The alternative is critical peace research, a strategy that continuously critiques and questions sovereign conceptions of violence and peace while simultaneously committing to the ethical and practical imperative of non-violent resistance to structures of domination.
Jackson 15 – prof of peace and conflict studies @ U of Otago
(Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31)
Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281). A third important epistemological stance is a deep awareness of the linkages between power and knowledge, particularly in terms of the different ways in which knowledge can be employed by actors as a political tool of influence and domination. For example, critical scholars are sceptical of the way in which certain kinds of knowledge claims about peace and conflict – for example, that movements who resist and contest neoliberalism or reject dialogue are by definition ‘spoilers’, or that dialogue is an inherent social good, or that neo- liberal peacebuilding leads inevitably to ‘peace’ – have been used by governments and international organisations to de- legitimise certain kinds of struggles and support certain kinds of externally imposed ‘solutions’ (see Duffield 2001). Consequently, critical scholars begin by asking: Who is peace and conflict research for? How does peace research support particular interests? What are the ideological effects of peace research, particularly on those societies being studied? Another important epistemological issue for CPR is the notion of categories and how they are applied, particularly in research on political violence, peace, reconciliation and the like (Jackson et al. 2011: 158–164). While categories can be very useful for understanding complex realities and uncovering salient aspects of a particular phenomenon, they are at the same time profoundly problematic. In particular, critical scholars are concerned that when typologies are presented as universally applicable, without recognition of the specific power- knowledge structures in which they emerged and which sustain them, they can function as a tool of ideology, in part through their assumptions of ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’, and their reliance on presumed essences and binary differences. As Foucault (1970) argues in The Order of Things, at their root, orders or categories are never natural or objective, but part of a political- historical structure. In contrast, critical scholars do not view their categories as timeless or universal, but as products of a particular set of power structures and their regimes. As such, they should be continuously interrogated, their boundaries, dichotomies and causal implications problematised, and their political and ideological effects exposed. This has certainly been the case by CTS scholars in the terrorism field (see Jackson et al. 2011). Methodological commitments The ontological and epistemological commitments outlined thus far have a number of important specific consequences for method and research practice. First, critical scholars are committed to transparency about their own values and standpoints, particularly as they relate to the interests and values of the societies in which they live and work. For Western- based scholars, this translates into an abiding commitment to being aware of, and trying to overcome, the Eurocentric, Orientalist, and patriarchal forms of knowledge often prevalent within Peace Studies, Security Studies, IR, and other areas of social science more generally (see Henderson 2013; Toros and Gunning 2009). Related to this, critical scholars are committed to taking subjectivity seriously, in terms of both the researcher and the research subject (Dauphinee 2007). This means being aware of, and transparent about, the values and impact of the researcher on the process and outcomes of the research, and being willing to seriously engage with the viewpoint and perceptions of the Other, particularly those who have been demonised or silenced in broader peace and security discourses. As Jutila, Pehkonen and Vayrynen (2008: 628) put it, the peace researcher ‘should enter into the life- worlds of the groups she or he studies before venturing to write about them’. Another commitment of a critical approach is to methodological and disciplinary pluralism – a willingness to embrace the insights and perspectives of different academic disciplines, intellectual approaches, and schools of thought. In particular, critical scholars see value in post- positivist and non- IR-based methods and approaches, such as discourse analysis, post-structuralism, constructivism, Critical Theory, historical materialism, history, ethnography and others. In one respect, this means refusing to be limited by the narrow logic of normal social scientific explanation based on linear notions of cause and effect. Instead, a critical perspective argues that adopting an interpretive ‘logic of understanding’ rooted in ‘how possible’ rather than ‘what causes’ questions, can open space for subjects, perspectives and affective forms of understanding that are often foreclosed by traditional social science (see Doty 1993). A final important methodological commitment is a permanent adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various end- users of peace and conflict research, including informants, the communities from which insurgents or rebels come, vulnerable populations like refugees or child soldiers, and the populations who bear the brunt of counter- insurgency campaigns or peacebuilding programmes – as well as the wider public, other academics, and policymakers. More concretely, this means ‘recognising the human behind the label’ (Booth 2008: 73), identifying marginalised and silenced voices, the adoption of a ‘do no harm’ approach, operating transparently as a researcher, recognising the different kinds of vulnerability of those being researched, honouring undertakings of confidentiality and protecting interviewees, utilising principles of informed consent, and taking responsibility for the anticipated impact of research and the ways in which it may be utilised (Breen Smyth 2009). A critical praxis of peace research Simultaneous with the ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments described above, CPR is rooted in a broad but clear set of ethical- normative and praxiological commitments. These commitments are based first and foremost on the recognition that ‘no reality transforms itself ’ (Freire 1993: 53); rather, human agents must engage in critical interventions – critical praxis – in order to transform oppression. Related to this, it is based on the acceptance of the