Posthuman feminist work analyze different bodies through means of differentiation—questions the process of becoming
Wilcox ’16 (Lauren Wilcox, PhD, is a Staff Research Scientist in People & AI Research.--“Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare”—Article--Volume 48 Issue 1, February 2016--https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010616657947)//Marzz
The work of posthuman feminists provides a necessary check on tendencies to theorize the drone as ‘other than human’ in ways that reinforce the separation of humans from techno-scientific practices, including the use of visual technologies, algorithms, and artificial intelligence in various configurations to enable ‘drone warfare’. The challenge the posthuman body poses is not the addition of new technological advances to an already-existing human body, but rather the addition of a body that is always already formed through norms and relations to others, whether these other are human, technological, or animal (see also Braidotti, 2013). Notably, N Katherine Hayles critiques the concept of the posthuman for its rehabilitation of a liberal subject of autonomy and individuality in the figure of the human. For Hayles, the posthuman ‘signals…the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will though individual agency and choice’ (Hayles, 1999: 286). As such, posthuman feminist projects critique a kind of ‘transhumanism’ that seeks to disembody consciousness or promote ‘other than’ or ‘more than’ human approaches that reify a particular normative version of humanity that enables distinctions between more or less worthy forms of life. Relatedly, posthuman feminist approaches take seriously the ways in which embodied differences are produced and lived, avoiding totalizing visions that might obscure the ways in which bodies are differentially produced through the interaction of technological processes with gendered, racial, colonialist, sexual, and other means of differentiation that are themselves emergent processes of identification and alignment with other bodies. As such, I understand the turn toward data and machine intelligence not as an ‘other than-human’ process of decision-making but as a form of embodiment that reworks and undermines essentialist notions of culture and nature, biology and technology, often but not necessarily in the service of projects of domination. Haraway’s concept of corporealization as ‘the interactions of humans and nonhumans in the distributed, heterogeneous work processes of technoscience’ (1997: 141) is highly relevant to theorizing drone warfare. Post-9/11 practices of security have intensified what Haraway describes as ‘corporeal fetishism’ (Haraway, 1997: 142) in which the sciences are imagined to be able to simplify and condense complex relationships and situated knowledges into singular digital maps of the body that are free from the alleged ‘failures’ of culture, but are in fact themselves corporealizing practices (see Pötzsch, 2015 for other examples). Following Haraway, I ask not to what extent drone warfare is embodied or disembodied, but rather, how bodies are corporealized in drone assemblages with a caveat that the corporealization is always in a process of ‘becoming’. The first aspect of corporealization I analyze is the production of targetable, killable bodies in drone assemblages.