Incorporating so-called feminist principles into inherently masculine institutions waters down feminist politics—WPS proves
Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19
Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 46-49. LJS
The realisation of UNCR 1325 was premised on a network of actors working both within UN structures and outside. Importantly, civil society were present through the NGO Working Group on WPS, an umbrella organisation which brought together interested NGOs to lobby for, draft and redraft the final Resolution (Hill, Aboitiz and Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2009: 1258–60). They envisaged the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 not as a tool to ‘make war safe for women’, but through acknowledging the different and disproportionate impact on women, and women’s role in conflict prevention and resolution (Cook, 2009: 126). The role of feminists, including those working through the NGO Working Group on WPS, meant UNSCR 1325 was championed as a ‘feminist achievement’ (Cockburn, 2011). Some later went onto question whether the Resolution was a ‘trick or treat’, arguing that despite some weaknesses, it should be seen as a new global gender norm in the making (Tryggestad, 2009: 552). More recently, and despite some progress in the adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs) to support the implementation of WPS, a growing cynicism has emerged in relation to its transformative potential (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 8). Member states, civil society, academics and critical actors within the UN itself were critical to the realisation of the Resolution. The formation of such a coalition of interested parties working together at the Security Council was unprecedented (Cockburn, 2011). Despite this, the politics of the Security Council meant certain compromises were necessary to realise the Resolution. This has resulted in silences and omission within the WPS agenda more broadly. It remains unclear if the lack of ‘feminist’ conceptualisations in policy can be attributed to a knowledge gap among those formulating policy (Cook, 2016: 22). Rather, given the diversity of the coalition supporting UNSCR 1325 it could be that even those fully equipped with sufficient understanding may struggle to get such language adopted because of wider institutional pressures or specific resistance (Cook, 2016: 22). For example, the NGO Working Group on WPS had feminist and anti-war members but they were not in the majority, there was therefore a lack of consensus on the extent to which UNSCR 1325 should challenge existing practices (Cohn, 2011: 12). As a result any discussion of the arms trade and militarism was off the agenda because some members found the topics ‘too political’ (Cohn, 2011: 12). As a result, there is an absence from UNSCR 1325 of the Security Council’s own responsibility within the UN Charter to support the establishment of arms regulations systems (Otto, 2004: 12). Another key silence is any mention of ending war, despite this being a foundational part of the Security Council’s brief (Cockburn, 2007: 147). These omissions and silences draw attention to the contradiction between the Security Council with an implicit support for a militarised interstate system, and the normative underpinnings of UNSCR 1325 on women in armed conflict. As Basu (2010: 289) argues, this dissonance has emerged precisely because of the challenges to women’s security which result from the current set-up of the international arena. The language of the WPS resolutions is also worth considering. UNSCR 1325 relies on comparatively weak language for a Security Council Resolution. This includes the repetition of ‘urges’, ‘encourages’ and ‘calls’, rather than stronger language demanding action from states (Tryggestad, 2009: 544). It also associated ‘gender’ with ‘women’, which means the calls for gender mainstreaming can be read as only applicable to the concerns of women. Gender is therefore transformed into a ‘safe idea’ for policy makers leaving behind its radical potential to produce change (Puechguirbal, 2010: 184). Gender also comes to signify a ‘need/want/lack’ (Shepherd, 2011: 515, 2008: 171–2). UNSCR 1325 also presents a victim-agent dichotomy. The Resolution frames women both as having ‘special needs’ and in need of protection in conflict situations, but also as agents ‘stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). For some, there is no contradiction here and it is possible to acknowledge both the disproportionate impact of war on women, while still ‘making women’s agency vibrantly visible’ (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004: 139). For others, the language of the Resolution has missed an opportunity to challenge myths that sustain beliefs about women’s helplessness in the face of sexual violence by also acknowledging their capacity to be agents of change (Otto, 2010: 117). UNSCR 1820 presents something of a shift away from this victim-agent understanding, and while UNSCR 1888 returns to the dual track approach, it does refer to civilians as victims of Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (CRSGBV), rather than women specifically (Shepherd, 2011). The passage of the WPS Resolutions through the Security Council has not always followed the same pattern as UNSCR 1325. In 2009 the next WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1820, was initiated by the US State Department, rather than civil society advocacy, and designed to complement the Bush Administration’s antitrafficking agenda (Otto, 2010: 109). However, the draft of the Resolution was leaked to NGOs who sought to respond critically in attempt to tone down the focus on women as powerless and vulnerable victims (Otto, 2010: 109). Unsurprisingly, UNSCR 1820 received a mixed reception from scholars and activists. Some welcomed it as a long overdue engagement by the Security Council with CRSGBV. Others criticised the resolution for reducing the broad scope of UNSCR 1325 and holistic nature of the WPS agenda to the issue of women as victims of war (Otto, 2010: 101; Cook, 2009b). In treating CRSGBV as a separate issue from violence against women in peacetime, there is a danger that the latter become normalised. Further, sensationalising sexual violence in war may reinforce the beliefs which make rape a powerful weapon of war (Cook, 2009b:48 The long view 129; Meger, 2016). Sam Cook (2009b: 