Dual use link—The 1AC’s construction of [insert enemy]’s AI/biotech as an existential threat serves to produce insecurity and creates a spiraling security dilemma
Lupovici 21
Amir, senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs and a research fellow in the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center. “The dual-use security dilemma and the social construction of insecurity.” Contemporary Security Policy, 42(3), 257–285. pp. 7-11
Threats are not simply given. They are constructed and shaped through social dynamics. This does not mean that the objective elements that affect insecurity are irrelevant. Rather, these elements are mediated through interpretation and carry effects through discourse that identify the threat and justify the response (e.g., Lipschutz, 1995, pp. 1–23). Actors, intentionally and unintentionally, create social structures that produce (in)security and threats. The dual-use dilemma is thus shaped by two interrelated social mechanisms. The first is the social production of the dual-use qualities of the technology. The second is the actors’ construction of the technology of their opponents as an existential threat, which is embedded in a broader social context that includes the actors’ relations, politics, identity, and history andcontinues previous securitizing moves. Through the combination of these, actors construct uncertainty over whether their opponent’s technology is meant for civil or for military/harmful (and potentially existentially threatening) purposes, and thus they allocate resources to address it. This is even if the opponent has no plans for harmful or military application of the dual-use technology. The securitizing moves an actor takes may affect the security of other actors, who in turn may take additional measures and contribute to the spiraling escalation. The concept of securitization captures the social dynamics of insecurity. Securitization is a process through which an intersubjective understanding that something is an existential threat is developed between a securitizing actor (enunciator) and audience. This intersubjective understanding allows the actor to call for exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan et al., 1998; see also Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 212–217; Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011). A crucial element of this process is the speech act of security, as it is the utterance itself that constitutes an issue as a security issue by labeling it as such (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 26–27). A number of facilitating conditions related to the language used, the securitizing actor, and the “conditions historically associated with the threat” affect the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32–33; Floyd, 2010, p. 13). However, scholars have challenged the emphasis on the semantics of security, pointing to the importance of images and to external conditions affecting the securitizing move that are not related to language (e.g., Vuori, 2008; Williams, 2003). It should also be noted that while the concept of securitization was originally developed to explore the constitutive elements of “new” security issues, such as migration, epidemics, and the environment (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015; Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 215), scholars have begun using this theory to study “traditional” security issues (Hayes, 2013; Lupovici, 2019; Roe, 2008; Vuori, 2008). I follow this line of studies, and especially Van Rythoven’s (2020) article.4 Van Rythoven uses the concept of securitization dilemma to explore the unintended consequences of the security dilemma dynamics. Among other things, he aims to highlight how this concept bridges traditional and constructivist theories of security, and to justify epistemologically and conceptually the combining of the security dilemma with securitization scholarship.5 Van Rythoven provides a promising point of departure to incorporate securitization theory into the study of the security dilemma. First, he defines the securitization dilemma as “a difficult choice where a securitizing move represents a powerful and attractive opportunity for political mobilization, but with the danger of perverse and unintended consequence” (2020,, p. 479). In short, the focus of the dilemma is diverted to the question of whether to securitize or not. Second, securitization theory also allows the capturing of different non-traditional kinds of threat, and not just threats to sovereignty, that initiate the security dilemma for different kinds of actors (and not just to state actors) (Van Rythoven, 2020, p. 484). I further elaborate on Van Rythoven’s assertions by acknowledging the spiral dynamics of securitizing moves. For Van Rythoven, a key aspect of the dilemma is the unexpected consequences of a securitizing move. He highlights the uncertainty that surrounds securitizing moves, as enunciators cannot know whether the audience will accept them or what the impact will be of implementing the practices stemming from these moves (Van Rythoven, 2020, pp. 486–488). While all these uncertainties are important, another key, and underdeveloped, question is how securitizing moves affect other actors. I argue that this dynamic may create a spiral of insecurity where actors respond with a securitizing move to a securitizing move initiated by another actor, thus affecting both actors’ security. Important to understanding security dilemma dynamics is the acknowledgement that securitization is a process rather than a single act (Roe, 2008, pp. 617–618, 624; Watson, 2011, p. 