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The 1ac’s struggle for technological expansion is a means of extending US imperialism to contain and dominate china—this leads to indirect forms of war

Chen ’21 (David Chen, PhD student in the Department of Sociology at the University of Toronto; December 2020, “Rethinking Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class: China, the United States, and Twenty-First Century Imperialist Rivalry”, Guilford Press Periodicals, https://guilfordjournals.com/doi/10.1521/siso.2021.85.1.82 DOA 6/26/22)//nm

The Sino–U. S. struggle for high-tech supremacy and the U. S. plan to torpedo China’s state-initiated program, “Made in China 2025,” which aimed to push the Chinese economy up the global value chain, is suspected to be the real reason behind the Huawei prosecution (Tabeta and Kawanami, 2018) and for the trade war (Zhou and Wang, 2019). President Donald Trump, for example, has frankly admitted when speaking to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chair Ajit Pai, “We cannot allow any other country to out-compete the United States in this powerful industry of the future. We are leading by so much in so many different industries of that type, and we just can’t let that happen. The race to 5G is a race America must win” (U. S. White House, 2019). The U. S.’ attempted takedown of Huawei therefore signifies a larger battle for high-tech supremacy between the two countries: one is positioned as the Lockean heartland hegemon and the other as a Hobbesian contender state challenging a weakened American hegemon (van der Pijl, 1998). The technology war and the trade war have unveiled a larger geopolitical and geoeconomic contest. The United States’ Pivot to Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are two grand strategies being used to counter one another. The Pivot to Asia is a foreign strategy first developed under the Obama administration to target the emerging China by shifting the geographical focus from the Middle East to East Asia, which constitutes economic as well as 86 SCIENCE & SOCIETY political–military means. The U. S. government has planned to deploy 60% of its naval power to Asian and Pacific regions by 2020 (Shifrinson, 2018; Wang, 2016). The military reinforcement parallels arms sales to Taiwan, ongoing navy presence in South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, soaring military budgets, and improving state relations and deepening military cooperation with China’s neighboring countries. The economic arm, in contrast, has been exercised in a less coherent but increasingly forceful way with the regime change from Obama to Trump. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) previously constituted an essential part of the Pivot to Asia, which, by building one of the most massive free trade zones in history, was also seen by the United States and its allies as a geopolitical weapon to curb China’s rise (Harvey, 2018, 161). The TPP therefore aimed to exclude rather than to engage China (de Graaff and van Apeldoorn, 2018; Yu, 2017). Robinson (2017) cannot be more mistaken when citing the TPP as a victory of transnational capital rather than an indicator of an escalated Sino–U. S. geopolitical struggle. The TPP was dropped by the Trump administration and yet the Sino–U. S. geopolitical struggle did not cease thereafter; instead, it has been carried out on other fronts, which involves more head-to-head combat. The mounting trade war and technology war (with Huawei being at the center of the storm) are important examples of the increasingly naked confrontation. Even though the Pivot to Asia is not a new invention but more a continuation of the long-term U. S. policies to engage and simultaneously to contain China (Rachman, 1996; Wang, 2016), it does show signs of growing hawkishness in the U. S.’ China policy: from a rather minimal containment approach to comprehensive containment (Etzioni, 2016). Similarly, China’s BRI (complemented by the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB]) was launched with both economic and political–military ambitions. The BRI project was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the sequential foundation of the AIIB to allocate support funds for the project (Yu, 2017). It can be seen as a new development as well as a continuation of China’s previous efforts — with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, for instance — to deepen its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence (Womack, 2013; Yu, 2017). On the one hand, the BRI is aimed to cope with the country’s economic challenges, such as overcapacity, growing energy dependence, and economic slowdown, by GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL 87 reconstructing the ancient (land and maritime) Silk Roads that allow Chinese capital and products to go westward: a land road traversing through central Asia and the Middle East to reach Europe, and a sea route spanning the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean (Shambaugh, 2018). Such an economic corridor is expected to include over 60 countries and regions and “is believed to be the world’s most promising economic zone” (Wang, 2016, 456), which would act as a counterbalance to the TPP. On the other hand, the BRI was also launched with a political– military objective: to act against the geopolitical dimension of the Pivot to Asia by expanding China’s regional influence and deepening economic integration with its neighboring countries through infrastructure building and cross-border trade (Shambaugh, 2018). Infrastructure modernization projects that link other Asian countries with China will foster not only economic interconnections but also political exchanges, which can help reiterate China’s win-win notion that stresses the country’s peaceful rise (Womack, 2013). The BRI therefore is rooted as part of China’s geopolitical strategy to renovate relations with its neighbors that deteriorated over the past decade (Wang, 2016; Yu, 2017). At the least, it is hoped to ameliorate the tensions and concerns regarding China’s rapid military expansion, including its island building in the South China Sea which is also claimed by other countries, ballooning defense budgets, ambitious navy modernization project, and threat of using armed force against Taiwan.

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