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The aff’s diplomatic engagement is an attempt to shore up US power through consent- it still relies on imperial power to achieve compliance

De Graaff and van Apeldoorn in 2011

Naná de Graaff VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands Bastiaan van Apeldoorn VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics, Critical Sociology 37(4) 403–427

It is true of course that Obama also at the same time, and in contrast to his predecessor, emphasizes the important role of international institutions and regimes (lauding in particular the United Nations) and since taking office has stepped up, next to the deliberate public relations efforts to restore America’s image abroad, the kind of diplomatic engagement – including with so-called rogue states – that was already going on in a more muted way at the end of the Bush reign. Although this engagement in the meantime has turned out to be less effective than hoped for and is being criticized from both the left and the right, and for instance vis-a-vis Iran a more hard-line stance seems now again in the offing, not just in style and tone but also in terms of actual foreign policy-making during Obama’s first year ‘the multilateral gloves’ (Stokes, 2005) have to some extent been put back on. This seems to fit well with a ‘liberal internationalist’ outlook such as was also expressed by previous democratic administrations (see e.g. Chanley, 1999). Yet this should not be taken as simply a return to previous policies. First, the renewed emphasis on institutions and diplomacy is combined with a continued emphasis on the need to enhance and apply military power, and more so than during the last Democratic presidency. A clear testimony of this is Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in which he stated that ‘it was not just simply international institutions … that brought stability to a post-World War II world … The United States of America has helped to underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strengths of our arms’ (Obama, 2009b). In the same speech, praised by the leading neoconservative Robert Kagan (2009) as signalling a ‘significant shift’ towards ‘a tougher, less forgiving, more quintessentially American approach’, Obama moreover reiterated that ‘I – like any head of state – reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation.’ (Obama, 2009b) Second, inasmuch as Obama does represent a relative shift back from coercion to consent, this should be seen in light of the failures of the coercive strategies of neoconservative imperialism. As the latter has undermined consent for US power so much as to become rather counter-productive, playing the ‘goodwill’ card may not only come naturally to Obama, but could also be seen as a strategy to seek to restore what is left of US global hegemony. The renewed search for consent that we have observed in Obama’s first year, however, is one that is born out of the fact that the USA has only a few cards left. This is crucially different from the neoliberal project of the Clinton years, which were the heyday for the power of both the USA and the neoliberal ideology. In short, inasmuch as multilateralism is making something of a comeback, it is out of weakness rather than strength. Finally, as indicated, the biggest challenge for Obama arguably lies on the economic front, where Obama not only has to adapt to the new multipolar reality and the loss of US structural power, but also will have to cope with the economic and ideological failure of the neoliberal accumulation strategy that has been pursued over the past decades; a failure which can be seen as at the heart of the current economic crisis. Returning to our network analysis above, the fact that largely the same people, linked to the same capital interests, which promoted the neoliberal accumulation strategy in the 1990s in the first place (e.g. Larry Summers, Paul Volcker) are now in charge of solving the crisis, in this respect may not bode well. Although Obama has recognized, and indeed made into a key priority of his overall foreign policy, the need to tackle the financial crisis also at a global level, in particular through the G-20 as the new primary platform for global economic governance, the three summits held thus far have produced little in the way of concrete steps towards a global reregulation of finance that could really form the basis for an alternative global growth model.

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