Contrary to realist beliefs deterrence is not effective in cyber policy
Craig and Valeriano ’18 (Anthony S J Craig, PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, and a member of the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research institute Oslo, Brandon Valeriano, Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University Reader in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Cardiff University, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age”, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal. An E-IR Edited Collection, February 3, 2018, Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age (e-ir.info)) PB
For realists, the acquisition of military capabilities is key to deterring aggression from other states and maintaining national security (Morgenthau 1947, 14). Deterrence aims at discouraging attacks through a demonstration of one’s military capacity and willingness to respond in kind. Deterrence theory rose to prominence during the Cold War because of the threat of mutually assured destruction from nuclear weapons, and realists figure prominently in the debate arguing that nuclear weapons have a stabilising effect on international relations (Waltz 1990; Mearsheimer 1990, 19-20). Deterrence logic now appears to be influencing cyber policy. For example, in its national cyber security strategy, the US government policy is aimed at ‘convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United States’ (Department of Defense 2015), and the UK government, too, has spoken explicitly about the need to respond to cyber incidents with offensive actions (Elgot 2016). Although it may seem an attractive option because of the perceived difficulty of defence as discussed earlier, there are several issues that undermine cyber deterrence. First, a state’s ability to retaliate is not physically demonstrable due to the virtual nature of cyber weapons and the secrecy states maintain over them. Second, unlike nuclear weapons, cyber weapons do not have the same destructive capacity and so, to have a sufficient deterrent effect, would have to be used repeatedly and to great effect. This is difficult, however, because each cyber weapon is designed for a specific vulnerability which could be subsequently patched. Third, attributing the source of cyber incidents can be difficult and perpetrators often deny involvement. In such cases, therefore, a state cannot be certain of whom to respond against (Libicki 2009, 39-73). These arguments suggest that deterring aggression through cyber means is an unworkable policy in practice.