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Autonomous weapons are moral – the ability for targets to fight back against autonomous weapons mean they respect the target’s autonomy

Young 21 (Garry director at the GW Institute of Public Policy, 03-29-2021, accessed on 6-21-2022, Ethics and Information Technology, “On the indignity of killer robots. Ethics and Information Technology,” 23(3), 473–482. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-021-09590-2 , pp. 6

A strong rebuttal of the indignity argument denies the truth of P3 (that the deployment of killer robots disrespects the dignity of combatants). Positioning ourselves once more behind a veil of ignorance, we again ask: what would military commanders be agreeing to if they were to agree to the permissibility of killer robots? We know that they would be agreeing to deploy autonomous weapons whose decision making cannot be constrained by recognition respect. In deciding whether combatants live or die, the killer robots would be ‘treating’ them as objects and not as moral agents with inherent sortal dignity. In other words, they would be processing combatants in a manner that would be no diferent to any other object in their environment. Given this, the charge is that we (qua military commanders), by agreeing to deploy killer robots in this way, would be treating combatants in a manner that disrespect their sortal dignity. It is this claim that the strong rebuttal challenges. Permitting killer robots does not deny combatants the opportunity to fght back against these automated weapons, and therefore act as moral agents. The weapons themselves may not be capable of respecting the inherent dignity of the combatant they target, making their deaths appear arbitrary (Amoroso, 2017) but, in deciding to deploy such weapons, we are capable of recognizing the inherent dignity of the combatants these weapons will eventually target. After all, even if we accept that sortal dignity is inherent, what counts as an afront to this dignity is not immuable. Instead, it is constructed, and forms part of what Killmister (2017) refers to as social indignity. Therefore, from behind the veil of ignorance, we (qua the community of military commanders) could agree (socially construct and endorse the view) that killer robots are not an afront to sortal dignity because their deployment does not prevent combatants from acting as moral agents (exercising their rational autonomy) and quite possible neutralizing the killer robots in return: a fact we recognize and respect.11 Consequently, P3 of the indignity argument is false, meaning that C(ii) does not necessarily follow. Given the stronger rebuttal of the indignity argument, if P3 is rejected then C(iii)—the claim that the death of a combatant, as a consequence of P3, amounts to an undignifed death—is likewise rejected. In the case of the weaker rebuttal, however, where P3 is not rejected, might a case still be made for the truth of C(iii): that even when treating a lack of respect for the dignity of combatants as a pro tanto wrong, the afront to the combatant’s dignity nevertheless results in an undignifed death? I do not believe so, as I intend to show in the next section. By drawing on two examples from fction I defend the claim that one can preserve one’s outward dignity in the face of indignity but, also, that the preservation of dignity supports the stronger rebuttal’s claim that recognition respect would be bestowed on combatants faced with an assault from killer robots from the community of military commanders (as well as others), adding weight to the claim that the deployment of killer robots is not in fact undignifed. Either way, C(iii) is undermined.

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