The 1AC’s new biotech is merely a rearrangement of US domination—the drive for metaphysical innovations are justified by fears of the uncertain states which must be controlled by the technologically developed US empire
Jasanoff ’06 (Sheila Jasanoff, Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, has authored more than 130 articles and chapters, founded and directs the security technology and sciences Program at Harvard, served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science, holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège; 2006, “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and Science”, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145?seq=1 DOA 6/25/22)//nm
PLANTS FOR THE PLANET: THE EMPIRES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY Apart from occasional radical social misfits such as the so-called Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski,43 few any longer question the vital role of science and technology in human development. Even opponents of particular technological projects—large dams,44 for example, or genetically modified (GM) foods45—rarely dismiss technology outright; rather they favor smaller, more transparent, or more locally governable technological systems. The question that preoccupies students of science and technology, then, is not whether, but how, to integrate innovation into people’s lives so as to make a positive difference. Years of research in the social psychology of risk perception46 and public understanding of science47 have established that popular fear or rejection of new technology often rests, at bottom, on an uneasiness about the ways in which technology is managed or, more accurately, governed. What do these observations imply for an industry with global ambitions, like agricultural biotechnology? How, more specifically, does biotechnology contribute to ways of political worldmaking beyond the nation-state, and what implications do the engagements between biotechnology and global politics have for democratic governance? In reaching for answers, it is useful to think of biotechnology operating politically in several different registers. It is, of course, most plainly a material technology: it makes new instruments for warding off harm and disorder, such as plants that resist insects, weeds, or drought, and it redesigns pieces of nature, such as genes, to perform new tasks in new environments. In this respect, biotechnology is, concurrently, a metaphysical device; it brings new entities into the world and through that process reorders our sense of rightness in both nature and society.48 At the same time, biotechnology is a discourse: to some, of progress and improvement, beneficence and utility; to others, of risk, invasiveness, and domination from afar. Proponents of agricultural biotechnology tell particular stories about a world in which plant genetic modification is possible, and these stories carry political and cultural weight. Lastly, biotechnology is an institution of governance; it shapes forms of social life by influencing how people choose to, or are able to, live with the products of bio-industry. Each of these registers, as we see below, has been activated in the global politics of biotechnology. The Resisting Multitude In May 2004, a scientific journal reported that German researchers were keeping secret the locations of some thirty sites planted with GM corn for fear that anti-GM activists would destroy the crops, as they previously had elsewhere in Germany.49 Failure to disclose these locations was contrary to the EU Directive 2001/18, which requires GM crop sites to be publicly registered. Noncompliance with European law in traditionally law-abiding Germany may have been newsworthy, but the threat to GM crops was anything but novel. From the late 1990s onward, attacks on field trial sites began evolving into a form of international protest that seemed to epitomize Hardt and Negri’s thesis about an emerging, assertive, global multitude: in Britain, hundreds of demonstrators dressed in decontamination suits uprooted GM plants in test fields in 1999; in India and Brazil, farmers’ unions organized similar protests; in France, José Bové, the charismatic head of the radical Confédération Paysanne (Peasant Confederation), became a folk hero by orchestrating the destruction of thousands of GM plants, as well as a partially built McDonald’s outlet, in 1999. His subsequent trial, fine, and terms of imprisonment left him and his supporters undaunted, indeed ready to resume battle as much as five years after their initial transgressions. Field trial sites were not the only theater of protest against GM agriculture. Antiglobalization activists early identified biotechnology as a symbol of the environmental, economic, and cultural homogenization they wished to resist. Demonstrations against Monsanto and GM corn (or maize), together with evocations of risks to nontarget species such as the monarch butterfly, were part of the repertoire of street protest during the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999. In this and similar episodes, representatives of a loosely networked global citizenry asserted their right to debate technological futures in terms other than those conventionally used by nation-states and their expert advisers: the formal discourses of law, molecular biology, economics, risk assessment, and bioethics. At stake was who had power to determine how much global harmonization there should be and which scientific, technological, and economic innovations should be allowed to diffuse throughout the world. Those opting for more local, bottom-up