NATO adoptions gender policy to insulate itself from criticism and to serve pre-existing militarist agendas
Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19
Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 55-58. LJS
The first iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy is a brief document. It acts more as a normative aspiration for what NATO can achieve through engagement with the WPS agenda, rather than as a detailed policy action plan. It quotes verbatim from NATO’s foundational values outlined in The Washington Treaty, and is presented as a tool to promote ‘democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (NATO, 2007). The policy focuses primarily on operational aspects, with the intention that further work would take place to identify the wider applicability of WPS. Specifically, it calls for NATO Military Authorities to take the lead in developing practical proposals for engagement with the agenda. The broader context is key to understanding the operational focus. At this time, the NATOled ISAF Operation was in a particularly difficult stage as a result of Taliban insurgency (Johnson and Mason, 2007). There was an emerging realisation that gender was key to understanding Afghanistan, and there was a need to engage the whole population. This was evidenced in the deployment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012). The additional need to improve dialogue among a wide pool of contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 598) provided another incentive for NATO’s engagement with WPS. This also contributes to explaining the centrality of partners to NATO’s engagement with WPS. WPS offered a shared starting point for NATO to foster a ‘community of practice’ with partners (Wagnsson, 2011: 598). The 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 was never intended as a transformative document, rather it was intended as a catalyst for further engagement with gender as an operational imperative. It took four years for the NATO/EAPC Policy to be revised and extended. The 2011 version moves beyond a narrow focus on operational issues. It outlines a six-track approach for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This includes a commitment to mainstream WPS across policies, programmes and documentation in order to benefit the ‘daily work of the organisation, its staff and committees’ (NATO, 2011). WPS is also outlined as a means to foster cooperation with international organisations and civil society, including ‘exchanges of information, best practices and expertise, as well as practical cooperation’ (NATO, 2011). This supports and extends Enloe’s (1983) conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect to gender, sharing lessons among member states on the integration of women into NATO Forces. Here, we see NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ extending to include other actors, as well as relating to WPS specifically (Wright, 2016). It also demonstrates the ‘added value’ of WPS for NATO as a means to bring in civil society, a group of actors the alliance had previously not sought meaningful engagement with (Mayer, 2008: 117). As well as other international organisations, such as the EU, which while NATO has had a long-standing ‘strategic’ partnership with, it has been beset with ‘long-standing political blockages’ (Smith and Gebhard, 2017: 305). The understanding of both women’s bodies, and a gender perspective as a means to support operational effectiveness supports the broader context against which this policy was adopted. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, where gender (or women) became beneficial in rhetoric, doctrine and practice (Dyvik, 2013: 412), contributed both to NATO’s engagement with WPS but also supported a very particular understanding of gender (Wright, 2016: 356). Of particular note, is the aim for WPS ‘to become an integral and complementary part of NATO’s corporate identity’ (NATO, 2011c). This is interesting in two respects. First, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 is implied as something a ‘good’ institution would do and frames NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as a means to bolster perceptions of NATO. Second, it goes against the intentions of the feminist activists who supported the realisation of UNSCR 1325 in the Security Council, with the Resolution intended to challenge, rather than support the militarism NATO embodies (see discussion in Chapter 1). The alliance has a track record of instrumentalising gendered narratives, and specifically targeting women. For example, the use of symbols of women’s liberation to demonstrate the superiority of Western countries during the Cold War (Risso, 2009: 509). More recently and following the adoption of the 2011 NATO/EAPC Policy, the alliance’s showcase digital diplomacy initiative to commemorate the draw-down of NATO-led forces from Afghanistan in 2014, titled Return to Hope, instrumentalised Afghan women to ‘sell’ NATO’s intervention to publics back home. The narratives included also supported a very particular gender understanding of the intervention and were underpinned by a masculinist protection logic (Wright, 2019: 10). At the same time as NATO had publicly committed to integrating WPS concerns into public diplomacy, a core part of the agenda being the better representation of women, we see women marginalised from a key public diplomacy initiative (Wright, 2019: 11). The 2011 NATO/EAPC Policy also endorses national initiatives to promote women’s participation their armed forces. This situates UNSCR 1325 within NATO’s long-established concern with the status of women in NATO Forces, formalised in the