Cybersecurity discourse relies on objective “experts” whose true purpose is to constantly displace the structural causes of insecurity- the result is an endless set of recommendations that reaffirm the militaristic ideology of the status quo
Jacobsen 20
Jeppe Teglskov, assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. “From neurotic citizen to hysteric security expert: a Lacanian reading of the perpetual demand for US cyber defence.” Critical Studies on Security. 3/1/2020. Pg 1-10. LJS
The goals of security policy experts – a term used collectively here to describe independent consultants and think tankers that produce policy recommendations and advise the US Administration – keep shifting. A case in point is the extensive policy discussion on cyber deterrence. Improving deterrence of cyberattacks against the US has been a recommendation put forward by task forces and commissions at regular intervals during the Obama Administration (National Research Council 2010; CSIS 2017; DSB 2013; DSB. 2017). The Administration’s attempts to accommodate these recommendations have invariably been met by new and different sets of proposals and demands, and a reluctance on the part of experts in the cyber community to stand by previous policy proposals. By way of a brief summary, elaborated further in the body of this article: Before 2010, policy experts called for more offensive cyber capabilities to ensure a cyber deterrence posture. Around the time that the Administration provided these capabilities, the cyber deterrence problem ceased to be attributed to a cyber capability problem and was now thought to result from a lack of signalling. Shortly thereafter, the Administration responded by signalling a willingness to respond strongly to cyberattacks, at which point the expert community began calling instead for resilience in both civilian and military US networks to achieve cyber deterrence. This demand for cyber resilience was put forward in such vague terms that it is impossible to determine when it is achieved.¶ The dependency on increasingly complex socio-technical systems in contemporary society has rendered reliance on experts unavoidable. And with their rise to ubiquity in policy circles, expertise has also become a frequent object of study in social sciences. In critical security studies, the sociological approaches have been particularly attuned to the study of expertise. Within this field, security scholars have focused largely on how the everyday practices of professional experts play a role in categorising what constitutes an insecurity – and ultimately, in (re)producing particular ‘regimes of truth’ (Bigo 2002; Berling and Bueger 2015). In so doing, these contributions see experts as the embodiments of specific forms of knowledge that is practised or articulated as part of a dominant rationality of government (or dispositif or field). This article introduces a strategy for studying security policy experts that does not reduce the expert to the embodiment of a knowledge regime or a tool for political interests. It suggests that paying attention to how the expert subject identifies with and performs its role as an expert vis-à-vis the government that takes policy decisions, advances our understanding of the expert’s role in reproducing insecurities.¶ The article takes its cue from the writings of those critical security scholars that show how today’s risk governance has led to increasing public awareness and general concerns in society about unpredictable and catastrophic events (Aradau and van Munster 2011; Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and van Munster 2008). Such concerns about uncertainty, the critical security scholars argue, have not only led to the government introducing precautionary and pre-emptive strategies for governing security but has also given rise to anxious and neurotic subjects (De Goede 2008; Walklate and Mythen 2010; Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet 2017). Scholarly contributions within this field have so far almost exclusively diagnosed the neurotic subject among citizens being governed. In fact, the neurotic subject is treated somewhat disconnected from or even juxtaposed to the experts that implement or propose the current security governing strategies and thus can be said to mobilise collective anxieties (Fournier 2014). Experts are, apparently, unaffected by anxieties about future uncertainties. This article extends the notion of the neurotic subject to the expert, and asks: How does a reading of the expert as a neurotic subject advance the way we study the reproduction of insecurities?¶ For answering this question, the Freudian-inspired work on the neurotic citizen by Isin (2004), which is the main inspiration for the above-mentioned turn to anxiety and neurosis in the risk literature, is a useful stepping-stone. However, the article switches the theoretical point of departure from Freud to Jacques Lacan – the latter of which enjoys increasing attention in critical security studies recently (Mandelbaum 2016; Heath-Kelly 2018; Danil 2018; Eberle 2019). To date, the Lacanian contributions within this literature have generally introduced Lacan’s notion of the divided subject – and one or a few concepts related to it – to extend the analytical power of existing critical security and IR approaches (Epstein 2011). However, Lacan offers a – largely unexplored1 – systematic strategy for locating and studying the divided subject in different social relations, his matrix of the ‘Four Discourses’ (Lacan 1998, 2007).