Realist theory is wrong- cyber power will not transform traditional power dynamics. Full blown cyber war is not a threat.
Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age (e-ir.info)) PB
As a theory mostly concerned with issues of national security and power, realism would appear to be the instinctive international relations perspective for understanding cyber conflict. Our analysis suggests that realism does remain a relevant framework for identifying important security-related issues in the cyber domain and can sometimes provide useful insights about some enduring characteristics of international relations. However, realist theories about conflict often fall substantially short in explaining the unique dynamics of cyber conflict. In many ways, the cyber domain resembles a realist world with its anarchical nature and lack of institutional governance where states fear one another and develop their capabilities in response. Yet, it is unclear whether cyber arms races are likely to escalate into cyber conflict. Realism also raises interesting questions about cyber power, about who possesses it, and how it relates to international stability. In terms of whether cyber power will transform traditional power dynamics, the evidence suggests this is not the case. The trend we have seen thus far has been restrained from full-blown cyber war in favour of less destructive forms of cyber interactions. The offense-defence balance is the clearest example of a realist theory being used to explain the cyber domain, but it appears empirically inaccurate in its assumptions about the cyber domain and its predictions about cyber conflict. Real-world cases of cyber conflict suggest the offense is not as easy as is often assumed and the fact that we have not seen much cyber conflict suggest the theory is misplaced. Importing the notion of deterrence from the nuclear era is furthermore ill-judged and makes little sense in the context of the reality of cyber weapons.