War hasn’t declined, it’s just transformed- modern tech means fewer battlefield soldiers, more targeted killing, and higher intensity
Michael Mann in 2018
Department of Sociology, University of California Los Angeles; Have wars and violence declined?; Theor Soc (2018) 47:37–60
War is not ending but it is changing. There has been a striking shift, identified by¶ Randall Collins in Theory and Society (1974) from “ferocious” to “callous” cruelty¶ embodying indifference toward the victim. There might be no evolutionary trend¶ toward kindness, merely a shift from inter-personal ferocity to long-distance callous¶ indifference. Plunging sharp weapons into flesh has been replaced by bombing at a¶ distance. Historically swords and javelins inflicted direct bodily violence, one person¶ trying to hack at the body of another. Ferocity is required for this and was valued as a¶ social trait. Bowmen were partly an exception, inflicting death at a distance, but if their¶ infantry and cavalry protectors were dispersed, they would probably be slaughtered.¶ Sports like tournaments and jousting, archery, and quarter-staff combat were specifically¶ geared to ready the medieval population for physical combat. The great warrior¶ was he who was most ferocious and vicious. But the deadliest weapons are now¶ wielded by people who never see the enemy they kill. This was early typified by¶ artillery corps firing on dots in the landscape and it was epitomized by World War II¶ bombers who never saw the enemy at all. Here are the mundane yet chilling words of¶ William Sterling Parsons, the commander of the Enola Gay immediately after he had¶ dropped the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima:¶ Results clear cut successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than any test.¶ Conditions normal in airplane following delivery (quoted by Malesevic 2010, p. 83).¶ There is no hint of any violence in the tone of his log entry, only bureaucratic¶ indifference to the impact of atomic bombs on the victims.¶ Postwar guided missiles further lengthened the distances between killers and victims,¶ while today’s drones can be fired from a continent away. The bulk of military¶ training is now technical, and calmness and callousness, not ferocity, are the dominant¶ martial virtues. There are special force and infantry exceptions to this but ferocity is¶ largely removed from the culture of the Northern countries making war. Randall¶ Collins (2008) has produced extensive data on violent encounters within countries of¶ the North. He notes that those involved are not actually very skilled at body-to-body¶ violence. They flail and slap and they lack the ability to go for the jugular. The abolition¶ of conscription and the use of specialized mercenaries is growing. This removes war¶ from the everyday experience of most young men in the North of the world. There is no¶ need for much cultural resonance of violence or training for inter-personal violence.¶ Indeed, today we regard physically vicious people as deviants. We still have sports like¶ boxing and wrestling (as did medieval people) but these are no longer relevant to war.¶ Again, it is fantasy violence.¶ Also relevant to the question of culture is the proportion of army size to total¶ population, “the military participation ratio,” MPR, pioneered by Stanislas Andreski¶ (1954). Ratios in peacetime ratios are always lower than in wartime so large fluctuations¶ are to be expected across time and space. The earliest estimated ratios are for¶ classical Greece and Rome (ancient Chinese texts give unbelievable figures). Most¶ ratios in the Greek city-stats were in the range of a 3–5% MPR but when threatened by¶ major war this could rise above 10%. Roman figures were higher. As in Sparta the¶ Roman ratio sometimes rose during over 20% (Morris 2005, Patterson 1993). In¶ medieval and modern Europe ratios again fluctuated—under 2% in the twelfth century,¶ growing because of wars in the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, rising to near 20%¶ during the Thirty Years War and then dropping to only about 2% by 1789. The¶ Napoleonic Wars inaugurated another cycle of surge and decline. The ratio reached¶ 11% in the US civil war, and between 7% and 11% among the European Powers in¶ World War I. Ratios were under 1% in the inter-war period but surged to 7–12% in¶ WorldWar II. It then fell through the abandonment of conscription in most countries to¶ under 2% by 2000, and 1% by 2010. Yet a few states in dangerous areas, like the¶ Middle East or East Asia, continue to mobilize 10% of the population.¶ It is difficult to discern long-term trends from this, yet in the advanced countries¶ lower MPRs are likely to stay, the consequence of armed forces becoming much more¶ capital-intensive, requiring the services of fewer soldiers but much larger numbers of¶ civilians to supply them. World War II figures suggest that the United States, Britain,¶ the Soviet Union, and Germany all mobilized at least half of their national product for¶ military spending (Harrison 1988, Harrison table 3). If we could construct an” economic¶ mobilization ratio,” it would probably be much higher than in most prior history.¶ In pre-industrial periods we cannot measure total product, but armaments industries¶ were smaller while most of the total product in a near-subsistence economy would have¶ to be consumed by farmers who had to be fed in order to supply the armies. Now mass¶ armies have become rare, conscription has been abolished, but a large military industrial¶ complex has appeared. The workers in that complex are highly unlikely to¶ experience bodily violence, still less death. All that is required of them is a certain¶ callous indifference to the likely victims of the weapons they are making.