¶ The article zooms in on one of the four discourses, Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric, introducing it as an analytical strategy for studying policy experts as neurotic subjects. Lacan defines the Four Discourses as abstract ways to structure our communication and identification. The Hysteric Discourse, one of the four discourses, is a social bond where a neurotic subject constantly protests and demands that an ‘other’, in the position of the master signifier, delivers what the subject desires (for example, absolute security) (Fink 1995, 129–37). The article focuses on US policy experts in the field of cyber defence.2 US cyber defence is as an apt case study not only because ‘cyber’ is officially considered the biggest threat to US national security, but also because cyberspace is articulated in the US as an uncertain, unpredictable and insecure domain where governments rely on assistance from outside experts to solve problems (Dunn Cavelty 2013; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). As the neurotic subject is likely to emerge from uncertainty and as experts hold a privileged position in the cyber policy debate, the social bond between the US cyber defence experts and the government is an ideal case for examining the expert as a neurotic subject that communicates through the Hysteric Discourse as well as what it means for the reproduction of insecurity.¶ Through the case study of the US cyber policy experts, the article contributes to the emerging body of critical security studies on experts. It introduces a Lacanian-inspired hysteric strategy for advancing the analysis of security experts. First, the article locates the drifting of desire in the public expert documents on cyber deterrence and argues that the US cyber policy experts’ ever-evolving and ultimately elusive demands are illustrative of a desire for a desire unfulfilled, which reproduces cyber insecurity as a national defence priority. And second, the article shows that the social bond between the cyber policy expert subject and the US government is sustained – despite the former taking up employment in the executive branch – by the subject pushing the object of desire in front of it to the point of ultimately returning to the position as outside experts. Together, the two readings illustrate a critical security strategy for studying the reproduction of insecurity through the experts’ neurotic identification as experts.¶ The article comes in three sections. First, it situates the study of security expertise in the critical literature on risk and uncertainty. Second, it introduces Lacan’s hysteric social bond as a strategy for studying the subject, and third, it illustrates how to apply this strategy through a case study of US cyber defence experts.¶ Security experts and expertise in critical studies on risk and uncertainty ¶ The study of experts and expertise in International Relations and security studies is not new. A focus on scientific experts preoccupied IR functionalists of the 1960s as did the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ in the early 1990s where the primary interest was to explore the causal mechanisms by which experts exert influence over security policy. More recently, critical security approaches also turned their attention to the study of experts and expertise (Berling and Bueger 2015, 3–6).¶ The main analytical task of these scholars has been to highlight the contested and contingent ground upon which expertise is constructed and exercised. Leander (2014) offers an excellent example of the contestation and controversies over the production of expert knowledge in the case of the 2013 Sarin gas attack in Syria. And scholars such as Büger and Villumsen (2007) have shown repeatedly how ‘facts’ are produced through a web of practices. The production relates, for example, to the network of peace researchers, US policy-makers, NATO officials and bureaucrats that stabilised the ‘democratic peace thesis’, or to the practice of quantification, expert monitoring groups, and special advisors, which generate a specific form of knowledge on piracy (Bueger 2015). Similarly, a group of security scholars – the so-called Paris School – approaches security as a professional struggle between experts (the managers of unease), who, through their bureaucratic, everyday practices and routines, define what counts as insecurity (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Whether drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Foucault or Actor-Network Theory, the existing contributions tend either to reduce security experts to the ‘scientific knowledge’ and tools for ‘political interests’ or to treat security experts as passive deployers of security techniques.