The MIC is a result of economic crises generated by capitalism. Their authors are corrupt with specific incentives to continue this system- the result is that the “efficiencies” the aff proclaims come from stripping away money from other needs
Thomas K. Duncan and Christopher J. Coyne in 2013
Department of Economics, George Mason University; The Origins of the Permanent War Economy¶ ; https://www.ccoyne.com/Origins_of_the_Permanent_War_Economy_-_final.pdf
The military-industrial complex that Eisenhower (1961) warned of has become a vast network of¶ expanded political power, enlarged profits, and increased state authority. Indeed, national¶ security, in terms of dollars, mentality, and interests, has bled into nearly every aspect of¶ American life (Turse 2008), creeping into nearly every federal department (Mueller and Stewart¶ 2011), into domestic and international humanitarian efforts (Coyne 2008, 2013), and even into¶ domestic policing (Hall and Coyne 2013). The result has been a lasting impact on the evolution¶ and structure of private industry (Duncan and Coyne forthcoming). Defense funding goes not¶ only to giants like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, but also filters through¶ subcontractors and supportive non-military firms and organizations to influence “professional¶ and business services, financial, information and administrative services, retail trade, leisure and¶ hospitality services, education and health services, construction, and other manufacturing”¶ (Fuller 2011, 1). How did this permanent war economy emerge?¶ This paper answers this important question. Our analysis emphasizes the combined¶ efforts of three key interest groups (unions, industry, military) that arose in the context of the¶ dual crises of the Great Depression and World War II. In any good crisis, there are multiple¶ parties ready to take advantage of the state of emergency (Higgs 1987, 2004, 2005a, 2006, 2012).¶ During the depression and the war that followed, a partnership between industry, the military,¶ and politicians emerged. The Great Depression and World War II resulted in increased spending¶ by government, and a variety of interests groups took advantage of the opportunity to advance¶ their interests: unions with jobs, industry with profits, military branches with budgets, and¶ politicians with votes and lobbying stemming from the support of these interests. These crises, ¶ combined with the State’s monopoly over the military, created the opportunity for these interests¶ to influence the trajectory of economic activity in a lasting, and self-serving, manner.¶ This paper contributes to two interrelated strands of literature. Firstly, we contribute to¶ the literature on the origins of the permanent war economy (Oakes 1944; Vance 1951a, 1951b,¶ 1951c, 1951d, 1951e, 1951f; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Vatter 1985). This literature emphasizes¶ how the origin of the permanent war economy was a solution to the unemployment problem that¶ plagued capitalism. Our explanation, in contrast, emphasizes the central role of government’s¶ monopoly on the military and the desire of powerful special interests to secure the rents of that¶ monopoly in the context of the crises of the Great Depression and World War II.¶ Secondly, we extend the literature on the distortionary effects of the permanent war¶ economy (Russet 1971; Melman 1970, 1971, 1985; Rothbard 1989; Higgs 2006; Duncan and¶ Coyne forthcoming) by linking its origin and perpetuation to special interests. Those who argue¶ for the necessity of a constant state of military readiness tend to overlook, or at least¶ underestimate, the negative effects of military spending in terms of rent-seeking behaviors by¶ private interests. While the permanent war economy generates a mutual benefit for government¶ and private interests, it also generates a significant negative externality by diverting resources¶ from other, private uses.