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Autonomous weapons are at best more ethical than humans and at worse just as ethical as humans

Gunkel 17 (David, Professor of Communication Studies at Northern Illinois University. 2017 “Mind the gap: responsible robotics and the problem of responsibility” Ethics and Information Technology. doi:10.1007/s10676-017-9428-2)-qcl

Conversely, we can entertain the possibility of what has been called “machine ethics” just as we had previously done for other non-human entities, like animals (Singer 1975). And there has, in fact, been a number of recent proposals addressing this opportunity. Wallach and Allen (2009, p. 4), for example, not only predict that “there will be a catastrophic incident brought about by a computer system making a decision independent of human oversight” but use this fact as justification for developing “moral machines,” advanced technological systems that are able to respond to morally challenging situations. Anderson and Anderson (2011) take things one step further. They not only identify a pressing need to consider the moral responsibilities and capabilities of increasingly autonomous systems but have even suggested that “computers might be better at following an ethical theory than most humans,” because humans “tend to be inconsistent in their reasoning” and “have difficulty juggling the complexities of ethical decision-making” owing to the sheer volume of data that need to be taken into account and processed (Anderson and Anderson 2007, p. 5). These proposals, it is important to point out, do not necessarily require that we first resolve the “big questions” of AGI (Artificial General Intelligence), robot sentience, or machine consciousness. As Wallach (2015, p. 242) points out, these kinds of machines need only be “functionally moral.” That is, they can be designed to be “capable of making ethical determinations…even if they have little or no actual understanding of the tasks they perform.” The precedent for this way of thinking can be found in corporate law and business ethics. Corporations are, according to both national and international law, legal persons (French 1979). They are considered “persons” (which is, we should recall, a moral classification and not an ontological category) not because they are conscious entities like we assume ourselves to be, but because social circumstances make it necessary to assign personhood to these artificial entities for the purposes of social organization and jurisprudence. Consequently, if entirely artificial and human fabricated entities, like Google or IBM, are legal persons with associated social responsibilities, it would be possible, it seems, to extend the same moral and legal considerations to an AI or robot like Google’s DeepMind or IBM’s Watson. The question, it is important to point out, is not whether these mechanisms are or could be “natural persons” with what is assumed to be “genuine” moral status; the question is whether it would make sense and be expedient, from both a legal and moral perspective, to treat these mechanisms as persons in the same way that we currently do for corporations, organizations and other human artifacts. Once again, this decision sounds reasonable and justified. It extends both moral and legal responsibility to these other socially aware and interactive entities and recognizes, following the predictions of Wiener (1988, p. 16), that the social situation of the future will involve not just human-tohuman interactions but relationships between humans and machines and machines and machines. But this shift in perspective also has significant costs. First, it requires that we rethink everything we thought we knew about ourselves, technology, and ethics. It entails that we learn to think beyond human exceptionalism, technological instrumentalism, and many of the other -isms that have helped us make sense of our world and our place in it. In effect, it calls for a thorough reconceptualization of who or what should be considered a legitimate center of moral concern and why Second, robots that are designed to follow rules and operate within the boundaries of some kind of programmed restraint, might turn out to be something other than what is typically recognized as a responsible agent. Winograd (1990, pp. 182–183), for example, warns against something he calls “the bureaucracy of mind,” “where rules can be followed without interpretive judgments.” “When a person,” Winograd (1990, p. 183) argues, “views his or her job as the correct application of a set of rules (whether human-invoked or computerbased), there is a loss of personal responsibility or commitment. The ‘I just follow the rules’ of the bureaucratic clerk has its direct analog in ‘That’s what the knowledge base says.’ The individual is not committed to appropriate results, but to faithful application of procedures.” Coeckelbergh (2010, p. 236) paints a potentially more disturbing picture. For him, the problem is not the advent of “artificial bureaucrats” but “psychopathic robots.” The term “psychopathy” has traditionally been used to name a kind of personality disorder characterized by an abnormal lack of empathy which is masked by an ability to appear normal in most social situations. The functional morality, like that specified by Anderson and Anderson and Wallach and Allen, intentionally designs and produces what are arguably “artificial psychopaths”—robots that have no capacity for empathy but which follow rules and in doing so can appear to behave in morally appropriate ways. These psychopathic machines would, Coeckelbergh (2010, p. 236) argues, “follow rules but act without fear, compassion, care, and love. This lack of emotion would render them non-moral agents—i.e. agents that follow rules without being moved by moral concerns—and they would even lack the capacity to discern what is of value. They would be morally blind.”4 Efforts in “machine ethics” (or whatever other nomenclature comes to be utilized to name this development) effectively seek to widen the circle of moral subjects to include what had been previously excluded and marginalized as mere neutral instruments of human action. This is, it is important to note, not some blanket statement that would turn everything that was a tool into a moral subject. It is the recognition, following Marx, that not everything technological is reducible to a tool and that some devices—what Marx called “machines” and what Winner calls “autonomous technology”—might need to be programmed in such a way as to behave reasonably and responsibly for the sake of respecting human individuals and communities. This proposal has the obvious advantage of responding to moral intuitions: if it is the machine that is making the decision and taking action in the world with little or no direct human oversight, it would only make sense to hold it accountable (or at least partially accountable) for the actions it deploys and to design it with some form of constraint in order to control for possible bad outcomes. But doing so has considerable costs. Even if we bracket the questions of AGI, super intelligence, and machine consciousness; designing robotic systems that follow prescribed rules might provide the right kind of external behaviors but the motivations for doing so might be lacking. “Even if,” Sharkey (2012, p. 121) writes in a consideration of autonomous weapons, “a robot was fully equipped with all the rules from the Laws of War, and had, by some mysterious means, a way of making the same discriminations as humans make, it could not be ethical in the same way as is an ethical human. Ask any judge what they think about blindly following rules and laws.” Consequently, what we actually get from these efforts might be something very different from (and maybe even worse than) what we had hoped to achieve.

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