¶ This tendency is particularly present in the many studies of security governance through risk. Here, the attention to technologies that represent the tools for generating ‘objective’ knowledge about risks has not only pushed the experts developing, proposing the use of, or applying the technologies to the background, but has also directed the analytical lens primarily towards the production of bionic subject-positions of those being ‘risk managed’. Amoore and de Goede (2008, 9–10) call the current usage of data-driven (surveillance) technologies to identify risky bodies and bodies at risk, the ‘techno-expert deployment of risk’. Biometric technologies are the prime example of the dominant mode of risk management, and they are used to illustrate how the technologies, rather than addressing the political subject, govern bodies with the aim of controlling the future through enforcing the (political) status-quo in the present (Bell 2006; Epstein 2008). But while experts are not the focus of these analyses, the literature on security-governance-through-risk contains an opening to ask new questions about security experts.¶ Critical risk scholars such as Aradau and van Munster (2011) argue that governing through calculation and management of the future has fostered public concern about unknowable, future catastrophes, such as terrorism and natural disasters. This increasing focus on unknowable disasters and worst-case scenarios, some scholars have suggested, renders the subject neurotic and anxious (De Goede 2008; Walklate and Mythen 2010; Fournier 2014). The neurotic subject was first discussed in the context of risk by Isin, who draws on Freudian insights to account for citizens’ acceptance of the social effects of neoliberalism. Isin (2004, 225–6) argues that the subject called upon to adjust its conduct in times of emerging risks is not ‘a rational, calculating or competent subject’ but an affective subject that needs ‘soothing, appeasing and tranquillizing’ to manage anxieties. The neurotic subject-citizen speaks and makes demands: It wants the impossible (absolute security and safety) and is presented with new solutions to manage its affects (ibid: 232). The critical security contributions that find inspiration in Isin’s work all locate anxiety and neurosis at the level of the citizens who are being risk managed and in juxtaposition to the experts and government officials that mobilise these anxieties (Fournier 2014: 315–7; De Goede 2008; Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet 2017).¶ Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2018) has taken an important initial step towards moving beyond the dichotomy between experts who mobilise anxiety and the anxious subject. She examines the role of anxiety among those experts and government officials who are in a position of securitising issues and who practice security towards various threat objects. With the change in focus, she has also switched the psychoanalytic starting point from Freud to Lacan. She introduces Lacan’s divided (or split) subject and related concepts such as drive, anxiety, enjoyment, and lack and applies them to the War on Terror to understand the continuous invention of new threat objects that occurs as soon as the old ones are destroyed (ibid.).¶ Building on Heath-Kelly’s argument that the subject repeatedly invents insecurities to avoid confronting an ontological lack/insecurity, the next section proposes to situate the subject in Lacan’s most formalised methodological matrix, his ‘Four Discourses’. Lacan’s Discourses do no refer to specific content (e.g. legal, political, medical, etc.) but can be understood as structuring different social bonds between the subject and the social field, i.e. different modes of communication through which the subject identifies. The following section introduces the divided subject and develops an analytical strategy for approaching the neurotic expert-subject through a particular social bond, Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric.¶ From divided subject to hysteric social bond: introducing a new reading strategy¶ Lacan was one of the 20th century thinkers who worked most extensively with the subject. The novelty of Lacan is the way in which he unites three distinct definitions of the subject: the liberal acting subject, the subject of structuralism and the subject of the unconscious. The conventional understanding of the subject is the Cartesian acting subject, often exemplified in the (to Lacan, imaginary) idea of being a whole and autonomous ‘self’ that forms the environment. The opposite conception of the subject is the subject that is subjected to the socio-symbolic structures of society. This subject is the product of – or subject position formed by – for example, a legal, medical or political discourse. Lacan introduces a third subject, which allows him to account for why the subject identifies with the socio-symbolic structures in the first place. He calls it the subject of the unconscious. This subject represents a ‘pre-subjective’ part of the individual that cannot flawlessly pass into the subject – it represents the failure to become the subject. The unconscious takes its form as a nonsymbolisable residual that keeps the subject desiring and identifying with new objects (Fink 1995, 36–48). In other words, the Lacanian subject – when emerging in the socio-symbolic order to assume an identity – cannot escape an ontological lack that is the inevitable result of being positioned in the gap/void between the other two subjects.