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Beginning with a widened structural criticism of militarism is a pre-requisite to effective critical ethico-political interventions – voting aff crowds out critical readings of militarism

Eastwood, 18 – James, Professor in the School of Politics and IR at the University of London. “Rethinking militarism as ideology: The critique of violence after security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 49 (1-2) – Special issue on Militarism and security: Dialogue, possibilities and limits. 44– 56, doi: 10.1177/0967010617730949, p. 52-54 – KLab

The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization therefore do not yet offer a full account of militarism as I have elaborated it above, in which organized political violence is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This is important because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against these critiques. Revealingly, these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifist or to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’, rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has certainly left their analysis wanting, and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of militarism, it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies arguments calling for desecuritization. For example, Booth argues that security should only ever be the ‘means’ for the ‘end’ of emancipation (Booth, 2007: 114–115) and that means and ends should be related ‘non-dualistically’ (i.e. the means should be consistent with the ends sought; see Booth, 2007: 428–441). He explicitly includes political violence as a means that must be subject to this rule (Booth, 2007: 429–431), and he even embraces aspects of Gandhian nonviolence (Booth, 2007: 115). Discussing the critique offered by securitization theory, he responds, ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored, but there are occasions when introducing a military dimension is sensible’ (Booth, 2007: 168). Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore give him the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing, and that it can be used for progressive ends. What is notable here is that Booth also invokes a thin notion of ‘militarization’, more or less reducible to the decision to use force, to establish his claim. He is quite comfortable with the risks of militarization identified by securitization theory because he believes he has circumvented them. By contrast, the critique of militarism as ideology gives us more powerful tools to disagree with Booth here. For Booth ignores the danger that, in conditions of militarism, war can begin to serve a wide array of non-strategic instrumentalities as a result of its ideological penetration of social relations. Militarism can entrench a pattern of conflict by binding social relations, subjectivities and identities to the pursuit of war, thereby making war far less amenable to ethico-political discipline than he imagines. By setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’, including militarily, Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence. Responding to critiques of securitization in their cosmopolitan approach, Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald are more sensitive to these dangers, admitting that the use of force can entrench conflict and thus impair the longer term pursuit of global security (Burke et al., 2014: 19–21). In response, they argue that the ultimate aim of security practice should always be nonviolence, ‘a gradual but determined demilitarisation of global politics’ in which force is permissible under strict conditions but always regrettable – ‘a pacifism of ends rather than means’ (Burke et al., 2016: 74). They place their confidence in a set of detailed principles restricting the use of force in different circumstances, which they hope will help to avoid these risks (Burke et al., 2014: 71–97, 119–145). Again, however, the ambition for nonviolence rests on the thin basis of an aspiration for ‘demilitarization’, something that they in fact derive from the critique of securitization, rather than an understanding of militarism as ideology. As I have explained above, what characterizes militarism is not violence with a lack of a true justification but an ideological desire for war and military activity. Militarism is therefore fully compatible with a credible justification for violence, and may even draw strength from it. Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald’s criteria for the use of force may well be stricter than available alternatives, therefore, but this is still no guarantee against militarism. Even if they succeeded in preventing some wars, they would still not ensure that the remaining, apparently justified wars did not indulge in and encourage militarism. Cosmopolitan theories therefore do not disrupt the ideological factors making war desirable; rather, they risk supplementing them with additional justifications. A more effective critical intervention against cosmopolitan security is therefore to highlight the dangers of militarism as ideology, rather than simply to call for demilitarization. Conclusion What the above arguments stress is the importance of embracing a critical concept of militarism, one premised on the explicit ambition to disrupt its ideological effects. With this in mind, it is worth considering why most critical security studies scholars prefer to adopt the term ‘militarization’ rather than ‘militarism’. ‘Militarization’ in this usage seems to imply the process of making something a military concern. In this way, it is similar to Shaw’s account, in which militarization implies an increase in the penetration of social relations in general by military relations – or, in other words, the process by which more and more things are made military concerns. For Shaw, the concept of militarism functions as a measure of this penetration. But this is not the same as a critical concept of militarism, in which the specific kind of penetration being analysed is an ideological penetration and in which the intention is to disrupt this penetration through critique. Like Shaw, critical security studies has also understood militarism as a measure (of ‘militarization’) rather than as a critical concept, with the result that its analytic and political potential has been blunted when engaging in the critique of violence. However, this may also be a reflection of an underlying tendency in critical security studies itself. For we could argue that neither security nor securitization are critical concepts in the sense intended by ideology critique. Instead, they are more like measures, in that they measure either how secure something is or how securitized an issue has become. One consequence of this, which is particularly problematic for scholars seeking desecuritization, is that these concepts therefore also actively participate in the process they seek to critique: they name things as ‘security’ issues, even when the argument is that these issues should not be security issues at all. This proliferation of security concerns, encouraged as much by scholarship as by practitioners, results in the ‘crowding out’ of other frameworks that may more accurately reflect the underlying dynamics – concepts such as war (Barkawi, 2011) or neoliberalism (Montesinos Coleman and Rosenow, 2016) – and that may be more appropriate for critical ethico-political interventions into phenomena that critical security studies interprets as security or securitization. My final suggestion is that militarism is yet another concept that risks being obscured in critical security studies analysis by this tendency to measure rather than critique. By contrast, I have shown above how a more critical concept of militarism as ideology can offer a superior starting point for an analysis of the shortcomings of various justifications for the use of force, including those encountered in critical security studies. Militarism can help us to think more precisely about the circumstances in which the use of violence to achieve political objectives (such as ‘security’) can descend into a more generalized and intractable desire for war and military activity. My hope is that from such an understanding we might also better equip ourselves to intervene in this process and resist it.

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