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Articulating Chinese threats to cybersecurity papers over the internal sociopolitical contradictions present in the United States, serving to create a homogenized understanding of both countries that ultimately results in more threats and insecurity

Jacobsen 20

Jeppe Teglskov, assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. “Lacan in the US cyber defence: Between public discourse and transgressive practice.” Review of International Studies. 2020. Pg 10-18. LJS

In short, the US cyber defence community represents China’s behaviour in cyberspace as a threat that transgresses the values and norms the United States officially follows and promotes. China is everything the United States is not. The Chinese government has an omnipresent gaze, enabled by excessive use of surveillance techniques and censorship, which challenges and violates the respect for and protection of freedom of expression and privacy that the United States promotes online. The Great Firewall represents to the US cyber defence community an attempt to secure the power of the Chinese government and the United States seeks to secure liberal values for all in cyberspace. Thus, Chinese government’s primary interest in consolidating its own centralised power by draining the economic power of others through cyber theft of intellectual property undermines the United States’ official ambition of becoming the global force for good that brings economic prosperity to billions all over the world. Lastly, the opaque Chinese government/patriotic hacker relationship is a transgression of the idea of a transparent and lawabiding state that the United States publicly promotes and defends. Let me now turn to the second step in the symptomal reading; namely highlighting what tensions in the US cyber defence the Chinese fantasy displaces, how the Chinese threat object is taking on different opposing features, and where the ‘repressed’ returns. First, ‘China in cyberspace’ displaces the fact that there are more uncomfortable and disavowed ‘truths’ about the cyberspace politics in the United States, ‘truths’ that are pushed to the margins of the US cyber defence discourse. Prior to the Snowden revelations, this was, for example, the fact that American privacy online is under pressure, not only from Facebook but also from the intelligence agencies’ attempt to prevent terrorism. Similarly, one can detect a process of displacement in relation to the fact that the United States’ pursuit of military superiority in cyberspace involves exploiting vulnerabilities in IT systems used by Americans as well as allies, which ultimately reproduces an environment that is technically insecure. Pushed to the margins by the Chinese fantasy is also the fact that the US cyber defence community itself is riddled with tensions, for example, over funding or who should have authority over the US cyber capabilities – that is, whether to use software exploits (cyber weapons) for intelligence (NSA) or military (US Cyber Command) purposes. Thus, ‘China in cyberspace’ is a symptom of more fundamental tensions. It plays a role as the object that prevents the US cyber defence community from confronting the fact that it is neither defending cyberspace nor is a homogenous whole. In other words, China is not only our other, it is that which enable us to keep the illusion that we are a ‘whole’ American self, and that which allows us to identify with this self. It prevents the US cyber defence community from confronting the fact that the very social field it represents is structured around an impossibility – that fulfilling a fantasy does not deliver the enjoyment it promises. Second, the displacement is supported by a condensation: the Chinese cyber threat takes on contradictory features. While more ‘traditional’ discourse analyses would see such inconsistencies as evidence of a less stable discourse,73 the symptomal reading draws the opposite conclusion. It was noted above, how the Chinese government through its Great Firewall is perceived to exert total control over its citizens and how the government enjoys total homogenisation with these subjects. Yet, it is also commonly understood among members of the US cyber defence community that the technical restrictions deployed by Chinese government authorities are easily circumvented by Chinese netizens and that the general level of cybersecurity in China is low. This is illustrated, for example, by a US Cyber Command official who explained in an interview that the NSA with ease had penetrated networks in Chinese universities, mobile phones, fibre-optic cables and servers controlled by the Chinese government, and second, by an official US policy that invests millions of dollars in technologies to promote freedom online, including tools for citizens to circumvent censorship regimes.74 According to the logic of condensation, the perception of the weaknesses of Chinese cybersecurity exacerbates, rather than dampens the perception of China as a threat. In an interview, a US official working with cyber defence policy worried that the insufficient Chinese cybersecurity allows other groups to route their cyberattacks through Chinese networks, while permitting China to deny responsibility for any hostile cyber activity with reference to a possible third party having penetrated its IT infrastructure. In other words, China is both a cyber superpower and cybersecurity novice – and threatening for both reasons. However, what hold these conflicting narratives together is what they have in common. In both cases, the Chinese government enjoys what the US cyber defence community cannot have: plausible deniability due to poor cybersecurity and totalitarian control with its citizens. This is the role of condensation. Importantly, while China is a symptom that displaces other more fundamental ‘truths’, these ‘truths’ return. Thus, the Snowden revelations symbolise ‘a return of the repressed’. Snowden and other whistleblowers revealed how the US cyber defence community is not simply defending a unified United States from Chinese threats from cyberspace but is conducting excessive surveillance and cyber exploitation practices; as will be elaborated in the following, the US cyber defence entities undermine global network security, collect data on its own citizens, and bribe private companies to share more user data than necessary – and they lie to Congress about it. As I will argue, these transgressive practices should not be understood as being detached from the official US cyber defence discourse characterised by restraint, transparency and clarity, but as constitutive hereof. Transgression is closely connected to the fantasmatic distinction between an idealised harmonious self and the Chinese symptom. The last section elaborates this claim by extracting the kernel of enjoyment that work to sustain the US cyber defence discourse.

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