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The aff’s lack of gendered analysis about NATO specifically reproduces hegemonic masculinity, creating violent hierarchies

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 17-21. LJS

The concept of hegemonic masculinity was brought to prominence by Connell (1995) and refers to the particular set of masculine norms and practices that come to subordinate other masculinities, enabling the continued dominance of men over women. Hegemonic masculinity is never explicit and has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). The military occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). As a military alliance NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values. The concept of hegemonic masculinity refers to a configuration or pattern of ‘idealised’ masculine characteristics that occupy a position of power and privilege within particular a social, cultural and temporal context (Connell, 2005: 78). Central to this formulation is the notion differentiation within masculinities, bound up with varying levels of power and privilege. Connell defines these as ‘hegemonic’, ‘subordinate’, ‘complicit’ and ‘marginalised’ masculinities (Connell, 2005: 79). Subordinate masculinities therefore are those which do not conform (or are not seen to conform) to hegemonic ideals. For Connell, (assumed) characteristics and practices of subordinated masculinities are often ‘blurred’ with femininity (Connell, 2005: 79) – ‘effeminate’, homosexual men for example – thereby allowing for them to be ‘symbolically expelled’ from the hegemonic representation of ‘masculinity’. Complicit masculinity encompasses Connell’s notion of the ‘patriarchal dividend’. In short, Connell (2005: 79)18 NATO as an institution asserts that whilst not all men represent the hegemonic ideal, the majority of men gain advantage from the overall subordination of women– that there is an inherent dividend attached to simply being born a man, into the one half of a socially constructed binary that is culturally more valued. As Via (2010: 43) argues: A man’s (or anyone’s) claim to masculinity … is a positional claim in opposition to a feminine other that society has constructed to be the lesser of the two binaries. Without the existence of an individual or group that can be labelled as the weaker party, masculine social norms would be without content. In addition to gender, ethnicity, class and other marginalised characteristics also have a part to play in how hegemonic masculinity is constructed. Here, it is necessary to consider ‘relations between the masculinities in dominant and subordinated classes or ethnic groups’ (Connell, 2005: 80). This is a linear relationship between the ‘authorisation’ of the hegemonic masculinity of the dominant group and the marginalised. So, while it is possible for some within marginalised communities to embody hegemonic masculinity, this does not necessarily correlate with an increase in social authority to the wider group. Indicative of this is the example of black men athletes in the United States who are seen to embody hegemonic masculinity, but this is not something extended beyond their elite grouping (Connell, 2005: 81). Hegemonic masculinity is plural and variable. It is therefore necessary to centralise the ‘relationality’ of gender relations. This means considering the relationship both within and between masculinities and femininities. No masculinity (or femininity) arises except in a complex system of gender relations that are fluid and contextually specific (Connell, 2005: 73). Therefore ‘masculinity, like femininity, is always liable to internal contradiction and historical disruption’ (Connell, 2005: 73). To state that particular manifestations of masculinity are hegemonic is not to suggest that all, or even most, men enact or embody hegemonic masculinity; indeed, it can be argued that most men do not (see Demetriou, 2001: 342). Hegemonic masculinity can therefore be seen to represent normative ideals about the conduct, embodiment and enactment of masculinity in any culturally specific context. However, Connell posits the question: ‘What is “normative” about a norm hardly anyone meets’? (Connell, 2005a: 70). It is normative then, not in the numerical sense, but in that it culturally accepted and legitimised via particular cultural practices and through institutions. Hegemonic ideals are therefore conditional and intrinsically linked to institutional power; they are constructed via process rather than existing as a fixed or static ‘type’ and intimately linked to context: Hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual. So the top levels of business, the military and government provide a fairly convincing corporate display of masculinity, still very little shaken by feminist women or dissenting men. It is the successful claim to authority, more than direct violence that is the mark of hegemony (though violence often underpins or supports authority). (Connell, 2005a: 77) In this conceptualisation, hegemonic masculinity is bound up with the legitimation of authority and claims to power and privilege in a particular gender order or gender regime. This legitimation and claims to authority within institutions and cultural practices produce a façade of unitary masculinity which determine the standards against which other masculinities (and femininities) are then defined (Cornwall and Lindisfarne, 1994: 20). In the example of the military, constructions of hegemonic masculinity are drawn upon to construct uniformity within the soldiers and