Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The 1AC’s shift towards artificial intelligence is a tool of military domination that fuels an endless cycle of warfare

Shaw ’17 (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617713157 DOA 6/24/22)//nm

The robotic revolution Robots have disrupted the social and economic spaces of human coexistence for decades. In 1961, General Motors installed the first industrial robotic arm – Unimate – on its assembly lines in New Jersey. Since then, robots have migrated from factories to the social spaces of everyday life. According to one report, there are over 8.4 million robots globally, with a market value in excess of $15 billion (Kadtke and Wells, 2014: 43). And with the exponential leaps in microprocessing power predicted by Moore’s Law, we now stand on the verge of a ‘Cambrian’ explosion of robotic life on planet earth. This has big consequences for the spaces of security and violence. On the ground, in the air, and underwater, military robots are eroding the human monopoly on violence. ‘Today, the world is approaching a robotics revolution in military affairs that may be on par with the introduction of gun-powder, levée en masse, and the advent of nuclear weapons’ (Sukman, 2015: 44). The coming decades will see US soldiers augmented, replaced, and wounded by artificial warriors, which ‘has the potential to change our basic core concepts of defense strategy’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 6). Yet the robotic revolution must be placed within a longer trajectory of capital-intensive warfare (see Edgerton, 1991). This liberal form of violence aims to use technological superiority to ‘solve’ the problem of ‘uncivilized’ states and actors (Mabee, 2016). Accordingly, the US military continues to project peace through capital, security through technics. In 2014, the USA accounted for just over half of global arms sales in a $70 billion annual industry (Theohary, 2015). Still, robots are disrupting the architectures of capital-intensive warfare. The future-oriented 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age sheds light on the US military’s production of robotic geopolitical futures. Co-authored by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work, it insists that ‘U.S. defense leaders should begin to prepare … for war in the Robotic Age’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 5). A similar report by the Pentagon-funded National Defense University explores how evolutions in synthetic life, robotics, and artificial intelligence will transform US dominance (Kadtke and Wells, 2014). At the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the US military had zero ground robots. By the end of 2008, there were 12,000, including iRobot’s PackBot, which was integral to counter–improvised explosive device (IED) missions. Aerial robots continue to disrupt the spaces, subjects, and geopolitics of US conflict (Shaw, 2016). Indeed, what Kate Kindervater (2016) calls ‘lethal surveillance’ has transformed US geopolitics. The Pentagon now stocks a fleet of well over 12,000 aerial drones (US Department of Defense, 2013). Controversially, medium-altitude Predator and Reaper drones have been deployed outside of ‘hot’ battlefields in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Shaw and Akhter, 2012). And on a smaller scale, the US Army is researching how to equip its soldiers with tiny pocket-sized drones for ‘over the hill’ surveillance, which could revolutionize infantry tactics. Within the USA, Predators and Reapers are routinely flown by US Customs and Border Patrol along the Mexico and Canadian borderlands. And back on the ground, $55 million has been spent on transferring 1000 military ground robots to police forces across 43 US states (Center for the Study of the Drone, 2016). On 7 July 2016, Dallas Police Department became the first to use an exploding robot to kill an armed suspect. A robot red-letter day. How, then, can we piece together these developments? Former secretary of defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Defense Innovation Initiative, also known as the ‘third offset strategy’, on 15 November 2014. Underpinned by robotics, cyber warfare, autonomy, 3D printing, electric weapons, miniaturization, and the internet of things, this strategy is designed to sustain US technological dominance in the 21st century. The ‘third offset’ follows precedents in the Cold War. To offset Soviet numerical advantages in the 1950s, the US military invested heavily in nuclear weapons. The second offset strategy of the 1970s was driven by stealth, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and network-centric systems. In both cases, technology was translated into US military dominance. Yet, unlike in the Cold War, the robotic revolution today is sweeping across multiple nations (and non-state actors), not just the US and Soviet militaryindustrial complexes. Thus, US empire confronts a robotizing warscape that is both global and unpredictable. US empire: Towards a proxy army of robots In the preface to the 2015 National Security Strategy, US President Barack Obama declared, ‘We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivalled in human history’ (White House, 2015). Rarely, however, is ‘empire’ used in official parlance. Yet, as Mabee (2004: 1360) suggests, ‘while “lonely superpower”, “unipolar”, and other monikers have been utilized, the US as empire seems to convey a richer understanding and a deeper resonance of America’s contemporary role’. But what exactly is empire? ‘Empires are usually states’, replies Zielonka (2012: 519), ‘but they are states of a peculiar nature.’ Can a statecentric understanding capture the global infrastructures of US military power? For Dalby (2005: 435), ‘If empire is to be of analytical use, it seems that none of the versions of it in circulation are quite adequate to grapple with nuances of the present.’ Accordingly, the concept of empire must connect the geographies of contemporary technics with past materializations. As Parker (2010: 128) concludes, ‘for all its differences from nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples, the geopolitics of empires is likely to be found in the present and in the future’. US history is inscribed by imperialism. For Munro (2014: 1567), ‘continuing to think of US history in imperial terms enables us to see how the present arrives already fundamentally shaped by past economic disparity, racial inequality, hetero-patriarchal oppression and a deep interrelation between the realms of foreign and domestic’. Accordingly, Heumann (2011) argues that the USA has always been an empire-state rather than a nation-state, inheriting the precedents of European empires. Practices of racial domination and expansionism underwrote US state formation and early capitalism, leaving a legacy of segregation. Fast forward to the 19th century, and the so-called Monroe Doctrine of 1823 articulated the belief that the USA was a guardian against European intervention in the ‘New World’. Under President Woodrow Wilson, this moral imperative was reworked into an idealistic vision for spreading democracy across the planet. The grim parade of US proxy wars and black ops during the Cold War – particularly in Latin America – entrenched the idea that the USA was the guardian of western civilization. Despite this history of foreign intervention, the USA has consistently escaped the label of empire (Johnson, 2004a). This did change during the ‘war on terror’, as the Bush administration adopted ‘a new ideological commitment to empire’ (Agnew, 2003: 883). Consider the now infamous boast of White House adviser Karl Rove: ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality’ (originally quoted in Suskind, 2004). Supporters of US empire ranged from liberal interventionists to neoconservative hawks. Under both visions, ‘the US state is thus seen as an imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states’ (Stokes, 2005: 219). Or, as Michael Ignatieff (2003) declared, ‘The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.’ Others find the idea of US empire implausible in an era of global capital (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 384). Empire is viewed instead as a deterritorialized form of capitalist world sovereignty. Yet globalization should not imply a flat and frictionless world of capital. The USA has long been the leader of an uneven world capitalism since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. Accordingly, ‘there is a geography of globalisation: one that rests on an imperial centre’ (Mabee, 2004: 1360). Thus, while capitalist logics are vital in explaining geopolitics, so too are the planetary materialities of US empire. Empires entrench their power through technics. No human sovereign is as awe-inspiring as the technical background that secures humanity across the planet. The question then becomes, how will US empire materialize – and maintain – its dominance in an age of global robotics, technological diffusion, and powerful non-state actors? If the third offset strategy is an indication, US empire will reconstitute by shifting to a permanent, robotic proxy war. Since World War II, the practice of total warfare between states has diminished and proxy wars have increased (Kaldor, 2012). One of the most infamous examples in US history was the CIAfunded Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s. More recently, the Pentagon spent billions on private military contractors in Iraq. But rather than outsource military power to human contractors, US military surrogates of the future could be replaced by robots: private military contractors without flesh, risk, or vulnerability (or healthcare costs). As Mumford (2013: 43) suggests, ‘developments in communications and information technology have the potential to nullify the twentieth-century belief in “boots on the ground” as a proxy-war necessity’. An army of robots can entrench US power without humans on the ground. And, just as importantly, these artificial warriors are profitable commodities (Shaw, 2017). A robotic US empire thus advances proxy warfare – and capitalism – to its most logical conclusion.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.