The perm is worse than the alt alone—NATO’s history of co-optation allows it to defang feminist demands and insulate itself from criticism
Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19
Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Gendering NATO’s core tasks Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 107-109. LJS
Feminist goals are always inherently vulnerable to co-option. This occurs when institutions use feminist rhetoric selectively ‘to promote their own agenda irrespective of the consequences for women’s lives’ (D’Costa and Lee-Koo, 2013: 2). Co-option as a practice ‘absorbs the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political priorities’ (von der Lippe, 2012: 19). On one level co-option occurs when these original feminist concepts interact with hegemonic strategic policy priorities and objectives, neutralising their transformative praxis (von der Lippe, 2012: 20). Our discussion in Chapter 5 on the meaning of a ‘gender perspective’ draws attention to this. However, the implications of cooption are arguably far more severe for feminist praxis when they are used as an alibi for neutralising positive action or opposition. This sees institutions ‘appropriate the language of advocacy in order to co-opt social movement resistance’ (True, 2003: 379). A public commitment to feminist goals can therefore become resistance to feminism. For example, at the national level, large corporations which adopt legislative recommendations before they are binding are likely to do so because they are vulnerable to criticism if they are not seen to be proactively engaged (Martin, 2000: 213). The public commitment may indeed loosely correlate to certain specific actions taken by the institution. However, ultimately it allows the institution to co-opt the issue and use it to support an alternate message (Martin, 2000: 213). Initiatives which on the surface appear progressive then come to sit against both sexist and racist institutional structures which are left unchallenged. For example, research on UK universities’ implementation of the 2010 Race Relations Act finds a disjuncture between the image of the university presented in an implementation policy and the reality (Ahmed, 2007: 594). Ahmed’s concept of ‘documents as performance’ is helpful here (2007: 594). Ahmed asks us to consider how documents become ‘forms of institutional performance in two senses. Both the ways in which institutions perform an image of themselves through the document and how institutions perform presenting an image of “doing well”’ (Ahmed, 2007: 594). International Women’s Day provides another example of an event with radical and transformative foundations which is now being marked by global108 Gendering NATO’s core tasks corporations, the UN and other international actors, including NATO. The first International Women’s Day was organised by internationalist socialist women in the USA in 1907 with the aim of bringing attention to their fight for equality in every aspect of life (Kaplan, 1985: 166). In Europe, the inaugural event was held in 1911 to draw attention to the cause of women’s suffrage (Kaplan, 1985: 166). It was the celebration of International Women’s Day in Russia in 1917, where women were joined by men from the metal works in protests on the breadline and in factories,2 which really served to root the day in its transformative socialist origins (Kaplan, 1985: 166). The protests and the response of the Czar (who ordered his generals to shoot if necessary) precipitated the February revolution (Kaplan, 1985: 166). Despite these origins, the increasing neo-liberalisation of International Women’s Day is evident through its adoption by global corporations. This has been accompanied by a shift to understand the day as about women’s empowerment, rather than women’s rights (Grosser and McCarthy, 2018). Ultimately, this has led to its distancing from the transnational feminist activism which is at its core (Grosser and McCarthy, 2018). To mark International Women’s Day 2018, NATO launched a Facebook and Instagram campaign posing the question: ‘Did you know that NATO has more women in leadership positions than ever before? Together – men and women – we are stronger! #IWD2018’. While this may be true, as we discuss in Chapter 1, this belies the reality of the continued and significant marginalisation of women from decision-making roles within NATO. There has been progress, but it has been slow. This presents the possibility that International Women’s Day has been co-opted as a public diplomacy tool to promote a linear picture of progress of women’s empowerment, one removed from the reality of women’s positions within these institutional structures, whether global corporations or NATO. Rather than reflect on existing institutional challenges to gender equality, again as we outline in Chapter 1, NATO has marked the day by presenting a positive picture of a gender-sensitive employer. This supports the argument that one outcome of the commodification and co-option of feminist agendas (e.g. gender equality and women’s rights) can be that they lose their transformative potential (Acker, 2006: 460). At the international level, the implications of co-option are epitomised in the relationship of feminists to the World Bank. Following the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, a ‘Women’s Eyes on the Bank’ initiative was established to monitor and attempt to transform the World Bank (True, 2003: 379). The women’s movement shifted from challenging the World Bank to viewing it ‘as a potential ally in dialogues between women’s groups and their own governments’ (O’Brien et al., 2000). This resulted in women’s needs and goals being framed as compatible with the neoliberal logics underpinning World Bank programmes (Bergeron, 2001: 1002). The relationship between local women’s movements and the World Bank has therefore facilitated the appropriation of the ‘language of advocacy’ by the institution (True, 2003: 379). The very real danger of the co-option of feminist agendas by international institutions necessitates critical feminist knowledge of how such institutions operate. Gender mainstreaming is one policy initiative which states and international institutions have engaged with, which has transformative potential. Gender mainstreaming refers to ‘efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women’ (True and Mintrom, 2001: 28). It has its origins in the UN conferences on women (True and Mintrom, 2001: 28), and is also called for in UNSCR 1325 (United Nations, 2000). It is a core part of NATO’s implementation of WPS. For example, the 2018 NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan 2018 brochure states that ‘gender equality is considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices’ (NATO/EAPC, 2018). Gender mainstreaming initiatives are retroactive in the sense that the organisational structure as well as the practices, norms and behaviours of individuals within that structure predate gender mainstreaming as a policy initiative (Benschop and Verloo, 2006: 20). They can therefore be characterised as ‘disruptive’ because of an inherent tension and competition between a ‘new’ focus on ‘gender’ and the institutional ‘mainstream’ (Benschop and Verloo 2006: 20). If implemented correctly, such initiatives should seek to address the persistence of gender inequality within organisations and through doing so asks ‘new’ things of the institution. They therefore have the potential to address ‘the genderedness of organisations: the material and discursive constructions of masculinity and femininity that shape and are shaped by organisations’ (Benschop and Verloo, 2006: 19). As Walby (2005: 322) argues, pre-existing institutional priorities (in the case of NATO, the ‘core tasks’ outlined in the NATO Strategic Concept) ‘compete with goals of gender equality for prioritisation, which makes gender mainstreaming an inherently contested process that is never simply about adopting new policy’. Instead, the process involves a ‘negotiation’ between the ‘dual agenda’ of the established institutional practices and gender equality (Walby, 2005: 322). Here it is ‘new’ policy that is struggling with the existing organisational norms; disrupting them and rendering them visible. Analysing the effects of particular ‘disruptive’ policy initiatives within NATO provides insight into the pervasiveness of gender norms and hierarchies. However, contextualising NATO’s concern with gender issues against its core tasks, collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, brings into question whether they were ever ‘disruptive’ or can bring the change expected of them in terms of transforming NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.