Liberalism is inevitable and a transition would cause escalating conflict – the alt excludes the aff but the aff doesn’t exclude the alt
Paris, 10 – (Roland, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” February 17, 2010, http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf) // kt **modified for ableist language
In fact, there seems to be no viable alternative to some version of liberal peacebuilding. Consider, first, the question of whether international peacebuilding should be continued at all. As we saw, some commentators including Jeffrey Herbst and Jeremy Weinstein have suggested that conflicts should sometimes be allowed to burn themselves out, and that large-scale “impartial” intervention (even after a ceasefire agreement) risks locking in conditions that are not sustainable or compatible with long-term peace. There is some logic to this approach, since wars ending in military victory may produce longer-lasting peace than those ending in negotiated settlements. But this strategy could also involve huge risks and costs: The victors might decimate the losers, or alternatively some wars might grind on for years or decades without resolution, all the while producing humanitarian crises before one side finally achieves victory. In the meantime, conflicts could spread to neighbouring territories, as several have done in Africa in recent years. On balance, then, failing to provide assistance when it is possible to do so, and when it is requested by local parties, would seem a short-sighted and dangerous solution to the shortcomings of these operations; just as suspending the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding would be a significant overreaction to the various problems that these missions have experienced and caused. Nor is there any sign of declining demand for new operations, given the increased trend for civil conflicts to end in negotiated settlements in recent years.97 But why, in this case, must peacebuilding be liberal? The simple answer is that alternative strategies – that is, strategies not rooted in liberal principles – would likely create more problems than they would solve. One approach, for example, might be for international agencies to establish permanent trusteeships over war-torn states – that is, externally run governments that have no intention of ceding their authority to local actors. This option is not unlike the formula proposed by Stephen Krasner, who called for direct international governance of dangerously fragile states “for an indefinite period of time.”98 The main problem with this approach is that it would come very close to colonial-type control – indeed, much more so than even the most longlasting and interventionist post-settlement missions that have been conducted to date. Maintaining such an arrangement over the long term would likely require permanent suppression of domestic political activity within the host state. As David Edelstein points out, even when foreign military deployments are made at the invitation of local parties, they face a problem of an “obsolescing welcome” whereby elements of the local population tend to grow increasingly resentful of a powerful external presence in their society.99 Continuing to embrace the objective of transferring full sovereign powers to local actors may thus be the single most important strategy for addressing this problem and for widening the “window” of time available for peacebuilders to assist in strengthening domestic institutions within the host state. By contrast, establishing permanent foreign rule would reduce the time available for peacebuilders to do their work before local resentment begins to build and the peacebuilding mission becomes an obstacle to, rather than a facilitator of, consolidating a stable peace. A second alternative to liberal peacebuilding might be for international agencies to identify local leaders who could rule as undemocratic strongmen over their society. This would, at least, provide a means for peacebuilders to scale back their presence quickly, as long as they continued to offer various types of support (financial, material, etc.) to the ruling person or party. Indeed, this was roughly that strategy that the United States and Soviet Union pursued with their respective patrons in many parts of the world during the Cold War. However, one of the practical problems with this approach is that authoritarian regimes created and sustained by external parties have often turned out to be more fragile than they appear, in part because they tend to lack domestic legitimacy and therefore remain in power only by repressing or buying off their internal rivals. This was one of the lessons learned at the end of the Cold War, when a reduction or cessation of immense flows of superpower assistance led to the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Somalia, Zaire/Congo and elsewhere, followed by a violent scramble for power. Furthermore, in a country just emerging from civil war, where two or more factions were engaged in large-scale killing, a postconflict “strongman strategy” would risk alienating unrepresented groups that might choose to resume violence rather than living under the new regime. Some measure of power-sharing, or at least a reasonable prospect of gaining power through an unrigged political process, generally helps to mitigate this danger.100 A third alternative to liberal peacebuilding might be to rely on traditional or indigenous practices of peace-making and governance, rather than elections and other accoutrements of liberal democracy. Roger Mac Guinty has usefully highlighted the limited space provided for such approaches in existing peacebuilding models, which tend to be “highly standardized” and rooted in a sense of the “superiority of Western approaches to peace-making.”101 In contrast to the more formalistic and legalistic approaches, traditional and indigenous methods tend to focus on “consensus decision-making, a restoration of the human/resource balance, and compensation or gift exchange designed to ensure reciprocal and ongoing harmonious relations between groups.”102 Because they reflect local customs, he adds, these techniques may “hold the potential to achieve a grass-roots legitimacy that may be lacking from more technocratic ‘alien’ forms of dispute resolution that form the mainstay of Western-funded and designed peacesupport programs and projects.”103 While Mac Guinty makes a strong case for adapting policies to local conditions and traditions (using examples such as Afghanistan’s Loya Jirgas, or tribal assemblies, which played an important role in that country’s initial transition from Taliban rule), he does not recommend relying exclusively on such techniques. On the contrary, he wisely warns of the danger of romanticizing traditional or indigenous practices – not least because they may serve to reinforce “the authority of existing power-holders” and to impose “social conformity,” sometimes in brutal ways.104 Tanja Chopra’s analysis of local peacebuilding initiatives in Kenya offers cautionary tale illustrating these dangers. Efforts to tap into traditional conflict-resolution techniques through community-level “peace committees” in Keyna have shown some success, but in some cases they have also served to “deepen existing rifts between communities” and “reinforce divisions” while also undermining concurrent efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law at the national