¶ Turning to Lacan’s divided subject has analytical implications. It becomes a core task for the Lacanian analysis to identify where the subject is positioned in a social context, and how this position allows the subject to cope with or avoid confronting its own dividedness. With his Four Discourses, Lacan seeks to codify the various positions that the subject can take in different social bonds. The Four Discourses – the Master, University, Analyst and Hysteric Discourse – can be thought of as abstract ideal-types for how social relations and identifications play out (Lacan 1998: 14–25, 2007, 11–68). Lacan’s Discourses are condensed formula-based models (called mathemes), which are made up by four positions (agent, other, product, and repressed truth) and four elements (master signifier, system of signification/knowledge, divided subject, and objet petit a), whose relations make up four different social bonds (commanding, indoctrinating, transforming, and protesting) (Žižek 2004, 131–57). Introducing every matheme is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. It therefore focuses on one of the discourses, the Hysteric Discourse, and unpacks its conceptual relations and social bonds in order to develop a strategy for studying the expert as a neurotic subject.¶ The decision to study experts through the Hysteric Discourse rather than the University Discourse, in which neutral knowledge speaks, echoes the attempt – motivated in the previous section – to move from studying security experts as the embodiments of a specific risk/security governance regime (a system of knowledge) to studying experts as neurotic (divided) subjects. Lacan, like Freud, regards the hysteric as one of the two ways of being neurotic, the other being the obsessional neurotic. Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasise that the subject, when located in a hysteric social bond, does not refer to a pathological or clinical personality type, but refers to a position occupied within a socio-symbolic system of meaning. Let me now introduce the hysteric social bond as an interpretive strategy for empirical analyses. A social relation resembles a hysteric social bond when a speaking agent deals with uncertainties and doubt by demanding that someone else does something about these feelings, and when this ‘other’ responds to the demands and protests by producing new knowledge and solutions (Fink 1995, 133). Importantly, the fundamental Lacanian assumption is that every social bond is driven by unconscious force, a repressed ‘truth’ that determines how the subject copes with its dividedness. In the Hysteric Discourse, this repressed truth is what Lacan calls objet petit a – the object cause of desire.¶ Objet petit a is one of Lacan’s most ambiguous concepts. In simple terms, it represents the empty position that a lost object can occupy, i.e. the position that allows an object to be currently unobtainable and hence desired. To the subject, a lost object occupying this position holds the promise of full enjoyment, i.e. a complete, secure identity, when reached. Hence, the lost object claims to symbolise the nonsymbolisable lack that remains when the subject attempts to assume an identity. In other words, objet petit a stands for the void or gap that causes desire by holding no positive content (Lacan 2007: 42–4, 176–9). When the objet petit a is repressed as in the hysteric social bond, the subject avoids directly confronting its desire and ultimately the ontological lack at the heart of its being. In empirical analyses, the function of objet petit a becomes visible, for example, as the drifting of desire from one (lost) object to the next with the illusory expectation that every new desired object symbolises and holds the power to overcome what is lacking in the subject/ socio-symbolic universe.¶ In the hysteric social bond, repressing or avoiding confrontation with objet petit a is a defence mechanism supported by anxiety. If the subject were to confront objet petit a, it would come to see itself in a new light, ultimately ripping it out of the comfort of communicating and identifying through the existing social bond. Thus, contrary to how this term is commonly understood, anxiety for Lacan is associated neither with the loss of an object nor with what is absent or uncertain. Rather, anxiety is an expression of presence – of not having in place a lost object (Lacan 2014; Burgess 2017, 29). It is the lack of a symbolisable lack: anxiety is the moment when the subject gets too close to objet petit a. Thus, in the hysteric social bond, anxiety emerges at the prospect of the ‘other’ delivering what the subject desires, and pushes desire along.