inherently degenerate and harmful nature of all forms of structural, cultural and direct violence. Consequently, critical research implicitly and explicitly questions both the ways in which dominant Western narratives have constructed their own practices of war and humanitarian intervention as legitimate violence, and the power structures, practices and narratives in the Western- dominated status quo which make direct and structural violence possible – including narratives of ‘new barbarism’, ethnic essentialism, worthy and unworthy victims, ‘good wars’, democratic peace, peacebuilding and the instrumental rationality of legitimate political violence (see Jabri 1996). More specifically, a critical approach involves a shift from state- centrism and making state security and system stability the central concern, to a focus on the security, freedom, and well- being of human individuals and communities. Critical scholars tend to prioritise human security and societal security over national security, and they are committed to minimizing all forms of physical, structural, and cultural violence (Toros and Gunning 2009), including that which results from states and international organisations, and from practices such as humanitarian intervention, diplomacy, peacebuilding, and the like. Importantly, this means abandoning the established conflict resolution norm of neutrality in conflict resolution practice, because ‘a neutral stance, without an analysis of power between the parties in conflict, can obfuscate the power differential that exists between parties in conflict and actually undermine the efforts of oppressed people by tacitly or explicitly supporting the prevailing ideology and social order oppressing them’ (Hansen 2008: 412). Third- party neutrality, in this context, functions to reinforce the status quo and unwittingly oppress the very people they are serving. Related to this, CPR takes seriously the scholarly and practical exploration of non- violent resistance and agonistic dialogue as practical alternatives to both legitimate and illegitimate forms of political violence. Importantly, this entails the adoption of an explicitly critical approach to conflict resolution practice, whether it is third- party peacemaking or peacekeeping (Pugh 2004, 2005) during the open conflict stage, or stabilisation and peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2012a) during the post- conflict stage. In either case, CPR entails a commitment to non-violent alternatives to the use of military force, local ownership and empowerment, resistance to oppression, the priority of social justice, the transformation of structures of structural and cultural violence (which may therefore entail the rejection of neo- liberal economic and political forms), and agonistic forms of politics. Critical scholars are committed to engaging equally with both policy-makers – the officials who have to make policies to deal with conflict and violence – and policy- takers – the groups and wider societies who have to bear the brunt of humanitarian intervention, neo- liberal peacebuilding policies or other peace efforts. Engaging with policy- takers lessens the risk of co- option by the status quo, particularly if those thus engaged include members of communities labelled as ‘protestors’, ‘activists’, ‘rebels’, ‘insurgents’ or even ‘terrorists’. However, to be effective in realising the potential for positive change within the status quo, critical scholars must simultaneously strive to engage with those who are embedded in the state, international officials, and so on. Collectively, this set of commitments – to human security over state security, to ending avoidable suffering, to minimising and questioning all forms of violence, to continuous immanent critique, including conflict resolution practice, and to positively transforming existing structures, including neo- liberal capitalism – can be described as a broad commitment to the notion of emancipation (see Jackson et al. 2009: 226–227), or what Freire (1993: 66) more simply calls ‘the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human.’ Despite objections to the term and its past implication in violent hegemonic projects, critical scholars for the most part see emancipation as a process of trying to construct ‘concrete utopias’ by realising the unfulfilled potential of existing structures, freeing individuals from unnecessary structural constraints, and the democratisation of the public sphere (Wyn Jones 2004: 229–232). Importantly, emancipation should be seen as a continuous process of struggle and critique rather than any particular endpoint or universal grand narrative. Critical pedagogy Lastly, given the importance and centrality of teaching to Peace Studies, I would argue that CPR is openly committed to critical pedagogy (Freire 1993; see also Hansen 2008). Such a commitment is rooted in an understanding that teaching can never be neutral; instead, ‘education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes . . . the means by which men and women . . . discover how to participate in the transformation of their world’ (Shaull 1993: 34; original emphasis). In other words, instead of problem- solving education, CPR ought to be oriented towards a kind of ‘problem- posing education’ in which ‘students learn to deconstruct the societal ideology affecting them in their everyday lives, see how it inhibits attainment of their interests, and visualize possible societal changes that could better serve their interests’ (Hansen 2008: 408). This necessarily entails providing students with a language and set of conceptual tools for understanding the ‘problematics of power, agency, and history’ (Macedo 1993: 17), and for developing appropriate modes of resistance and emancipatory action. Such forms of critical pedagogy are inherently praxiological because ‘when individuals reach critical consciousness, it allows them to become subjects in their world, actively and consciously co- creating it, rather than passive “objects” who accept their social reality’ (ibid.). From one vantage point, it also means accepting that ‘education is . . . a subversive force’ (Shaull 1993: 29), and the goal of teaching is in part to radicalise the student because ‘the more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform it’ (Freire 1993: 39). Clearly, at the present juncture, such a critical pedagogy is far removed from the current teaching of Peace Studies, which is largely focused on abstract theorising, (positivist) methodological training, the accumulated empirical findings of the field, inter- personal conflict resolution skills transfers, and the like.