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Autonomous weapons makes killing easy- diminishes humans to dots on a screen

Galliott 21 Galliott, Jai. "Humans, autonomous systems, and killing in war." Research Anthology on Military and Defense Applications, Utilization, Education, and Ethics. IGI Global, 2021. 240-257. [AJL]

In order to fully understand the issues associated with autonomy, one must place lethal autonomous weapon systems on a spectrum with other forms of autonomous weaponry. At one end we have close range, then middle range and long range at other end. Close range, for our sake, involves any easily attributable kill at ‘point-blank’ range, whether with one’s bare hands, an edged weapon or even a projectile weapon. According to Grossman (1995), the key factor in close range killing is the undeniable responsibility one holds for the act. John Keegan and Richard Holmes (1986) cite the story of an Israeli paratrooper during the capture of Jerusalem in 1967: ‘we looked up at each other for half a second and I knew that it was up to me, personally, to kill him’ (p. 266). When a soldier kills at this range, more than any other, it’s an intensely vivid and personal matter (Grossman 1995, p. 115). One can see the raw emotions on their enemy’s face, hear their cries and smell the gunpowder. The Israeli paratrooper mentioned above goes on to say that having shot his enemy at close range, he could see the hate on his enemy’s face and that ‘there was so much blood...[he] vomited, until the rest of the boys came up’ (Keegan and Holmes 1986, p. 266). Combat at close proximity is an interpersonal affair, so much so that it is incredibly difficult to deny the enemy’s humanity. For this reason, Grossman says, the resistance to close-range killing is ‘tremendous’ (Grossman 1995, p. 118). At midrange – where you can still see and engage the enemy with handgrenades, sniper rifles and so on, but usually without being able to gauge the extent of the +XPDQV$XWRQRPRXV6\VWHPVDQG.LOOLQJLQ:DU wounds inflicted – the experience of killing changes. At this range in the spectrum, the soldier can begin to deny responsibility for the fatal shot or blow if there are others present and participating in the act of killing. One is still located on the battlefield and can hear the gunfire and feel the stress, but the distance between adversaries makes the act of killing both physically and psychologically easier, and thus more morally troubling (Grossman 1995, p. 113). At long range, at which one must use some sort of mechanical, electrical or digital assistance to view or interact with others and potential victims, there is evidence to suggest that killing is made even easier. Among those who we have historically considered least reluctant to kill are pilots, artillery numbers and missile silo attendees. Gwynne Dyer (2010, p. 57) writes that while being observed by their fellows puts pressure on them to kill (as was the case with the gunners in Vietnam), it has much more to do with the distance between them and their targets and how it acts as an emotional and moral buffer. She aptly notes that on the whole, ‘gunners fire at grid references they cannot see; submarine crews fire torpedoes at ‘ships’ (and not, somehow, at the people in the ships); and pilots launch their missiles at ‘targets’’ (Dywer 2010). Grossman (1995) also reports that in his extensive career researching and reading on the subject of killing in combat, he is not aware of a single instance in which an individual operating at such long range has refused to kill. We also have numerous examples of long distance killing made easy. Dyer (2010) reminds us that in the early nineteen forties, for instance, the British Royal Airforce ‘firebombed’ Hamburg. Using early bomber aircraft, munitions blew in windows and doors over four square miles and resulted in a firestorm which left seventy thousand people dead, mostly women, children and the elderly (Grossman 1995). A further eighty thousand died in the firebombing of Dresden, two hundred and twenty-five thousand in Tokyo and many millions more in bombing conflicts since (Grossman 1995). If the bomber crews had to kill each of these people with a flamethrower or, as Whetham (2012) writes, slit each of their throats with a knife, the majority would be unable to do it. The awfulness of killing people at such close proximity and the emotional trauma inherent to each act, and to the collective acts, would have been of such magnitude that they simply would not have happened. Figure 1. Distance, Technology and Resistance to Killing As indicated on the chart above, killing conducted with the most basic semi-autonomous systems belongs at the beginning end of the long-range killing spectrum, followed by higher level autonomous systems, which when roughly grouped together, might even be worthy of its own designation: killing at keyboard range. The contention here is that there is no other tactical weapon on the battlefield today that facilitates killing with such physical and psychological ease and that it becomes a rather clinical and dispassionate matter, easing any of their operators’ existing moral qualms. Noel Sharkey (2010) offers support this argument in drawing attention to reports collected by Singer. Amongst a variety of other disturbing statements, he cites one twenty-one year old soldier who talks about his acts of killing with casual indifference: ‘the truth is, it wasn’t all I thought it was cracked up to be. I mean, I thought killing somebody would be this life-changing experience. And then I did it, and I was like, ‘All right, whatever’ (Singer 2009, p. 391). Later, he says that ‘killing people is like squashing an ant. I mean, you kill somebody and it’s like ‘all right, let’s go get some pizza’ (Singer 2009, p. 392). In this clinical killing environment, in which it seems reasonable to propose that some human targets are divested of their humanity, respect for the laws of war wanes. Many ‘war porn’ videos show raw footage of Predator strikes with people being reduced to little more than ‘hot spots’ or ‘blips’ on the screen, with operators often failing to take the necessary precautions to ensure noncombatants are protected. And, of course, it is not difficult to imagine how someone coding an artificially intelligence autonomous weapon might come to minimise the impact of their effort in reducing decisions regarding people to keystrokes. Again, it seems that obscuring ‘targets’ in this way and increasing the distance to the maximum possible, makes it easier for to kill in an indiscriminate and disproportionate fashion.

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