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Structural violence framing is analytically useless – can’t distinguish war from other types of violence – the move to conflate the two makes politics ineffective

Thomas 11 (Claire, Professor of International Politics at Sheffield University, “Why don’t we talk about ‘violence’ in International Relations?” Review of Int’l Studies 37 p. 1829-1831)

Much of the attractiveness of this idea of structural violence is that it broadens the remit of security studies, or of research into violence. Thus, economic issues and the damage done by poverty and so on become just as important as the damage done by direct, physical violence. Authors who work with the concept of structural violence aim to highlight the hidden structures in order to work towards their transformation.63 The problem with this is that it is defining a concept dependent on what we want to be able to study within its remit. A concept should not depend for its meaning on how we want to study it, but rather on what the concept means. The concept of structural violence is performing a similar role to the debate about broadening the definition of security. Within the security debate we are used to people posing the challenge of securitisation – that people call something a security problem in order to make it sound more urgent, more policy relevant and so on. One can pose the same challenge to structural violence. Rather than having a clear academic reason for stretching the concept of violence to incorporate other, equally bad, social ills, the main reason proposed is that these other social ills cause as much or more damage than the damage caused by violence. This may well be the case, and these issues should have urgent academic and policy attention. However, re-defining a concept like violence to incorporate these issues in order to gain that attention is a poor way of achieving this. A clear argument that states the reasons why wider social ills are more worthy of our attention does not need the further argument that we should also call them violence. So, by calling something violent, or designating it as an issue of security, an author is claiming a certain importance for the issue, escalating it up the policy agenda, and allowing for extraordinary reactions. For example, by saying that extremists use violence, one designates it as a significant and bad problem, which allows an exceptional response of violence (called military force) to counter it. The aim of calling something violence in order to push it up the policy agenda, meaning it requires special, urgent action, can also lead to dealing with these issues in a different, exceptional way, outside the realm of ‘ordinary’ politics. This may or may not be beneficial in dealing with the issue in question, or for our politics in general.64 A similar move is made by Žižek when he claims that alongside subjective violence (direct, intentional violence), there is also objective violence, one form of which is systemic violence – the damaging consequences of the ‘normal’ functioning of the system. This systemic violence must be taken into account, according to Žžiek, in order to make sense of subjective violence.65 He argues that this systemic violence needs to be given prominence, despite the urgency attributed to direct violence which fights for our attention.66 Again, this argument is valid in that systemic problems cause more suffering in the world than direct violence. But there has to be a further reason to also call this violence. After all, the argument can be made without the need to label something as violence. One could argue that seeing as our concepts are important because they change the way we think about the world, and change the way we act in it, a definition of violence that incorporates these other social ills would be valuable. However, broadening the concept in this way also has the potential for being damaging. If we conceive of all these things as equally violent, in order to see them as equally important, there is an implication that we are also going to tackle the issues as problems of violence. Issues of poverty are not helpfully tackled in the same way as issues of direct violence. The concept of structural violence is problematical as it means that the definition of violence becomes linked to the result of an act (or influence), and not to the intention or actual action of the actor. This illustrates a key difference in the way violence is conceived: one way sees violence from the perspective of the perpetrator, and sees it as intentional, destructive force; the other way sees violence from the point of view of the victim, and sees it as a form of violation.67 Bufacchi points out that these two concepts of violence stem from the Latin roots of the term. The root of the word violence is violentia, meaning a passionate and uncontrolled force, but the meaning is often conflated with ‘violation’, from the Latin violare, meaning ‘infringement’.68 Although the definition of violence is partly contingent on the result of an act, in that it requires that the intention is to physically harm the victim, it is also necessary for that result to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Because the result of many different acts or situations is physical harm or death (or unequal power or life chances), many things become incorporated into the definition of violence if the concept of intention is not used, and if the instrumental nature of violence is ignored. Roberts goes some way to improving on the debate about structural violence by pointing out that structures are created by people, and thus structural violence can be prevented and does have responsible actors. He also operationalises it by referring to specific acts of structural violence, looking at avoidable civilian deaths. He argues that his way of looking at human insecurity enables the analysis of structures, institutions and human agency, but without the problems caused by broadening the debate to include Galtung’s concept of realising full human psychosomatic potential.69 But this does not prevent the problem that structural violence still refers to anything an author wants it to. Interestingly, many of Roberts’ choice of examples can be incorporated under the title of direct violence in any case (they are preventable female deaths: infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate killings (normal domestic murder, dowry murders and ‘honour’ killings), lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five).70 Some caution is needed in this approach, however. It is easy to think of examples where violence is not intentional, for example a natural disaster, or bombing an empty building that accidentally harms someone nearby. We have already recognised that the concept has fuzzy boundaries, and thus we can recognise that some violence occurs naturally. The point here is to discuss that violence which is most relevant for the study of international politics. This is not the same as accepting that everything that causes harm in some way can be captured within the term violence. It is also not going so far as to say that accidental acts of violence are not violence at all. Collateral damage is still violent. The point of including the idea of intentionality in the definition of violence is that it ensures the violence we are discussing in international politics has an actor and does not end up including indeterminate ideas like a state of violence. It does not just happen on its own. It is also an action that is done with the intention of harming, unlike acts such as a doctor causing some pain in order to heal.

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