conformity to particular organisational priorities. That the unitary nature of hegemonic masculinity may be ‘illusionary’ does not negate the powerful, dominant effects it has upon ‘other’ masculinities and femininity, more broadly defined. As Sandra Via (2010: 43) notes: The dominance of hegemonic masculinity relies on its opposition to and competition with subordinated masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinities at once promote a particular organisation of the political order and reinforces unequal relationships between men and women in order to promote the legitimation of masculine authority. Hegemonic masculinity therefore has powerful ‘organisational’ effects (and indeed, can be drawn upon as a particular organisational resource) through which unequal patterns of gender relations can be ordered and maintained. One of the main critiques of the concept of hegemonic masculinity – indeed of a hierarchical gender order, more generally – is that it can imply a rigidity or a static representation, a ‘type’ or ‘essence’ of masculinity; further, that this was a negative type or a toxic assemblage of traits (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 840). Ultimately, that there was an inherent ‘descriptive tendency’ within the concept of hegemonic masculinity that resulted in essentialised characteristics being applied to particular groups of men. Connell and Messerschmidt rejected this critique and re-emphasised the importance placed on social context (2005: 832–3), asserting that just as masculinity and femininity is not a fixed entity in the body or personality traits of individuals – masculinities are configurations of practice that are accomplished in social action and therefore can differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting. (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 836) Indeed, it can be argued that the various usages and application of the term across a wide variety of empirical and theoretical research (including Feminist International Relations – see Kronsell, 2005 below) necessitate periodic critical evaluation as the concept ‘must mutate’ as it ‘finds applications in other settings and by other hands’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 854; Tickner and Sjoberg, 2011: 227–9; Messerschmidt, 2012). A level of appropriation or co-option, of elements from subordinate or marginalised masculinities and indeed of femininities, is necessary for hegemonic masculinities to remain hegemonic in changing social or cultural settings (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Hegemony can be accomplished through ‘the incorporation of such masculinities into a functioning gender order rather than by active oppression in the form of discredit or violence’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Both co-option and oppression can, and often do, occur together (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). They are ‘to a significant degree constituted in men’s interaction with women; therefore the commonalities in women’s gender practices also produce convergence’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). This notion of ‘hybridisation’, through appropriation, rather than overt violence, is a key theme in critical masculinities studies that sought to theorise the contested, contradictory, yet ultimately variable relationships between the masculinities of Connell’s gender order (for example: Messner, 1992, 1993, 2007; Anderson, 1993; Demetriou, 2001; Bridges, 2014). Messner (2007) puts forward a notion of a culturally ascendant hybrid masculinity that combines toughness and tenderness, but in specific ways which obscure (and perpetuate) power and inequality (Bridges, 2014: 61). Anderson (2010) has formulated a theory of ‘Inclusive Masculinity’ to explain what he sees as a (Western) cultural shift in declining homophobia and greater sexual and gender equality – though the extent of Anderson’s ‘inclusivity’ within contemporary Western masculinity in regard to homosexuality is contested (O’Neill, 2015). Demetriou (2001: 345) critiques an inherent elitism within Connell’s conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity, in that it downplays – or neglects entirely – the agency of individuals within subordinated masculinities and women generally, something Connell and Messerschmidt acknowledge (2005: 847). Demetriou’s work focuses on the appropriation of elements of gay culture into a ‘contemporary hegemonic bloc’ that reproduces rather than challenges patriarchy. What these studies (Anderson’s excluded) note is that the malleability of hegemonic forms or manifestations of masculinity does not suggest that patriarchal power is undermined. Indeed, it is suggested that transformation, appropriation and hybridisation of particular hegemonic forms of masculinity are essential for them to remain hegemonic and therefore do nothing to advance gender equality. As this discussion highlights, hegemonic masculinity is the norm and is normative, but it is never explicit and although this hegemony could be supported by force, it has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). For example, Connell (1995: 213) argues that the military (in Europe and the US) occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity. As a military alliance, NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic political and military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values and a valuable space for the study of military masculinities.

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