Justifications for the plan are a key site of analysis- leads to an improved understanding of arms control
NEIL COOPER in 2011
Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of¶ Securitization: Moving Weapons along the¶ Security Continuum¶ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.134–158¶ ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online
One of the features of the post-Cold War arms control agenda has been the emergence¶ of a set of control initiatives that are increasingly being categorized under the rubric¶ of humanitarian arms control (HAC)1 or humanitarian disarmament.2 This includes¶ the 1997 Ottawa convention on landmines, the 2008 Convention on Cluster¶ Munitions, various initiatives to restrict the trade in small arms and light weapons,¶ and current attempts to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by 2012. This¶ article focusses, in particular, on the issue of landmines and cluster munitions but¶ also discusses the issue of small arms and the putative ATT. The article has a¶ number of aims. First, to interrogate the claims of proponents that such initiatives represent¶ a novel and benevolent post-Cold War turn in conventional arms trade control,¶ one that illustrates the ability of global civil society to exercise bottom-up power by¶ successfully interjecting human security concerns into a policy field previously¶ dominated by the national security concerns of states. Second, to undertake a critical¶ historical political economy of both pariah weapons regulation in particular and¶ conventional arms transfer regulation in general with a view to highlighting the¶ elements of continuity and change represented by contemporary humanitarian arms¶ control initiatives in comparison with previous eras. Third, to frame this more critical¶ reading of past and current regulation in relation to current debates about the¶ relationship between moments of securitization, the everyday practices of (in)security¶ exercised by the professionals and networks of security, the ability of the powerless¶ to speak security, and the consequences arising from processes of securitization¶ and desecuritization.¶ The first section of the article will outline the Copenhagen School’s (CS) concept¶ of securitization as well as highlighting particular critiques of the concept relevant to¶ the subsequent analysis of humanitarian arms control. The following section will then¶ summarize the key elements in conventional accounts of the post-Cold War HAC¶ agenda and particularly the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions. The¶ next section will locate such campaigns in the much longer history of attempts at¶ pariah weapons regulation that has included attempts to ban various weapons technologies¶ such as the crossbow, the gun, the dum dum bullet, and the submarine. It will be¶ suggested that four factors are crucial in determining the nature of pariah regulation¶ and its relationship to the broader regulatory frameworks governing the conventional¶ defence trade. These are the relationship between regulation and the political and¶ material interests of powerful actors, the relationship between pariah weapons and¶ legitimized military technology, the relationship between economic philosophy and¶ the approach to arms regulation, and the relationship between regulation and the¶ dominant framing of threats. The article will outline how these different factors¶ have influenced conventional weapons regulation in different eras in order to¶ locate contemporary HAC initiatives within this much broader historical political¶ economy of regulation. This provides the basis for a more critical, and historically¶ informed, reading of the HAC agenda, particularly the claim that it represents a¶ novel and benign post-Cold War expression of bottom-up power that has successfully¶ challenged traditional arms control practices that privilege the military security of¶ states over human security considerations. The final section will discuss the relevance¶ of the preceding analysis for both the current debates on the concept of securitization¶ and the campaigning practices of arms trade Non-Governmental Organizations¶ (NGOs).
Ext Cooper-
The justifications behind the plan must be evaluated before determining whether or not they engage in ethical policy making. The guise of humanitarian disarmament covers the relationship between political and material interests of powerful actors – means they must prove the epistemology of the aff is ethical before getting to evaluate their impacts