NATO’s militarism serves to reinforce violent gendered and racialized logics—FETs prove
Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19
Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Gendering NATO’s core tasks Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 112-115. LJS
The conclusion is that – as NATO goes global, women are a critical asset for NATO’s new missions.… Particularly in certain cultural contexts, like in Afghanistan, female troops and mixed-gender units are essential toGendering NATO’s core tasks 113 carrying out such tasks as house searches, or establishing ties with the local population. As former CWINF Chair, Lieutenant Colonel Kristin Lund draws attention to above, as NATO became a crisis management organisation, military women became essential operational assets (NATO, 2004). NATO defines crisis management as ‘military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crisis – before, during and after conflicts’. Three years before NATO produced a policy on WPS, the 2004 CWINF conference outcomes included a call for the greater involvement of women in NATO militaries as ‘force multipliers’ (NATO, 2004). So, while NATO’s later engagement with UNSCR 1325, WPS and a gender perspective (as discussed in Chapter 5) would further articulate the ‘added value’ of women, WPS did not provide the impetus. Rather, WPS has mapped onto NATO’s pre-existing concern with women and in NATO Forces, and NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan came in December 2001 with the creation of the ISAF. This was to become NATO’s largest and most challenging crisis management operation to-date. Until the draw-down of forces December 2014, over 51 states drawn from NATO members and partners contributed to the mission (NATO, 2018). The complexities of the conflict saw gender (or women) become central to Western understandings of Afghanistan (Daulatzai, 2008) and shaped NATO’s subsequent engagement with the WPS agenda (Wright, 2016: 356). Gender, or specifically women, became beneficial not just in rhetorical justifications for the action, but in both doctrine and practice to population-centric counterinsurgency (Dyvik, 2013: 412). For example, the gendering of counterinsurgency through the use of FETs became part of efforts to sell the intervention to a war-fatigued audience framing it as a ‘gentler (feminine) option’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 200). We return to this when we discuss the gender perspective ‘in action’ in Chapter 5. FETs are far from representative of the experience of women in NATO Forces. Nevertheless, FETs captured the imaginaries of the media and broader public, as this Daily Mail headline exemplifies: ‘The British Army’s secret weapon in Afghanistan? It’s the seven female officers in Helmand Province gaining the trust of the locals’ (Daily Mail, 2012). FETs have also caught the attention of NATO, for example, the NCGP has continued to address the issue at conferences, despite their decreasing use (e.g. in 2004, 2018). Academia has also become fixated upon FETs, contributing to their exceptionalising, and leading the Navy War College in a call for papers for its regular academic conference on WPS to ban papers addressing them (US Naval War College, 2018). In operations, including in Afghanistan, FETs have been used to engage and ‘win over’ local women, or the half of the population out of reach to male soldiers. They were developed by the UK, US and others. However, ISAF forces also formed informal FETs drawn from ‘tactical and provincial reconstruction teams, civil affairs forces and agribusiness development teams’ (Holliday, 2012). Despite this, many of these efforts remained ‘ad hoc and disorganized and114 Gendering NATO’s core tasks training and employment are not standardized’ (Holliday, 2012). This is reinforced through the reflections of a former FET deployed in Afghanistan: ‘I couldn’t do anything for them,’ my medic told me. And I responded, ‘Neither could I.’ We were tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 12 months. Everything was temporary, except Afghanistan. Although we did other programmatic work like husbandry training and a literacy program, none were sustainable. Where there were few roads and doctors, we attempted to hand out pudding and toothpaste. When the next team came to replace us, their commander refused to conduct FET missions. (Ricks, 2016) Centralising gender in our analysis of FETs as a crisis management tool points to some of the broader implications of their use. As Mcbride and Wibben (2012: 211) found in their study of FETs, there was an irony that ‘their effectiveness is limited more by U.S. commanders than patriarchal Afghans’, leading them to question just ‘who is shielding their women from Afghan society more: Pashtun men or U.S. Commanders?’. Ultimately the deployment of FETs mobilised as a counterinsurgency tool rested on gendered and racialised logics. This is what Spivak originally articulated as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak quoted in Cooke, 2002). Here, this problematic reasoning has morphed to become ‘white women saving brown women from brown men’ (Cooke, 2002; Mcbride and Wibben, 2012). Gender and security in Afghanistan have been understood within a masculinist protection logic (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 414). As we argue in Chapter 1, a core part of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity is the projection of a masculinist protection role. Gendered norms become apparent when women join the military. This occurs as the ‘women soldiers’ subjectivity is formed against the norms of masculinity embedded in the organisation’ (Kronsell, 2012: 43). The increasing presence of women in the military therefore has the potential to be ‘disruptive’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2016: 12). Military women can be disruptive in the sense that their mere presence means the institution is no longer exclusively occupied by men’s bodies. But also in the sense that the perspective and presence of these women disrupt the masculine norms that pervade such institutions. The presence of women challenges the naturalness and invisibility of masculine norms; the relational nature of gender and the dominance of masculinity are therefore exposed. The use of women soldiers in FET roles brings this disruptive potential into question. In addition to their symbolism, FETs frame women as of ‘added value’ to the military, thus separating them from the homogenous military whole. Their use therefore is a potential obstacle to women into the military presenting a ‘disruption’ to established gender hierarchies and structures. For example, the foundation of military training is to strip a recruit’s individuality from them, making them an obedient part of the military whole and able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). Adding women because they are perceived to bring something different is problematic because it accentuates difference and rests upon the premise that the ‘different’ individuals can, and will, provide the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). In so doing, the existing majority is normalised and constructed ‘as homogenous and naturally associated with the organization’ (Kronsell, 2012: 67). Far from challenging the hegemonic masculinity militarism is built upon, the diversity argument reinforces an essentialist view of women as in opposition to the norm (Whitworth, 2004: 154). It also contradicts the foundation of military training, whereby recruit’s individuality is stripped from them so that they become part of an obedient military whole able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). The use of FETs fits a wider pattern of the recruitment of military women, where they are often assigned to particular, often times subordinate, roles (Mathers, 2013: 134).