NATO is an institution created to prop up an imperial world order that guarantees the continuation of western capitalism- it generates stability necessary to ensure the flow of goods and resources toward capitalist centers of power
INDERJEET PARMAR in 2018
Professor of international politics and head of department of international politics at city, university of London; The US-led liberal order:¶ imperialism by another name?; International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 151–172; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix240
My critical approach connects Gramscian thinking with a largely forgotten early¶ twentieth-century socialist theoretician of ‘ultra-imperialism’—Karl Kautsky.¶ According to Kautsky, in contrast to Lenin’s claim of the inevitability of interimperial¶ wars of hegemony, ultra-imperialism—the tendency of national ruling¶ classes to form international class-based alliances to jointly exploit the world’s¶ resources47—leads to cooperation rather than conflict between capitalist states.¶ Kautsky notes that inter-capitalist corporate/state cooperation could take¶ numerous forms—such as cartel-like agreements or even the formation of a¶ ‘league of states’.48 Of course, there is a strong tradition of critical thinking by¶ neo-Gramscians—including Cox and Gill, but also other Marxists such as Kees¶ van der Pijl49—that extends to the building of transnational alliances. That¶ work, however, largely focuses on alliances of the Cold War era between the¶ United States and western Europe as junior partner. In this article, I consider¶ two Asian states—South Korea and China—whose political–cultural incorporation¶ would clearly differ from the Euro-American example. On the other hand,¶ all incorporation processes come up against strictly national interests and specific¶ cultural differences, including in the British case: hence the controversies over¶ naval armaments in the 1920s and the terms of the alliance after 1945, the refusal¶ by Prime Minister Harold Wilson to support the United States with troops in¶ Vietnam and, later, frictions over the Falklands War.50 The attempt to incorporate¶ any power, great or small, is always going to be extremely difficult.¶ Kautsky is forgotten largely because his claim—which essentially suggested¶ there would be no major war between capitalist Great Powers—was spectacularly¶ disproved by the outbreak of the First World War.51 However, clearly there are¶ numerous alliances and international agreements that uphold Kautsky’s approach.¶ The EU is a case in point—a supranational alliance, bringing together several¶ great and smaller powers with a colonial past, which has effectively prevented¶ war between them and generated enduring cooperation over decades. Stokes¶ argues that American power, exercised via the LIO with its panoply of multilateral¶ organizations, perfectly exemplifies ultra-imperialism given its system-maintenance¶ role serving a range of other states—much to President Donald¶ Trump’s pluto-populist chagrin.52¶ Kautsky’s ultra-imperialism was hardly a utopia free of rivalries and wars,¶ however, given the levels of exploitation and subordination endemic in capitalist¶ international relations.53 Yet even critics argue that Kautsky’s idea has applicability¶ to the post-1945 era of the LIO, underpinned by US hegemony and an¶ influential web of institutions that embed western powers—NATO, the IMF,¶ the World Bank and the G7, among others. Indeed, it could be argued that since¶ 1989 ultra-imperialism spans virtually the world,54 although I would argue that¶ in the case of China the process began in the late 1970s. Of course, Kautsky is¶ clear that the pattern of international capitalist alliances is subject to change along¶ with the uneven development of power and economic strength. Therefore, we¶ would expect tensions to emerge within the system of relationships, despite the¶ basis of shared interests, placing great strain on institutions amid muscle-flexing¶ on the part of certain states that feel unduly constrained by the international¶ system. Hence the current tensions between the Trump administration and China,¶ Germany, the EU and NATO, for example. Whether this represents the breakdown¶ of the post-1945 order or its recalibration remains to be seen.¶ Kautsky is therefore useful for our understanding of the LIO in two ways:¶ first, in suggesting that, notwithstanding the emergence of unavoidable tensions,¶ war is not inevitable between Great Powers, but for reasons rather different from¶ those suggested by liberal internationalism’s egalitarian and benign ideas about¶ interdependence; and second, in pointing out that Great Powers, aiming to jointly¶ promote their power against others at home and abroad, build alliances with their¶ elite foreign counterparts where they already hold power or, by extension, where¶ such a nascent elite might be fostered. Such is the case in the instances of South ¶ Korea and China discussed below. In neither case is there any suggestion that¶ one state controls another—the point is that their ruling elites hold shared interests,¶ even if that means their enrichment at the expense of the broad mass of¶ their own people. This analysis challenges Leninist,55 realist and liberal conceptions¶ of the international order: the system is imperial but not necessarily doomed¶ to perpetual war, and is not benignly liberal. This is international ‘high’ (class)¶ politics—cooperation for shared narrow self-interest but resting on unstable social¶ and political foundations.¶ Ikenberry’s benign interpretation of the US-led order is read back into the activities¶ between 1939 and 1945 of elite planners of the postwar order. Developing the¶ ‘Grand Area’ concept, planners in the State Department and the Council on Foreign¶ Relations (CFR) identified the world zones the United States ‘required’ in order to¶ avoid having to radically reform its economy—zones that together encompassed¶ practically the whole world.56 The key point elided is that it was to cohere that¶ imperial ‘Grand Area’ that so much of the institutional architecture of western¶ power was built—the IMF and World Bank, the UN, the Marshall Plan, GATT¶ and NATO.57 The interrelations between the Grand Area’s regions were never¶ envisaged as being in any sense equal—raw materials would flow towards western¶ reconstruction and social peace, and finished industrial goods in the other direction.¶ The postwar settlement at home that coalesced, as Hogan argues,58 around¶ high-technology capital-intensive industries, international finance and organized¶ skilled labour, was located within an international settlement that secured broad¶ corporate interests under the auspices of an interventionist state. And, in that¶ respect, America’s military capacity to police flows of goods across the world was¶ at the very least a part of the reason why the United States acquired ‘forward¶ bases in Asia and Europe’.59 As policy-makers such as Henry Stimson and John J.¶ McCloy noted, American and western well-being relied on ‘“open markets, access¶ to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along¶ liberal capitalist lines”’.60¶ CFR and State Department wartime planning was therefore driven above all by¶ a vision of global–imperial leadership exercised by US elites, strongly supported¶ by Britain’s ruling elites, via an international order of organizations and relationships.¶ 61 The aim was, acting in concert with Britain’s elites, to resurrect European¶ Great Powers by means including the restoration of shattered colonial trading and¶ economic and financial linkages. The Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction¶ in just that global context.62 The UN was envisaged as a key international¶ agency for American imperial internationalism, at least in its earliest days63—and, as¶ its role in the making of South Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s¶ role in that country today. And, as I will show below, the building of a hegemonic¶ multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci–Kautsky synthesis.