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The 1AC is part of a desire to displace the insecurities of everyday life onto an external narrative- this entrenches militarism as ideology and presents it as a necessity

Victoria M Basham in 2018

Cardiff University, UK, Liberal militarism as insecurity, desire and ambivalence: Gender,race and the everyday geopoliticsof war, Security Dialogue1–12

As Salter (2006: 180) explains, though, it is not simply that states manage subjects but that the price of ‘freedom’, of an everyday life removed from insecurity, is that ‘we come to manage ourselves through a confessionary complex’. Key to this is that we ‘recognize ourselves as a society, as part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state’ (Michel Foucault, cited in Salter, 2006: 181) and regard others as outside this. The desire for this way of life means, therefore, that it is not just existential insecurity that facilitates war and war preparedness, but the multitude of insecurities that make up everyday life, from needing to have steady employment to wanting to feel part of a social and political community. Thus, while global fears are materialized and affective in everyday sites, other and often more pressing matters also play a role in the reproduction of liberal militarism (Pain and Smith, 2008). As Dowler (2012: 497) points out, this is why it is vital to consider how ‘militarization takes root in the banal processes of daily life that are essential to the reproduction of sovereignty’. As Eastwood (this issue) argues, though, everyday desire for war also animates militarism; fear only gets us so far. Importantly, however, as Eastwood also contends, desire is not necessarily fervent: it can be more ambiguous, even unconscious. Anthropologist Gerald Sider (2008: 124– 125) sheds further light on this when describing the everyday as an achievement; as those ways in which people work through and against the chaos, rupture and discontinuity that shape their lives to ‘try to make and to claim some kind of ordinary – some stability to today, some continuity between yesterday and tomorrow, in some parts of their lives at least’. Sider (2008: 125) moreover maintains that ‘what we call everyday life does not name a feature or an aspect of social existence … but a very high-stakes struggle’ – a struggle that is for many people throughout the world ‘largely unavoidable and often in the medium to long run unwinnable’. The desire for the ordinary should not be underestimated, therefore; it takes on a profound, if often taken-for-granted, importance not least ‘because it belongs to the people who have it – it is their time, their space, what makes their moments and their interactions their space and place’ (Sider, 2008: 129–130, emphasis in original). It is not difficult to imagine why this possession of ‘normality’ would be desirable to liberal populations promised that freedom is the very condition of their existence. Perceived threats to that freedom might motivate fears and suspicions that foster militarism. Equally, though, in the example of Syrian airstrikes, and hostility and ambivalence to resettling Syrian refugees, the desire of British citizens to have everyday lives free from concern about the everyday lives of others may call into question the ability of Syrians to have not only an everyday but any life at all. While such effects of desire to protect one’s own everyday are not always deliberate or callous, the prioritization of some lives and ways of life over others facilitates biopolitical forms of state power that entail that ‘the liberal way of war is governed, in part, by the very exercise of such discrimination and the application of lethal violence to it’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 49).

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