¶ The constant drift of desire ensured by anxiety in the Hysteric Discourse is both a productive and a conservative force. It is productive because it forces the ‘other’ to constantly improve its efforts in response to the subject’s demands and criticisms, and it is conservative in that the repression of objet petit a prevents the discursive configuration from being questioned and challenged. Following this logic, the worst that can happen to the hysteric social bond is if the ‘other’ caves to the criticism and gives up its position as the master who produces new solutions. This would force the subject to take responsibility for its own choices and decisions, and ultimately, confront its own desire.¶ The hysteric social bond offers an analytical strategy for locating and interpreting how the subject communicates and identifies in particular (security political) contexts. From the above, the initial analytical step is to locate a relationship that resembles a social bond between, on the one hand, an agent that makes demand and criticises and, on the other hand, a master that responds to these demands by producing solutions. The hysteric social bond then directs the analyst’s attention to the way the object of desire manifests itself empirically, including when the social bond seems to break down. The hysteric bond is particularly relevant to the security political analysis because the constant reinvention and articulation of a desired object that promises security when attained reproduces a present sense of insecurity.¶ The next section examines how the object of desire manifests itself, first, in the expert communication through policy recommendations on cyber deterrence made during and in the aftermath of the Obama Administration, and second, in a situation where the hysteric social bond breaks down, as it can be said to do when the cyber policy experts take up positions as secretaries, ambassadors or advisors within government. In both analyses, the article zooms in on the processes through which the expert subject avoids confronting objet petit a and how this avoidance ensures ‘cyber’ as a pertinent national defence issue.¶ The expert subject’s demand for cyber defence¶ Experts supposedly offer impartially and evidence-based knowledge and lay out possible ways forward. Experts are not enmeshed in normative partisan politics. At least, US think tanks emerged in the beginning of the 20th century on this foundation (Rich 2004, 34–41). Traces of this ideal still exist, although there are clear political divisions across US think tanks today (Abelson 2018). In the ongoing policy debates on how to defend the nation in cyberspace, non-partisan task forces and commissions put forward policy recommendations based on their ‘objective’ assessment of the nature of cyberspace and the actors acting within it. One of the most iterated recommendations revolves around how to achieve credible cyber deterrence.¶ Yet, the next subsection reviews the policy recommendations related to cyber deterrence made by commissions and task forces during the Obama Administration and in doing so, challenges the idea of experts as nothing but the embodiments of a dominant knowledge regime. The first subsection reads the relationship between policy expert and government as a hysteric social bond where cyber deterrence is kept out of reach by constantly changing demands or demands that are articulated so vaguely that they are impossible for the government to meet. The second subsection analyses the US cyber policy experts’ entry into the government as a break with the hysteric social bond that risks forcing the neurotic subject to confront its own desire, but it shows that such a move is accompanied by a constant reinvention of excuses as to why the expert-turned-master is unable to provide the cyber defence it is responsible for, ultimately leading to a definition of the object of desire as that which the subject cannot currently do: criticise and make demands. In this way, the hysteric social bond between experts who reproduce insecurities through demands for policy change and a government that seeks to accommodate these demands is sustained.¶ The desire for a desire unfulfilled¶ At the end of 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) brought together policy experts to develop cybersecurity recommendation for the incoming president. Under the headline ‘Military Doctrine and Deterrence’, the commission report emphasised the importance of ‘the need for a credible military presence in cyberspace to provide a deterrent against potential attackers’ (CSIS 2008, 24). The following quote from the report, however, calls in to question the commission’s own recommendation: Deterrence in cyberspace is particularly complicated because of the problems with attribution and identification. If a country does not know who is attacking, it is difficult to create appropriate and proportionate responses in ways that reduce the chance of escalation. A signal that a country is contemplating a response that goes to all potential attackers will not deter and could actually create more conflict (ibid.: 26). In short, if the attacker is not attributable and hence does not fear retaliation, then even the most potent cyber military is superfluous. To make a policy recommendation and in the same breath call into question the soundness of this policy is a hysteric communication par excellence. It avoids the anxiety that emerges when the specific object of desire (offensive military capabilities) is achieved by already introducing a new object of desire (better attribution).