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Research practices should frame your ballot—the 1AC’s militarist assumptions trade off with the educational value of critical reflection in security politics

Bellanova ’20 (Rocco Bellanova, Assistant Professor Critical Data Studies at University of Amsterdam, holds a double PhD in Political & Social Sciences and in Law, which has been awarded in 2014 by the Université Saint-Louis-Bruxelles and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel; 12/14/20, “Taking the trouble: science, technology and security studies”, Critical Studies on Security, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21624887.2020.1839852?needAccess=true DOA 6/24/22)//nm

The riches of STS We propose that one way to take the trouble is focusing on the devices, technologies, objects, knowledge and materialities that shape security. Notably, we want to highlight that understanding ever-evolving technologies and their applications requires security scholars to go beyond disciplinary boundaries. History, ethics, law, computer sciences and media studies all bring valuable perspectives to the study of security politics. Deploying resources from other disciplines pushes the researcher away from that which feels comfortable and towards new modes of thinking, new analytical distinctions and new conceptual apparatuses. Illustrative of this is the rich literature from various security scholars who have already looked to STS when developing new analytical approaches to issues ranging from drones (Leander 2013) to stoves (Abdelnour and Saeed 2014). Our invitation, of course, does not mean abandoning CSS, but provokes an ongoing questioning of its dynamics and ontological and philosophical underpinnings. Therefore, it does imply a commitment to being curious about the value of approaching the study of security through a new lens, as a way to gain appreciation of additional dimensions. Ultimately, this brings the risk of becoming even further detached from more orthodox understandings of what IR and security studies are expected to be, what they should be concerned with, and which conceptual terms are useful. Yet, such an apprehension would be not dissimilar to the suspicions advanced by scholars like Stephen Walt (1991, 213) with respect to the programme of ‘broadening the notion of “security” to include topics such as poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like.’ Moreover, a object-driven transdisciplinary journey may trigger worries about CSS consistency. We believe the contributions to this Special Issue demonstrate how these conceptual, empirical and methodological troubles are troubles worth taking Acknowledging that science and technology are core aspects of security studies shows great promise. This is different from claiming that science and technology are de facto more important today than a few decades ago. Rather it means that recent technological developments like the internet (Carr 2015; Herrera 2002), cybersecurity (Dunn Cavelty 2013; Fichtner 2018) and new weapons (Boyle 2013; Huelss 2019) require that we pay attention to their (in)security politics. However, not all technology-focused research in security studies takes its inspiration from STS, and nor do all studies of security technologies and the intersection of science and (in)security take place within the field of security studies. In fact, STS scholars have had a long-standing concern with providing analyses of security practices and objects. For instance, in her contribution Lucy Suchman (2020) engages with Donald MacKenzie’s (1990, 4) work on the ‘invention of accuracy’ of ballistic nuclear missiles, to unpack the discursive and practical effects of the increased automation of warfare. She thus demonstrates the value of engaging with an STS literature that, despite focusing on security, to date remains little known and mobilised by security scholars. In their chapter focusing on STS research on security practices, Kathleen Vogel et al. (2017) emphasise the increasing attention to knowledge (and non-knowledge) practices as well as the challenges of carrying out STS-informed research in the field of security. Unfortunately, STS researchers studying security pay only marginal attention to research carried out by critical security studies scholars (Evans, Leese, and Rychnovská 2020). Similarly, CSS has thus far shown limited interest and engagement with STS research focusing on security practices. Besides STS works explicitly focusing on (in)security, we insist that STS has a lot to bring to the study of security politics. CSS researchers already acknowledge STS as a rich source of concepts and ontological approaches, but some of this work forgets the diverse ‘genealogies of STS’ (Jasanoff 2012). To put it bluntly, CSS has fallen prey to a narrow focus on Latourianism, which has collapsed STS as a whole into Actor-Network Theory (ANT), with the latter being understood primarily as the work of a single author, that is, Bruno Latour (1987, 2005). Latour’s work has indeed marked most of the ‘new materialist’ turn mentioned above (Salter and Walters 2016). Our suggestion to read STS beyond Latour is not to put into question the value of ANT for the study of (in)security practices. As Pieter Lagerwaard (2020) demonstrates in his contribution, there is still much to be gained in engaging with Latour’s works and ANT more generally (cf. also Bellanova 2017), and to connect them with work on ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer 1989). But the success of ANT within