imperial Japan made its fatal gamble in 1941, after the US oil embargo and naval rearma-ment made it clear that Tokyo's window to dominate the Asia-Pacific was closing fast./20 In the 1970s, Soviet global expansion peaked as Moscow's military buildup matured and the slowing of the Soviet economy created an impetus to lock in geopolitical gains sooner than later. Even the United States once fit this pattern. The flurry of American expansion and the buildup of US naval power in the 1890s came after an economic slump that exacerbated internal tensions and amid a global upsurge of imperial aggran-dizement that left some US strategists concerned that Washington would be left behind by emerging European mega-empires. In some of these instances, it was economic dis-tress following a long period of growth that stoked anxious aggression. In others, it was the onset of strategic encirclement, often self-provoked, by rival powers. In all cases, an upsurge in a revisionist state's power gave it the means to challenge the status quo, but an apparent downturn in its future prospects gave it the motive to do so boldly, even violently. Given that China is currently facing both a grim economic forecast and tightening strategic encirclement, the next few years may prove partic-ularly turbulent./21

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