¶ Tellingly, the Administration’s decision to establish the US Cyber Command, the cyber branch of the US military, was immediately criticised as insufficient. CSIS director James Lewis underlined, for example, that ‘the U.S. is widely recognized to have pre-eminent offensive cyber capabilities, but it obtains little or no deterrent effect from this’ (cited in Markoff, Sanger, and Shanker 2010). In other words, the government should do a better job defending against and identifying the culprits in cyberspace.¶ Then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III was ready with a plan for improving cyber defence capacities. Presenting the Department’s cyber strategy, Lynn underlined that ‘[US cyber] deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation’ (Lynn III 2010, 99–100). The newfound priority of cyber defence did not appear to reassure the expert subject. As a case in point, the National Research Council (NRC) hosted a 2010 workshop with policy experts on cyber deterrence. And shortly after, the independent Defense Science Board (DSB) created a task force on Resilient Military System and the Advanced Cyber Threat to provide recommendations on how to maintain deterrence in the cyber era. Neither the NRC workshop nor the DSB report found offensive cyber capabilities or cyber defence to be the solution to the cyber deterrence problem. Instead, the desired object had drifted along: Now, the Administration needs to clearly articulate the willingness and the capacity to respond to cyberattacks not only with cyber weapons but with all available tools – ultimately nuclear weapons (DSB 2013: 15; Rosenzweig 2010, 247).¶ Articulating the willingness to respond to cyberattacks with any means was first introduced by the Obama Administration in the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace and subsequently iterated in both the Department of Defense (2015) Cyber Strategy as well as in a White House cyber deterrence white paper of late 2015 (Obama 2011: 14; Department of Defense 2015: 11; Otto 2015). However, as is prototypical in a hysteric social bond, getting close to the object of desire – that is, having more steadfast articulations about the willingness to retaliate – causes anxiety that prompts a slide towards a new object of desire. In this case, manifesting in a redefinition of the meaning of cyber deterrence.¶ Two subsequent commission reports on cyber deterrence, namely the CSIS cyber recommendations to President Trump and the 2017 DSB follow-up report on cyber deterrence (CSIS 2017a; DSB. 2017), no longer focused only on large-scale cyberattacks against the US critical infrastructures as that which needed to be deterred. In fact, the government’s cyber deterrence’s efforts including the articulation of a willingness to respond with all means necessary seemed to have worked, as no serious, crippling cyberattacks against US critical infrastructures had taken place – despite the experts’ continuous criticisms of US national cyber insecurity. What the US did not prevent, however, was economic cyber espionage and minor, non-destructive disturbances of public and private networks. Thus, in the new commission reports, the anxiety over such malicious cyber activity was now included as that which needed to be deterred. Once again, anxiety pushes desire along, now in the form of a desire for better defining a proportional response to cyberattacks on private entities and economic espionage. This drift to better declaratory policy also offers an explanation as to why the government – when it finally delivered on the previous demand for better attribution – failed to satisfy the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence. In 2014, the US successfully attributed and indicted Chinese government hackers for commercial cyber espionage, but as the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence now involved a desire for a strong national security response to cyber espionage, the US government’s attributions only reinforced the demands for economic sanctions (Nakashima 2015).¶ In short, as soon as the government delivers, the expert subject’s desire shifts, from offensive military capabilities in cyberspace to better attribution, to an articulation of willingness to respond, and most recently, to the need to define proportional responses to non-military cyber activity. With the drift, the cyber threat continues as a pertinent national security challenge – to which the solution remains always just out of reach.