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Realism’s exclusive focus on nation-states and its belief in the universal rules governing their affairs masks the imperialist nature of international relations and re-entrenches Eurocentrism in IR

Tarak Barkawi in 2010

Department of International History, The London School of Economics and Political Science; Empire and Order in International Relations and Security Studies; International Studies; https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-164

As a consequence, security studies and IR lack a coherent and developed body of inquiry on questions of empire (Barkawi and Laffey 2002). There is little in the way of an ongoing conversation traversing older and contemporary scholarship on which a review essay conventionally can report. This is an astonishing but also constitutive absence. For many, the modern world took shape around the imperial encounter between Europeans and the Americas, Africa, and Asia (Said 1993; Wolf 1997; Bayly 2004). From this perspective, a social science of “international relations” that failed to address empire and imperialism, or in significant measure orientate inquiry around hierarchy and domination, is not adequate to the experiences and histories of most of the peoples and places on the planet (cf. Buzan and Little 2000). Alternatively, such a social science is written by and for the powerful (Hoffman 1977). IR and security studies scholars, and their university departments, research centers, thinktanks, journals, and publishers, are mostly located in the West, and chiefly in the US, shaping perspectives in manifold ways (cf. Tickner and Waever 2009). Considering the heavy traffic in the US between the academy and thinktanks, policy planning staffs, and government, there are power/knowledge problems yet to be fully understood or confronted (Simpson 1998; Amadae 2003; Gilman 2003; Oren 2003; Laffey and Weldes 2008). Unlike anthropology, IR and security studies have not come to terms with their own implication in imperial power and what this might mean for how they understand the world (Asad 1973; Fabian 1983). Postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism in social and political inquiry do not have wide currency in the discipline (Chatterjee 1986; Chakrabarty 2000; Slater 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Of course, it is all in how one defines “international relations.” The absence of empire and hierarchy is constitutive in that inquiry is oriented around sovereignty and anarchy instead. The central problematic in the discipline is that of a system of independent wills, figured as sovereign states, relating to and competing with one another in the absence of higher authority. “None is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (Waltz 1979:88). This problematic requires “units” that are “formally” alike, in that they are sovereign entities, even if they differ in their relative power and capabilities. The inattention to hierarchy is principled and systematic, not inadvertent (cf. Lake 2009). A consequence in IR and security studies is that Westphalian terms of reference often occlude and distort imperial relations. One purpose of this essay is to reveal these moments of misidentification and misconception, especially in the form of broad suppositions at work in the literature, and in so doing to open new spaces for research. The central focus of IR situates discussion of imperialism and hierarchy outside the core of the discipline, and on its fringes where scholars from other disciplines engage with IR and security studies literature. Similarly, in respect of security studies in particular, the focus is mostly on major war between great powers, not “small wars” between the strong and the weak. When “small wars” are considered, as well as other conflicts in the global South, inquiry is all too often informed by sovereign conceptions of the international system, as in many studies of civil war and in the democratic peace literature (Licklider 1995; Ray 1995). In a framing engendered by the idea of the sovereign state, “civil war” in the global South is primarily conceived as an internal phenomenon (e.g., Holsti 1996:25–26). This is so despite the past and present role of former imperial powers, the activities of international organizations, states, and commercial enterprises, as well as the global economic relations that help produce and sustain “civil wars” (Reno 1998; Duffield 2001; Mamdani 2001; Nordstrom 2004; Gleditsch 2007). Alternatively, much literature on “counterinsurgency,” “counterterror,” and other conflicts involving Western powers is baldly written from the perspective of “how to do it better”; that is, from the point of view of imperial power, a policy science for the powerful (Pape 1996; Johnson and Mason 2008; cf. Al-Qaeda n.d.; Mao 1937). Such studies are not generally placed within an overall account of international hierarchy or the long run of imperial conflicts and histories. Yet defeating indigenous armed resistance and determining the conditions under which foreign peoples are governed is the stuff of imperial power. So another task for this essay is to situate existing literature on “small wars,” “civil wars,” and “low intensity conflict” within a framework of imperialism and international hierarchy, rather than the formal juridical categories of the sovereign state system. Forgetting empire is often a function of Eurocentrism, of the unreflective assumption of the centrality of Europe and latterly the West in human affairs. In IR this often involves placing the great powers at the center of analysis, as the primary agents in determining the fate of peoples. Too easily occluded here are the myriad international relations of co-constitution, which together shape societies and polities in both the global North and South. For how else would we be able to address the impact generated by a war in far-off Vietnam on the US, and its subsequent role ever since in shaping American society, politics, and foreign interventions? Vietnam was neither the first nor the last “small war” to have such big consequences, but understanding how and why requires an “imperial turn” in IR (Doty 1996).

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