CSS risks failing to appreciate the differences and divergences within ANT (Latour 1999; Law and Hassard 1999) and across diverse STS approaches (Bijker and Law 1992). Importantly, it also risks missing the chance to take the trouble to engage with, and thus discover, the heuristic and political potential of many other approaches such as feminist and post-colonial technoscience (see Hayles 1999; Harding 2009), those exploring the co-production of science and society (Jasanoff 2004) as well as work on the social construction of technology (Bijker 1995) and the design and deployment of large technological systems (Hughes 1987). The conceptual exchange The growing interest of STS in IR is also due to the fact that it speaks to adjacent trends. These trends include an emphasis on the socio-political significance of the seemingly mundane (Guillaume and Huysmans 2018; Lisle and Johnson 2019), the conditions of possibility for politics and contestation (Mandelmaum, Friis Kristensen, and Athanassiou 2016; Monsees 2019), and the need for creative methods and deeper methodological reflection (Aradau et al. 2015; Naumes 2015). Recent conceptual exchange with IR also places an emphasis on those entanglements (Bellanova and Fuster 2013; Voelkner 2011) and processes (Jackson and Nexon 1999; Passoth and Rowland 2010) that create both the ‘state’ and the ‘international’, which make them look like frictionless wholes. Advancing existing work that draws on STS to emphasise ‘entanglements’, Rothe’s article (2020) shows how these insights are useful in developing an analytical framework through which to better appreciate local entanglements that partly consist of technology, in his case, explored through the case of jellyfish-killer robots. Rune Saugmann (2020) discusses in his contribution how entanglements joining cameras, the police, media and audiences play out in different contexts, demonstrating how the assumed factuality of pictures can be contested. This leads him to explore what it means to make claims about the agency of the digital camera. Saugmann thereby contributes to a long-standing debate in STS on the question of agency of objects. Although these questions have also been discussed in IR (Hoijtink and Leese 2019, Lindskov Jacobsen and Monsees 2019), Saugmann’s original contribution highlights the need to think about what it means politically to talk about digital cameras’ agency. Indeed, methodological insights stemming from STS have been used to analyse world politics beyond the realm of science and technology. As contributions to this Special Issue demonstrate, STS can be of value for a range of themes not primarily associated with STS such as disinformation (Monsees 2020) or financial regulations (Lagerwaard 2020). What emerges from reading across the diverse contributions to this Special Issue is that the relation between researchers and research objects is of special concern when we take the trouble to analyse the roles of science and technology in security practices (see also de Goede 2020). Besides seeking new ways of politicising, critiquing and raising novel questions, it is also important to emphasise that ‘taking the trouble’ to engage with STS also enables us to see different things that can then be politicised and explored critically – for example, the use of tweets as evidence in court cases (Anwar 2020), or the role of roadblocks and prisons in intervention practices (Schouten 2019; Lindskov Jacobsen 2020), to name but a few. The relation between researchers and research objects can be best understood as a dynamic process that starts with our research apparatus (methods). Such an understanding invites us to better conceptualise the politics that are at stake in our research and to clarify what practices we are examining, if not directly partaking in, through our research. The contributions to this Special Issue all highlight that the encounter between STS and CSS affects our methods, politics and practices – i.e., the perspective we choose, how we do research, and with which consequences. Studying security politics and practices requires methodological reflections, especially in contexts where secrecy and unknowns are constitutive of the dominant security and surveillance practices (Balmer 2012; de Goede, Bosma, and Pallister-Wilkins 2019; Walters 2015). As a result, this Special Issue is not only relevant because of its analysis of timely empirical issues – like disinformation, terror financing and terror fighting – but also because it fosters debate about methodological questions and what kind of trouble is caused by deploying authors and concepts from STS. In different ways, these articles demonstrate how taking the trouble with STS and thinking with STS enriches our methodologies and modes of critical scholarship. Two contributions in particular explicitly show how engaging with STS insights adds to ongoing debates about doing critique in critical security studies (Austin, Bellanova, and Kaufmann 2019; Berling and Bueger 2017; Koddenbrock 2014). de Goede (2020) invites us to think of the ‘practice’ of critique as a form of ‘communing,’ which for Stengers means ‘participating in an ongoing, adventurous, unguaranteed, but generative process of making sense in common’ (Stengers 2019, 18, cited in de Goede 2020). Suchman (2020) demonstrates how technoscientific claims about accuracy presented as evidence of an ethical approach to warfare are fallacious, and that their core function is legitimating further violence.

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