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Distributed cognitions models enhance human life – post humanist ideologies help us fashion new modes of existence and explore the potential of virtual technologies

Hayles ’99 (N. Katherine Hayles is a literary critic and theorist. She is the author of How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics which won the Rene Wellek Prize for the best book in literary theory for 1998–1999.--“How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics”—Feb 15, 1999—book--https://monoskop.org/images/5/50/Hayles_N_Katherine_How_We_Became_Posthuman_Virtual_Bodies_in_Cybernetics_Literature_and_Informatics.pdf)//Marzz

Hutchins would no doubt disagree with Weizenbaum's view that judgment should be reserved for humans alone. Like cognition, decision making is distributed between human and nonhuman agents, from the steam-powered steering system that suddenly failed on a navy vessel Hutchins was studying to the charts and pocket calculators that the navigators were then forced to use to calculate their position. He convincingly shows that these adaptations to changed circumstances were evolutionary and embodied rather than abstract and consciously designed (pp. 347-51). The solution to the problem caused by this sudden failure of the steering mechanism was" clearly discovered by the organization [of the system as a whole] before it was discovered by any of the participants" (p. 361). Seen in this perspective, the prospect of humans working in partnership with intelligent machines is not so much a usurpation of human right and responsibility as it is a further development in the construction of distributed cognition environments, a construction that has been ongoing for thousands of years. Also changed in this perspective is the relation of human subjectivity to its environment. No longer is human will seen as the source from which emanates the mastery necessary to dominate and control the environment. Rather, the distributed cognition of the emergent human subject correlates with-in Bateson's phrase, becomes a metaphor for-the distributed cognitive system as a whole, in which "thinking" is done by both human and nonhuman actors. "Thinking consists of bringing these structures into coordination so they can shape and be shaped by one another," Hutchins wrote (p. 316). To conceptualize the human in these terms is not to imperil human survival but is precisely to enhance it, for the more we understand the flexible, adaptive structures that coordinate our environments and the metaphors that we ourselves are, the better we can fashion images of ourselves that accurately reflect the complex interplays that ultimately make the entire world one system. This view of the posthuman also offers resources for thinking in more sophisticated ways about virtual technologies. As long as the human subject is envisioned as an autonomous self with unambiguous boundaries, the human-computer interface can only be parsed as a division between the solidity of real life on one side and the illusion of virtual reality on the other, thus obscuring the far-reaching changes initiated by the development of virtual technologies. Only if one thinks of the subject as an autonomous self independent of the environment is one likely to experience the panic performed by Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics and Bernard Wolfe's Limbo. This view of the self authorizes the fear that if the boundaries are breached at all, there will be nothing to stop the self's complete dissolution. By contrast, when the human is seen as part of a distributed system, the full expression of human capability can be seen precisely to depend on the splice rather than being imperiled by it. Writing in another context, Hutchins arrives at an in Sight profoundly applicable to virtual technologies: "What used to look like internalization [of thought and subjectivity] now appears as a gradual propagation of organized functional properties across a set of malleable media" (p. 312). This vision is a potent antidote to the view that parses virtuality as a division between an inert body that is left behind and a disembodied subjectivity that inhabits a virtual realm, the construction of virtuality performed by Case in William Gibson's Neuromancer when he delights in the "bodiless exultation of cyberspace" and fears, above all, dropping back into the "meat" of the body.22 By contrast, in the model that Hutchins presents and that the posthuman helps to authorize, human functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it inhabits expand. In this model, it is not a question of leaving the body behind but rather of extending embodied awareness in highly specific, local, and material ways that would be impossible without electronic prosthesis.

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