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Your presumption should be that all aff evidence is a pile of lies- their authors have specific political and economic incentives to overstate threats and hype the value of the MIC

Edmund F. Byrne in 2017

Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis, IN, USA; Military Industrial Complex (MIC); Springer International Publishing AG 2017D.C. Poff, A.C. Michalos (eds.), Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics,DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-23514-1_209-1

“The military-industrial complex” (MIC) refers to a self-sustaining politico-economic system that perpetuates profitability in military supplies industries, de facto in multiple countries but primarily in the USA. It is made up of competing and/or collaborating entities – the maintenance of which is on the whole financially advantageous to all concerned. These include professional soldiers et al., managers and owners of industries that supply military equipment, government officials whose careers and interests are tied to military expenditure, and legislators whose districts benefit from defense procurement (Rosen 1973, pp. 1–2). The complex business objectives sought by these and other related personnel are fostered in part by exalting technical possibilities but also by spreading fear as to dangers that are imminent and can be countered only by maintaining the highest feasible level of military preparedness (Hallowell 2016). In pursuit of these objectives, MIC participants’ budgetary requests amount to meticulously orchestrated industry advertising portrayed as strategic force requirements. Given this state of affairs, the preeminent business ethical questions with regard to an MIC involve ends as well as means, i.e., not only death and destruction but systemically inherent pork and waste. C. Wright Mills (1956) formulated the concept of an MIC, and President Dwight Eisenhower famously warned about it in his 1961 Farewell Address. The entity itself had come into being during WWII as competing countries built up their military hardware in concert with the buildup of military manpower. When that war came to a cataclysmic end, the losers’ industries were severely pacified; but the winners, especially in the USA, intensified their production of warmaking equipment and, no less assiduously, their search for enemies against whom that equipment could be used (short of nuclear holocaust). And whenever so used if not used up the user government needed to fund so-called defense industry corporations to replace shortfalls of old equipment; and, increasingly, this process of replacing the old came to be supplemented with projects to introduce new means of mayhem aimed at meeting speculative future challenges. If this industry consisted as do others of freestanding companies that respond to changes in the market by changing their mix of products to remain relevant, its list of products would have changed considerably over the past seventy-some years. And in fact, budgetary reductions were at times deemed circumstantially possible and desirable, e.g., at the end of a war, notably that in Vietnam, or more so following the demise of the USSR. MIC companies are not free-standing, however, but depend on government funding the size of which is based on a need to confront dangers that seemingly can only increase. Thus challenged the industry seldom discontinues old products, not even if the military itself asserts no need for them; and new products are rarely left unfunded merely because experts claim they will never be effective. In an artificial budgetary climate like this, in which careful estimates of demonstrable need are seldom relied on, budgetary bottom lines are more likely to be derived from actual confrontations such as the September 11, 2001, attacks. For these lend weight to estimates of risks posed by terrorists whose defeat will require a massive infusion of funds into companies whose products and services will be needed if the nation is to be adequately “defended.” The MIC’s monetary distribution system involves interdependencies so complex that downsizing, never mind abolishing, it is generally deemed virtually unthinkable. Lobbyists for the contractors give their preferences weight by distributing vast sums of money to parties issuing contracts through the US Department of Defense (DoD) (OpenSecrets.org 2015). In addition, the actual manufacture of parts for weapons systems is distributed among plants deliberately located in most if not every Congressional district. A Congressional representative’s campaign contributions, hence voter support, ultimately depend on his or her level of support for the budget from which local defense manufacturers receive their contracts. Governmental public and nonpublic MIC employees similarly risk losing their jobs if they are not supportive of this system in every way (Hartung 2011, Chap. 1; Reich 2010). Apart from these domestic arrangements, many of the companies dealing with DoD are multinational in scope, and thus so is the US MIC. Non-US weapons procurers deal directly not with contractors but with Foreign Military Sales (FMS), a program in DoD, that uses the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as its intermediary.

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