10). Recognizing this allows us to consider the political context in which securitizing moves are embedded, as well as the political effects of securitizing moves (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25; Guzzini, 2011, p. 331; Hayes, 2013, pp. 16–17). A number of scholars have extended these ideas by considering the different dynamics through which the same security issue is repeatedly securitized. They explore the concept of re-securitization, when an already-securitized issue is put back on the agenda (Mavelli, 2012, p. 190; McDonald, 2011) or attains a new climax (Lupovici, 2016). Scholars have also explored the international effects of securitizing moves. Beyond domestic consequences, securitizing moves’ political effects and outcomes influence other actors, who respond to them as a result of either the rhetoric employed or the behavior triggered (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 205–206; see also Lupovici, 2019; Wæver, 2011, p. 476). Especially important for capturing dynamics around the chain reaction of a security dilemma is a counter-securitizing move, which occurs when actors resist a securitizing move. Actors can resist a securitizing move in different ways,6 and against different elements of the targeted securitizing move (Stritzel & Chang, 2015, pp. 551–552). Although Stritzel and Chang (2015, p. 553) do not specifically connect their discussion to the security dilemma, they argue that “[a]n explicitly interactive reading of processes of securitization versus counter-securitization … can establish fruitful conversations specifically with military strategy.” Thinking of securitizing moves as part of an iterating process that affects other (international) actors captures the essence of the security dilemma (Table 1). The traditional security dilemma is fueled by the “objective” characteristics of the means acquired by the actors and focuses on whether to arm to prepare for an emerging threat, even though the act of arming may itself be threatening to the opponent. Conversely, the securitization approach to the security dilemma focuses on the actors’ spiraling constructions of insecurity. From this perspective, a security dilemma erupts when an issue is securitized and counter-securitized by rival actors. An actor’s securitizing move is constructed as an existential threat by another actor and thus it is spirally aggravated. The securitization approach of the dilemma is based on the view that, on the one hand, a securitizing move may be advantageous for the securitizing actor by mobilizing support for extraordinary measures, legitimizing their response to an opponent’s challenge or, alternatively, winning them some domestic political gains. On the other hand, the move itself may invite the opponent to make securitizing moves of its own. The result may be a spiral dynamic in which each actor conducts a securitizing move where they securitize the securitizing move taken by an opponent. The dilemma then is whether to securitize and enjoy the benefits of it while also facing the risk of negatively influencing other actors or providing tools for the opponent to perform securitizing moves of their own. When the means Actor A holds or develops (or even the rhetoric related to these processes) are constructed by Actor B as an existential threat and Actor B can justify taking extraordinary measures to address the alleged insecurity, then Actor B contributes to the dynamics of the security dilemma. In turn, Actor A may securitize Actor B’s response—that is, Actor B’s securitizing move is securitized by Actor A. More specifically, Actor A may construct a number of things as an existential threat: (1) Actor B’s construction (labeling the means acquired by Actor A as an existential threat); (2) Actor B’s justification to take extraordinary measures; or (3) Actor B’s execution of the measures legitimized through the securitizing move. Securitizing of any of these issues by Actor A can lead to attempts to justify additional means Actor A should take and can expedite attaining the means of threat to Actor B that have already been justified. The securitized issue becomes part of the opponent’s securitizing move: it provides a pretext for enunciators to perform their own securitizing move and it also gives both sides tools to further securitize the situation, and so on. This creates the dangerous spiral dynamic. Each securitizing move—and the ensuing extraordinary measures—becomes a strong justification for the opponent to re-securitize the opponent’s moves and attain a new securitization climax. I build on a securitization reading of the traditional security dilemma to present the dual-use security dilemma (see Table 2). Basically, the dilemma in the latter is whether to securitize an opponent’s dual-use technology. On the one hand, by securitizing these technologies, an actor can attain domestic support and legitimacy for policy measures, including measures addressing the (constructed) threat Conversely, the securitizing move itself, apart from any execution of these measures, may alarm an opponent or even provide it a pretext for its own securitizing moves, thus initiating a spiral dynamic of insecurity. This may especially be tragic in situations where the actor whose dual-use technology was first securitized had no plans to use the technology for military/harmful purposes. I suggest that the dual-use security dilemma is shaped by two kinds of social dynamics. First, social processes shape whether and how a technology can be seen as dual-use. Second, once a technology is seen as dual-use, enunciators are able to rely on this knowledge to further securitize it.