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Hybrid warfare discourse displaces security anxieties by framing Russia as an evil Other that must be contained- it results in limited understanding of the root causes of war and turns the case

Ünver and Kurnaz 22

H. Akın, Department of International Relations @ Özyeğin University - Istanbul, Turkey; Ahmet, Department of Public Administration and Political Science @ Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University - Çanakkale, Turkey. “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis.” SSRN. 4/5/2022. Pg 2-16. LJS

To sum up, NATO’s discourse on disinformation presents a discursive continuity and is broadly in line with its securitization preferences prior to the popularization of the terms ‘fake news’ or ‘information operations’. By leveraging a buzzword that has mainstream popularity, NATO’s discursive efforts refocus the alliance’s strategic agenda back on Russia, and semantically clusters these securitization moves on existing competition areas with Moscow. Since securitization is the process by which regular events, actors and phenomena are elevated into a policy frame that requires special measures, NATO’s disinformation discourse directly fits into the theoretical spectrum. NATO’s 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration and the 2019 London Declaration both prioritized disinformation as a major, strategic-level alliance threat and combating information warfare have been integrated into NATO military exercises since 2017. NATO has been running wargames that focus on coordinated, Russian-origin disinformation campaigns against NATO battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland and has been investing in the establishment of new digital countermeasure labs (NATO, 2020). In other words, as a successful securitization effort, disinformation has been receiving ample attention, resources and cohesion-building initiatives within the NATO framework. As part of this strategy, NATO’s securitization efforts have a clear securitizing agent (alliance), existential threat (Russian-origin information warfare), a referent object (alliance cohesion, electoral integrity) and an audience (international public opinion), along with new doctrinal changes and investment schemees.5 Discussion and ConclusionOur analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its offcial documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in offcial documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its offcial documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging. The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like offcial speeches, texts and reports.This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s offcial statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem. Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there isn’t a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter into NATO threat language, NATO’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis or pre- and post-2014 documents that prioritize Russia as a threat alike, implying that it is not really disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This suggests the hypothesis that even if technologies change, NATO-Russia rivalry will remain securitized the same way. In other words, contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.

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