129) argues that it is necessary to question the idea that experiencing sexual violence in conflict is the very worst thing that can happen to a woman and is unrecoverable from. This reinforces the notion that raping a woman in war is equivalent to ‘raping a nation’, with women seen as a resource, and closes down avenues to ending violence (Cook, 2009b: 129). The third WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1888 adopted in 2009, also addressed the issue of CRSGBV and was again sponsored by the US. However, the Obama administration sought to break from the Bush legacy on the issue (Otto, 2010: 110). The Resolution made a significant departure from UNSCR 1820 by treating the issue of CRSGBV as one of structural inequality, not women’s inherent vulnerability (Otto, 2010: 103). Five days after the adoption of UNSCR 1888, Vietnam sponsored the adoption of UNSCR 1889. The fourth WPS Resolution returned the focus of the WPS agenda to women’s participation, reinforcing and strengthening the provisions of UNSCR 1325 with measures to address women’s structural inequalities. UNSCR 1889 joined UNSCR 1325 in introducing new language acknowledging women as agents and displacing representations of women as victims (Otto, 2010: 103). In 2010, the adoption of UNSCR 1960 created a set of institutional tools to combat impunity and steps towards the prevention and protection from CRSGBV. Two further WPS Resolutions were passed by the Security Council in 2013: UNSCR 2016; and UNSCR 2122. UNSCR 2106, adopted in June, was proposed by the UK as part of their Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) and became the fourth resolution to focus on CRSGBV. As a result there was again concern that the WPS agenda had narrowed to focus on CRSGBV at the expense of women’s participation (Krause and Enloe, 2015: 329). The adoption of UNSCR 2122 in 2013, which acknowledged the salient role women do and should play in contributing towards sustainable peace, was therefore significant because it represented the return of the WPS agenda to its wider and more comprehensive origins (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015: 20). The Resolution also embodies the strongest language on women’s agency of all the WPS Resolutions (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014: 51). The penultimate WPS Resolution, UNSCR 2122’s focus on monitoring the implementation of the WPS agenda through increased briefings to the Security Council from various UN entities, represented a radical departure from previous WPS Resolutions (Shepherd, 2014: 22). The Resolution called on member states, regional actors and UN entities to review their existing implementation of the WPS agenda and revise existing targets in preparation for the High-Level Review mandated by the Resolution in 2015. In addition, the Secretary General commissioned a Global Study led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, former Special Representative of the Secretary- General on Children and Armed Conflict and former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. The study was intended to review the progress made towards achieving the goals set out in the WPS Resolutions and to outline a global policy agenda to inform WPS efforts going forward (UN Women, 2014).The long view 49 Fifteen years on from the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Spain sponsored the adoption of a further resolution, UNSCR 2242. This resolution is the most recent in the WPS framework and the main focus is a call for WPS to be a cross-cutting issue within the Countering Violence Extremism agenda. This is a departure from the recommendations of the Global Study on UNSCR 1325, which recommended that CVE be separated from women’s rights, noting that the instrumental use of women’s rights can be harmful in fragile situations (Wright, 2015). More positively, as Wright (2015) notes, UNSCR 2242 does call for research into the impact of CVE on women’s rights. In addition to CVE, UNSCR 2242 makes a number of other contributions to the WPS agenda. These include the creation of an Informal Expert Group on WPS at the UN Security Council (a recommendation of the Global Study) and a call for WPS to be incorporated into all country-specific situations on the Security Council’s agenda. As Table 2.1 points out, the WPS Resolutions can be broadly categorised into those addressing CRSGBV and those addressing WP. The CRSGBV Resolutions have been critiqued for being reductive in framing the rationale for women’s participation as a means to address CR-SGBV (Heathcote, 2018: 380). The paradigm also presents men from conflict-affected states as the perpetrators of CRSGBV, deflecting from the inadequacies within other ‘peacetime’ states’ approach to the issue (Heathcote, 2018: 380). CRSGBV is understood as the archetypal experience of women during conflict. As Heathcote (2018: 380) argues, this could deflect ‘attention from economic needs, Gender-based Violence and the role of gendered power relations in producing the myriad of gendered harms that communities experience’. As Meger (2016: 153) contends, this has resulted from the ‘securitization’ of CRSGBV which has entailed presenting the issue as a threat to the state with the assumption that restoring state authority and bringing perpetrators to justice will decrease CRSGBV. In separating CRSGBV from the broader continuum of violence against women, evident through peacetime and in conflict, women’s insecurity is not adequately addressed. UNSCR 1889 and UNSCR 2122 focus on substantive representation, developing further the call for women’s participation in UNSCR 1325. As Heathcote (2018: 381) cautions, while this is a welcome development it has also been accompanied by a shift to the use of indicators as a means to ‘measure’ the success of WPS. As she notes, indicators are never neutral or objective tools and there is a risk that WPS will become a means to count women, rather than to meaningfully address the ‘the substantive and structural disadvantages that hinder women’s full participation within any community’ (Heathcote, 2018: 381). UNSCR 1889 also lacks nuance in considering just which women are represented and assumes women are a homogenous group able to speak for all. Both Resolutions also fall back on emphasising the need to consult women’s civil society groups as a solution to WP, rather than considering how to promote women as decision makers (Heathcote, 2018: 380).