Cyber threats are political tools to increase the money received by cyber companies- the result is a corrupt industry that overhypes security risks
Pascal Brangetto, and Mari Kert-Saint Aubyn in 2015
Economic Aspects of National Cyber Security Strategies; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence;
Do we see the emergence of a cyber security industrial complex? Is it comparable to the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower was warning us against during the Cold War? Should we worry? Companies providing cyber security services are making money, as there is a¶ real market worth billions of dollars. Drawing from older examples, there are¶ some real concerns that governments may not be getting what they need for¶ the money they spend. For example, the US Government spent $1 billion on HP¶ telling the Navy what it did on information architecture overhaul and system¶ integration. This is the problem of the revolving door: it is difficult to trust the¶ expertise when people are worrying more about their future job than about¶ national interest. There is also the apt aphorism about the perfect weapon (for¶ example, the case the B-1 bomber) that has 435 parts – one for each¶ congressional district. A third of billboards on the Washington subway advertise¶ defence industries, including cyber security firms.¶ The ideas of ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ and ‘cyber war’ have been around for a while,¶ used or derided by public figures, but they are clearly serving the interests of¶ cyber security companies. For instance, the private sector is interested in the¶ hack-back capability that a company like Crowdstrike can provide. They also¶ help them deploy honeynets of their own, assist them in the intelligence¶ gathering effort in order to find out who exactly is the attacker. Endgame is¶ probably selling zero-day exploits despite statements to the contrary; there are¶ a number of countries that are buying. Another phenomenon is the porosity¶ between the policy-makers’ world and the corporate world. Everyone sits on¶ everyone’s board. For example, Richard Perle helped establish Palantir in the¶ intelligence community. While, speaking of security rackets, Tiversa is a¶ company which scans P2P networks looking for private files and subsequently¶ offer protection for these files.¶ On another note, can we really frame this issue by declaring ‘private good,¶ public bad’ – ‘innovativeness and efficiency vs. capture and waste’? There can¶ always be the argument in favour of ‘blue skies’ research that might find an¶ immediate application, but some innovations are generated by the cyber¶ security industry. However, can this be sustainable without massive investment?¶ Brand names are established and it is very hard to enter the market. There have¶ been large-scale IT transformations with mergers, and large corporations can be¶ as bad as public sector.¶ The cyber security industry is a bonanza for arms producers. In Europe,¶ traditional security companies are expanding into the cyber security market via¶ acquisitions and partnerships (e.g. BAE and Detica). States are investing in cyber¶ security and companies are making use of their long-term good relationship¶ with states. The defence market is characterised as a monopsony and oligopoly,¶ and the Iron Triangle is also at work here. Critical information infrastructures¶ are largely privately owned and states do not have the capabilities to protect¶ them.¶ The arms market and the cyber security market have several common features:¶ security is a public good; there is a need for trust between the government and¶ the companies providing security; fear is often used as a legitimation of public¶ security policies; and there is an interest in sophisticated tools for both attack¶ and defence. But there are also differences: cyber security is usually not about¶ violence; the structure and composition of the markets are drastically different;¶ and states have to work with the wider ICT industry to make their products safer¶ by design, rather than only with security companies to fix the problems.