Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Realism’s misreadings are rooted in the desire to strengthen power politics and are justified in the name of self-interest

HARTMUT BEHR and AMELIA HEATH in 2009

Professor of International Politics at Newcastle University (UK) and specializes in political theory, sociology of knowledge of the discipline of IR

Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neorealism, Review of International Studies / Volume 35 / Issue 02 / April 2009, pp 327 349

DOI: 10.1017/S0260210509008547

The results from our analysis can be summarised and further developed as follows: We recognise that Morgenthau’s theory cannot be understood as a general theory; also, the assumption of international anarchy cannot be traced back to Morgenthau. Furthermore, it remains a currently open question why both neo-realists and their critics hold this association with Morgenthau. Finally, we argue that classical ‘realism’ has to be understood as a historically contingent way of thinkingwhich intends to provide answers to distinct historical circumstances of world politics. The time of Morgenthau was a time of ideologies and of hubristic and apocalyptic national power politics. Reacting to these challenges creates, and perpetuates, his support of power politics. Apart from that, however, Morgenthau’s normative demands aim at the creation of international law and organisations as well at the strengthening of supranational ethics. Thus, according to Morgenthau any conduct of international politics is and has to be ‘realist’ (only) insofar as it acknowledges contingent historical circumstances and develops respective practical imperatives. Morgenthau explicitly expressed this political ambition in the editions of Politics Among Nations published after 1948. Considering the notion of ideology, he writes: The nation that dispensed with ideologies and frankly stated that it wanted power and would, therefore, oppose similar aspirations of other nations, would at once find itself at a great, perhaps decisive, disadvantage in the struggle for power. That frank admission would, on the other hand, unite the other nations in fierce resistance to a foreign policy so unequivocally stated and would thereby compel the nation pursuing it to employ more power than would otherwise be necessary.70 Ideology or counter-ideology is therefore necessary and justified against the horrors of totalitarianism and fascism and, in his view, the naïve policies of appeasement. This book was indeed, and could be nothing else but, a frontal attack [. . .] [Morgenthau addresses here the appeasement policy towards Hitler and the idealistic ‘democratic-peace’- vision of Woodrow Wilson as well as the Fascist and Stalinist ideologies; the authors]. It had to be as radical on the side of its philosophy as had been the errors on the other side. With that battle largely won, the polemical purpose can give way to the consolidation of a position that no longer needs to be attained, but only to be defended and adapted to new experiences.71 But the battle continued, and the neo-realist production of ideologies relied uponmisunderstood ‘realist’ assumptions in order to conceptualise, promote andstrengthen national power politics, now with new targets and against a new enemy (the Soviet Union and communism). The graveness and idiosyncrasy of the above analysed misreadings, including the biased selectivity of their readings, seems onlycomprehensible as an attempt to formulate and justify a new political ideology,namely that of US foreign policy during the Cold War. This effort is accompaniedby an ideologisation of political thought, which seems to have become soinfluential and manifest in a disciplinary canon that – with a few exceptions – eventhe critics of neo-realism have not revealed these misreadings, but instead haveperpetuated them. This is probably the reason why some of those misreadings have found their way in most of our up-to-date textbooks and introductions.72 Indeed, a plethora of neo-realists became cooks in the ‘kitchen of power’.73 Theinitial ‘realist’ idea of a temporary political counter-ideology against the apocalypses of nationalism and fascist and Stalinist ideology has developed into aself-contained ideology of ‘national interest’ which has separated the theorems of (Morgenthau’s) ‘realism’ from its original understanding of historical contingency. In an emerging epoch of scientism when political science in general and International Relations in particular have borrowed their epistemologies frompositivistic natural sciences and economy (Waltz is an outstanding example of this), ‘realist’ (though falsely) and neo-realist theorems have become perceived asscientific laws in order to deduce axioms for political conduct as well as strategicpredictions of future developments. Waltz’s perception of patriotism complements this observation: The rationality of the state, which domestically acts in case of doubt as an authoritarian power state and homogenises political differences, dictates to oppress opinions, movements and individuals opposing the national interest. Foreign policy elites have come to define political rationality in theirinterest and to protect those interests as some objective raison d’état. The domestic production of political homogeneity occurs through instruments of the power state, like media control. A poignant example can be seen in the historical defence of national interests in maintaining the Cold War rationale or the run up to a specific war.74 This rationality of foreign policy has little, if no, relation with democratic practice: neither in decision-making, its legitimisation, nor in its policy implementation.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.