level.105 Traditional and bottom-up approaches, in other words, should be part of peacebuilding, but they are no panacea. There are other reasons to be cautious before embracing traditional governance methods. Those who believe that doing so will eliminate or reduce the intrusion of foreign peacebuilders in the domestic affairs of the host state fail to recognize that peacebuilders will still need to make crucial choices, whether they wish to do so or not. No society has a single, unambiguous set of governance structures (traditional or otherwise) that can be automatically activated. Consequential decisions must therefore be made to privilege some structures and not others – and, as much as peacebuilders might view themselves as referees in such decisions, in fact they will always be “players” simply by virtue of their relative power in the domestic setting of a wartorn state.106 In any event, some measure of external influence may be necessary and desirable: if the post-conflict society could organize its own governance arrangements without international assistance, there would have been no need or demand for peacebuilding in the first place. Given all this, consider the implications if international agencies were to adopt a general policy of relying on indigenous governance structures in post-conflict countries. Very likely, any political outcomes of this process would be questioned and contested due to perceived international “interference,” no matter how well-meaning and diligent the peacebuilders were in seeking to remain neutral. Further, in cases where one individual or group dominated such a process, the result could be the equivalent of the second alternative to liberal peacebuilding discussed above – strongman rule – with all the problems associated with that option. These are all real concerns that counsel caution, but in spite of the risks and complexities, experience in Afghanistan, Cambodia and elsewhere suggests that much more research attention needs to be devoted to the topic of hybrid arrangements in countries recovering from conflict, or approaches those that blend formal, informal, modern and customary methods of governance and conflict resolution.107 It is also interesting that Mac Guinty argues that one of the benefits of customary arrangements could be to enhance “political participation,” while he also warns against the dangers of authoritarianism. Such arguments suggest that Mac Guinty, like other commentators discussed above, is less concerned with the liberal orientation of current peacebuilding approaches than he is with their relative rigidity and lack of adaptability to local conditions. In fact, there is nothing in the idea of the “liberal peace” or “liberal peacebuilding” that mandates such inflexibility. Liberal polities come in many different styles and forms, from group-based “consociational” proportional representation arrangements to Anglo-American-style plurality systems, and there is nothing to prevent liberalism from accommodating new models. Nor does support for liberal political principles stand in the way of pursuing any number of complementary initiatives and goals, including those focusing on post-conflict reconciliation,108 social welfare and justice,109 extensive public deliberations at the national and local levels,110 or the empowerment and inclusion of women and other marginalized groups.111 The key principles of liberalism – individual freedoms, representative government, and constitutional limits on arbitrary power – offer a broader canvas for institutional design and creative policymaking. Without clear alternatives, some version of liberalism therefore remains the most sensible foundation for post-conflict peacebuilding. The overarching goal of such missions should be to create the conditions for representative self-government, not only because such an outcome is the least morally objectionable goal for peacebuilding, but also for the practical purpose of facilitating the eventual departure of peacebuilders through the restoration of domestic sovereignty over the territory. Further, while the importance of elections alone should not be exaggerated, they remain a crucial tool for populations to constitute their own governments, not only during the period of peacebuilding, but on an ongoing basis.112 While it is true that encouraging elections itself involves an external intrusion in the internal affairs of the host state, surely we can differentiate between more and less acceptable intrusions – including the fact that elections are meant to facilitate the society’s ability to shape its own destiny and exercise self-government, so that the peacebuilders themselves can leave. Elections alone cannot achieve this goal, nor do elections equal democracy. But of all the possible ways in which international actors can influence the domestic politics of a country, the idea of promoting self-government is one of the least morally objectionable – and, from the standpoint of not overstaying an “obsolescing welcome,” it may be a pragmatic necessity. Similarly, while certain economic liberalization strategies can be destabilizing,113 is there really an alternative to some version of market-oriented reform in states emerging from war? The second half of the twentieth century demonstrated that centrally planned and state-dominated development strategies – including not only Soviet-style communism but also import substitution strategies pursued in many parts of Latin America and Africa – generally produced lower levels of economic growth than market-oriented development strategies. Debates continue about the appropriate balance between the market and the state in economic development, including greater regulation of financial institutions and the like, but there is near-universal agreement today that non-market-oriented economic policies (or those that do not give the market a primary role in allocating scarce resources) are too inefficient to generate sustained economic growth. Most of those who have criticized the economic dimensions of liberal peacebuilding (including this author) have called for less aggressive adjustment strategies in order to reduce the destabilizing effects of rapid marketization, but have not rejected the idea of economic liberalization itself – in part because economic growth is important to the long-term success of peacebuilding.114 Although there is no guarantee that states pursuing market-oriented development policies will become richer, there is a near guarantee that those pursuing nonmarket-oriented strategies will stay poor. There is no universally-applicable, market-oriented model appropriate for all peacebuilding cases. Rather, there are countless variations of liberal economic policies that can be explored and pursued,115 but all share one thing in common: a primary orientation toward markets as a foundation for long-term growth. If existing economic policies have been ill-suited to the needs of war-torn states, it is not because these policies have been “liberal” or market-oriented in the broad sense of these terms, but rather, because they have paid too little attention to the particular vulnerabilities of countries just emerging from destructive and divisive conflicts, including the potentially destabilizing effects of “shock therapy” adjustment policies.116 Addressing such problems primarily involves altering and customizing, not abandoning, the economically liberal elements of peacebuilding.