Advancement of AI lowers resistance to killing- distances people from reality
Galliott 21 Galliott, Jai. "Humans, autonomous systems, and killing in war." Research Anthology on Military and Defense Applications, Utilization, Education, and Ethics. IGI Global, 2021. 240-257. [AJL]
Most human beings are born with what can only be described as a primitive survival instinct that, without unchecked counter force, would lead to a degree of violence and savagery. But in most societies, people are raised and socialised in such a way that typically leads them to hold an aversion to harming other human beings, which might be why some choose to participate in warfare via wielding ones and zeroes rather than guns and bullets. In a military context and as applied to lower-end autonomous systems, this socialised reluctance to kill is evidenced by recounts and statistics from earlier wars. David Grossman (1995), a self-proclaimed ‘killogist’ or military psychologist, writes of two World War veterans. The first confirms that many WWI infantrymen never fired their weapons and relied instead on artillery, while the second says that platoon sergeants in WWII had to move up and down the firing line kicking men to get them to fire and that they felt they were doing good if they could ‘get two or three men out of a squad to fire’ (Grossman 1995, p. xiv). While some have criticised his methodology, S. L. A. Marshall gave further supporting evidence in arguing from personal experience and studies conducted on firing ratios, which revealed that ‘on average not more than 15 per cent of the men had actually fired at the enemy’ (Marshall 2000, p. 54). He attributed this startling inhibition to kill to an ‘ingrained fear of aggression’ that was based on society’s teaching that killing is fundamentally wrong (Marshall 2000, p. 71). For Marshall, success in combat and the welfare of the state and its people demanded that action be taken to correct or overcome this problem. For those with an aversion to highly autonomous weapon systems, the problem is reversed, as will be later discussed. In the years following publication of the first edition of Marshall’s book – that is, in those following WWII – there is evidence that Marshall’s calls for corrective action were answered. The claims of very low firing rates had been replaced by very high and morally concerning firing rates. By the time of the Korean War, the American firing rate was said to be up to fifty-five percent and, in Vietnam, it was reported to be up to ninety or ninety-five percent (Meagher 2006). Some expressed doubts about these firing rates too, with some finding troops with unspent ammunition in the rear of troop formations, but they were generally satisfied that among those who actually sighted the enemy, there appeared to have been extraordinarily high and consistent firing rates (Grossman 1995). From a strictly military or operational perspective, this is a remarkable success story. In order to overcome the hesitancy to fire and kill that most people develop over time, Russel Glenn says that staff sergeants and platoon commanders watched their troops to ensure that they were actually engaging with the adversary and that in Vietnam, they listened for the steady roar of machine gun fire which indicated to them that their soldiers were unhesitatingly firing their weapons (Marshall 2000). However, this corrective action seems unlikely to account for such a radical shift in the firing ratios. The real cause for the difference in the firing rates, it could be argued, has much more to do with technology employed in later conflicts and changes in military training which, together, allowed and continues to allow, individuals to achieve a physical, emotional and/ or moral distance from their enemies, thus enabling them to kill somewhat easier. It is these distances that need to be explored in more detail, as even the most advanced autonomous unmanned systems that can be conceived of today or the near future will only further these distances and the disengagement and the accompanying desensitization. They may further them to a point that gives rise to unique problems affecting their operators’ ability to wage discriminate and proportional warfare, but the problems, even in the face of artificial intelligence, are uniquely human problems and well within the domain of just war theory and theories similarly seeking to govern human behaviour. +XPDQV$XWRQRPRXV6\VWHPVDQG.LOOLQJLQ:DU The link between physical and emotional distance, ease of aggression and waging warfare is in no way a new discovery and thus it is puzzling why critics of autonomous weapon platforms ignore the relationship that this link has with the modern programmer come warfighter. As Grossman (1995) writes, it has long been understood that there is a positive relationship between the empathetic and the spatial proximity of the victim and the resultant difficulty and personal trauma caused by the kill, or the morally problematic ease of killing, more generally. This relationship has been a cause for concern among anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, theologians and, of course, soldiers themselves, who often struggle to understand their own actions. Jesse Glenn Gray (1959), an American philosophy professor whose career was interrupted by a period of service as a WWII counter-intelligence officer, wrote that unless one is caught in some sort of overwhelming murderous ecstasy where rage takes over, killing and destroying is much easier when done at a little remove and that with every foot of distance, there is a corresponding decrease in the accurate portrayal of reality. He argues that there is a point at which one’s representation of the world begins to flag and another at which it fails altogether (Gray 1959). Glenn put forward this argument over fifty years ago and the valid concern is that autonomous weapons systems seem to increase the relevant distances to the flagging point that he referenced, where the moral inhibitions of those operating, overseeing or designing/engineering autonomous systems are almost totally overcome but, the corollary of this is that, the advancement of digital warfare with high levels of artificially intelligent autonomous systems cannot surpass point that has already been reached. That is, the worry is not that we have reached another morally significant point in the history of weapons development, but that we are looking at a new enactment of an old trend. This is to say that to truly understand the relationship between soldiers, technical actors, autonomy and their ethicality for today’s purposes, we have to think about autonomous systems in the wider context of weapons that increase physical distance to the target and lower resistance to killing, as well how this maps onto increasing levels of artificial intelligence.