There is a distinction between the ‘body and ‘embodiment’, human and computer, but technology connects them – posthumanism loops them both
Wilcox ’16 (Lauren Wilcox, PhD, is a Staff Research Scientist in People & AI Research.--“Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare”—Article--Volume 48 Issue 1, February 2016--https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010616657947)//Marzz
Hayles’s distinction between ‘body’ and ‘embodiment’ is particularly useful here: while ‘body’ is an abstract, idealized, universal construct, ‘embodiment’ is contextual, fully imbricated in culture, and never quite complies with the abstract idea of a ‘body’. This notion of incorporation is borne out in Hayles’s (1999) genealogy of cybernetics, which describes a shift from artificial intelligence to artificial life. The famous ‘Turing test’ is representative of the first wave, which attempted to divest information processing from a human body. This test, described by Alan Turing, suggests that the answer to whether or not machines can ‘think’ can be ascertained in an ‘imitation game’ in which a human poses questions at a computer terminal. If the human cannot tell whether the answers are generated by a human or a computer, then the computer can ‘think’. The machine’s ability to ‘think’ is based on its ability to imitate a human. While divesting information from its body, the Turing test also points toward cyborg subjectivity as it separates enacted bodies and represented bodies (through the terminal) while bringing them together in the technology that connects them. The second wave of cybernetics associated with artificial life sought to redefine and reorganize the boundaries of the human body in and through imbrication in technology and in relation to other bodies. Artificial life, in contrast to artificial intelligence, defines the human in terms of the machine: humans are understood as information processors that evolved intelligence. The contrast is between machines constructed to imitate humans (as in the Turing test) and what Hayles describes as ‘the computational model’ or ‘regime of computation’ in which all life, including humans, is understood as a kind of self-organizing machine. Human subjectivity is understood in relation to the machine. Both of these models exist in the figure of the posthuman, in which feedback loops between the human and the machine mutually inform and construct one another. Both the bodies of drone pilots as well as the bodies of those targeted by such algorithmic regimes exceed or overflow their constitution in this ‘regime of computation’, and as such point to the ways in which bodies as posthuman bodies must be considered in terms of multiple sources of corporealization. Thus, the use of algorithms and ‘big data’ techniques to produce targetable bodies is a process that cannot be separated from the greater process in which the drone assemblage is made of posthuman bodies: bodies corporealized as processors of information and also as information bundles. While this form of corporealization is a key feature of drone warfare, the massacre in Uruzgan province reveals that the visual and affective registers of embodiment are also necessary and are particularly crucial in the embodiment of gender and race in drone warfare.