Autonomous weapons better for ethics- reduces unnecessary killing
Galliott, Jai. "Humans, autonomous systems, and killing in war." Research Anthology on Military and Defense Applications, Utilization, Education, and Ethics. IGI Global, 2021. 240-257. [AJL]
However, not all are convinced by the argument that autonomous systems present a moral problem in making it easier to indiscriminately and disproportionately kill, even at the higher end of the spectrum of autonomy. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun (2011, p. 339) argue that semi-autonomous robotic systems are subject to the same jus in bello requirements as other weapons used in war, but that their +XPDQV$XWRQRPRXV6\VWHPVDQG.LOOLQJLQ:DU technological advantages coupled with the removal of risk to soldiers means that they should, at the least in theory, make satisfying the principles of discrimination and proportionality an easier task and perhaps make operators more reluctant to kill in situations where doubt exists as to the legitimacy of the potential victim of aggression. They say that the in the case of surveillance, at the very least, the distance or what they call ‘separation factor’, arguably offers an increased level of control over lethal targeting decisions and ought to actually reduce the emotional toll and unnecessary killing (Brunstetter and Braun 2011, p. 339). They regard a drone operator’s ability to confer with a superior officer as being a critical factor encouraging ethical decision making in war. In some instances, this may be the case, and may even apply in the case of highly autonomous systems if the relevant coding and engineering is sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to account for all relevant morally relevant inputs and outputs, but in others, it might be that having a mission commander or a test overseeing the operator’s/programmer’s actions only places additional pressure on them to perpetrate lethal acts, just as the sergeants walking the trenches of WWI aimed to encourage reluctant soldiers to kill. Yet Christian Enemark (2013) also questions some of the assumptions relied on here. He says that there is reason to suppose that being physically absent from the battlefield is more conducive to discrimination (Enemark 2013). In his view, the removal of risk allows decisions to be made in a more deliberate manner and also removes anger and emotion that he thinks might otherwise lead to morally unsanctioned killings. That is, if a drone operator working from a desk in Nevada encounters the enemy, adherence to jus in bello protocol should improve as the operator is at little or no personal risk. It could be suggested, however, that if an operator or technical contributors is so emotionally removed, they are in fact likely to develop the sort disengagement referred to above or an even more morally concerning callousness. In case of highly autonomous system with little input other than through code, the concern that it such a callousness might pervade said code and perhaps even go unnoticed by virtue of being concealed within the system and being evident only from its highly complex actions, having even more severe and long-lasting consequences.