recognition of the CWINF in 1976 and discussed in Chapter 4. Some feminist advocates of WPS have been critical of this association, critiquing the motivation as stemming not from NATO’s support for gender equality, but to support pre-existing objectives to modernise and professionalise NATO Forces (Cockburn, 2011). Three years later, the 2014 NATO/EAPC Policy represented a significant development in NATO’s approach to WPS. This was reflected in the creation of the of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS in 2012 who became the figurehead for NATO’s engagement with WPS (discussed below). Most pertinently, there is a shift away from the emphasis in previous policies on the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 to bolster NATO’s existing agendas, to a focus on how NATO can support the broader WPS agenda. For example, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is framed ‘within the context of NATO’s wider policy objectives core tasks’, rather than as an add-on. The policy also applies for the first time to NATO’s own human resource policies (civilian and military), stating that ‘gender balance within our institutions is a goal in itself, and is also a means for improving performance’ (NATO, 2014a). In addition, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are also strengthened and provide greater transparency to enable outside scrutiny of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, with the NATO/EAPC Action Plan being released publicly for the first time (see discussion below). The latest iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy was released in autumn 2018. It is the first revision of the policy to have been formally consulted on with external actors through the Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP) established formally in 2016 (NATO, 2016a). NATO has previously been an outlier among international institutions because it has had no formal mechanisms to consult civil society in the policy-making process. CSAP therefore represents a significant change. The 2018 NATO/EAPC Policy also calls for NATO to develop ‘specific mechanisms to prevent and respond to SEA’ because ‘it causes disproportionate harm to women and girls and undermines NATO’s credibility and operational’ (NATO/EAPC, 2018). This is a significant development and could be an example of NATO seeking to reflect on how WPS relates to its own structures and practices. NATO Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 Beyond policy commitment, the actual implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policies on UNSCR 1325 has remained a key challenge for NATO. To support this, NATO has mobilised corresponding action plans with practical tasks assigned to institutional actors. In 2010, the first Action Plan was adopted by the NAC (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5), and was intended ‘to provide an overall framework for NATO’s practical implementation of the Resolutions with its Partners’ (NATO, 2011). This is referenced in the 2011 revision of the NATO/EAPC Policy, which includes provision for monitoring and accountability mechanisms. The stakeholders involved in the Action Plan are the International Staff, IMS, NATO Military Authorities, and member and partner states. However, this is all the information available on this version of the implementation plan because it remained classified due to the sensitive and operation-specific information it contained (NATO Official, 2014). This meant it was not a document which could be used to hold NATO to account for its implementation of the WPS agenda. Since the NATO/EAPC Policy was revised in 2014, the accompanying Action Plan has been made public and also included Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5). This increased transparency is welcome and brings NATO into line with the global approach to WPS which has seen 79 states adopt public-facing National Action Plans (PeaceWomen, 20184). However, it is far from practical for an international security institution, where, particularly in regards to operations, a level of secrecy is necessary. For practical reasons in certain areas, NATO Officials may therefore need to develop an additional classified and more detailed action plan (NATO Official, 2014). On the surface, the 2016 NATO/EAPC Action Plan seems to support the increased representation of women in NATO. One of the core outcomes is the ‘improved gender balance at all levels at NATO allies and partners’ defence and security institutions’. Yet, if we dig a little deeper into this statement, we find it omits mention of the representation of women within the International Staff or IMS. So, while increasing the representation of women in allies’ own forces, if realised, is likely to have some trickle-down impact on gender balance within delegations to NATO and staff seconded from member and partner states, it will not address the gender imbalance among those employed directly by the alliance. The gender imbalance within NATO should be a pressing issue for the alliance given its stated commitment to the WPS agenda. The 2018 NATO/EAPC Action Plan seems to offer a significant development then. It commits NATO under its pillar of ‘inclusiveness’ to ‘Map the obstacles and implement activities to increase the number of women in NATO, especially in leadership roles’ (NATO/ EAPC, 2018). Yet NATO has not released figures on gender balance at NATO HQ since 2012, an important part of achieving this aim is to provide transparency and therefore accountability on this issue. This indicates it is not a high priority for NATO and therefore an issue with considerable political sensitivities among the allies.