visions won a salient victory when Monsanto decided, under rising public pressure, to withdraw its plans to develop sterile seed technology, through use of the so-called Terminator gene;50 later, citing a drop in global demand, the company also announced that it would put on hold its plans to market genetically modified Roundup Ready wheat.51 Ideology and Enforcement Not everyone saw the antiglobalization movement as the promising vanguard of planetary resistance against an outmoded, corporate-dominated, neoliberal world order. Using the classical ordering machinery of science and the law, proponents of agricultural biotechnology sought to promote their visions of social and technological progress, stifling opposition and dissent. At the February 2000 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond, Republican from Missouri, Monsanto’s home state, was openly dismissive of the Seattle protest. He represented it as a struggle between scientific expertise and the misguided, if exuberant, ignorance of youth: “The scientific debate is not being controlled by Ph.D.s but apparently by young people with a proclivity for street theater. . . . It’s coming to the point that scientists are going to have to get dressed up as corncobs to get the attention of the media.”52 At the same meeting, Madeleine Albright, President Clinton’s secretary of state, also cast the conflict as one between reason and unreason. “But science,” she said, “does not support the ‘Frankenfood’ fears of some, particularly outside the United States, that biotech foods or other products will harm human health.”53 Both speakers, from different political parties, enlisted science as their ally in defending biotechnology against its critics. This invocation of scientific authority in support of technological innovation is a marker of America’s commitment to a particular ideology of technoscientific progress.54 A look across the ocean at contemporaneous UK debates on biotechnology helps bring into relief the ideological dimensions of the American position. The term “Frankenfood” was widely used in the British tabloid press to reflect and, some said, reinforce public anxieties. But concerns were not restricted to the media and the ignorant public. The British scientific community had all along expressed greater uncertainty about the safety of GM crops than its American counterpart, particularly with respect to the environmental consequences of commercial use.55 These doubts led British experts to reject the official U.S. position that the process of genetic modification carries no special risks; all that matters for regulatory purposes is the end product. Scientific and public opinion in Britain united behind a more cautious approach, demanding more experimentation—for example, through farm-scale trials56— before authorizing the commercialization of GM crops. As doubts intensified, Tony Blair’s government decided on a highly unusual three-pronged review of the science, economics, and public acceptability of these products to reevaluate the case for their introduction.57 The immediate outcome of this process was a decision to approve the commercialization of only one variety of GM corn, at least to start. Thus, while American neoliberalism treated biotechnology as just another stream of products, adequately controlled by the market except for assessments of their safety to human health and the environment, Britain’s more cautious and communitarian political culture granted the public some say in deciding which products they wanted to allow into the market. Whereas consultative procedures such as Britain’s GM debate and referenda in countries such as Denmark and Switzerland sought to defuse public opposition, elsewhere legal sanctions were employed to beat down what biotechnology promoters saw as unacceptable acts of intransigence. Thus, demonstrators such as José Bové who destroyed GM crops were prosecuted for damaging property in several countries. At the international level, the United States brought a case against the EU at the WTO for imposing an allegedly illegal moratorium on the importation of GM crops and foods. Foundational to the U.S. case was the argument that there were no good scientific reasons for keeping these products off the European market, and that the moratorium therefore amounted to illegal protectionism.58 Intellectual property law, too, has been invoked in safeguarding the investments made by multinationals such as Monsanto in GM crops. Particularly interesting were the prosecutions brought against farmers in the United States and Canada who were found to be growing GM crops patented by Monsanto without a license. In the best known of these cases, a seventy-three-year-old Saskatchewan farmer named Percy Schmeiser was sued for growing genetically modified Roundup Ready canola, which he claimed had blown into his fields from neighboring farms. A 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld Monsanto’s patent infringement claim, saying that Schmeiser’s unlicensed use of seed containing Monsanto’s patented gene was sufficient to constitute infringement.59 In a Solomonic turn, though, the Court awarded no damages to Monsanto, on the ground that Schmeiser had not benefited economically from his unlawful act; equally, Schmeiser was not required to pay Monsanto’s court costs. The case warned GM crop producers that, under Canadian law, they would have a difficult time collecting damages for patent infringement; at the same time, they could be subject to potentially unlimited liability if their seeds accidentally contaminated, and thus damaged, the products of certified GM-free organic farms.