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Reasonability collapses into competing interpretations, if we win our interp creates a better topic than theirs should be considered unreasonable.

Mancuso ‘82

(Steve Manusco, Debater for University of Kentucky, Wake Forest University, 1982, Topicality: In Search of Reason. The Debaters’ Research Guide, groups.wfu.edu/debate)

In recognition of the many possible definitions of a word, the debate community has adopted (original mother and father unknown) the convention that the affirmative definition only needs to be "reasonable." This burden traditionally stands opposed to the notion that the affirmative must have the best definition of a word, or even necessarily a better definition than the negative. While the initial theoretical underpinnings for such a convention are far from clear, it must certainly he justified on the grounds that it promotes the objective of quality debating. Such a convention recognizes that a definition is not right or wrong, but merely acceptable or unacceptable in a given situation. In situations where broad interpretations of a topic are desirable, a broader-than usual definition may be reasonable, and where a narrow interpretation is desirable, narrow definitions may be reasonable. Such a simplified view of reasonability is not justified in the face of the recent uses and abuses of such a convention. The relevant question is: What does it mean to be reasonable? Again, courts and legislators may have their own definitions of "reasonable," but they may not be at all useful for the functioning of the term in debate. To state that a court has been unable to define the word "reasonable" only means that in that particular context it was difficult, not that such a finding should be accepted as proof that we cannot come up with a workable concept of reasonability for our purposes. Of course, someone who has listened to a few debates concerning "reasonability" may find great sympathy with such a court the concept has taken on very diverse forms, to say the least, in its varied uses. On one extreme, teams have argued that as long as they were not "absurd" in defining their terms, they were reasonable, and some teams have argued that because their definition exists they are some how reasonable. On the other end of the definitional continuum, some interpretations of reasonability have been very restrictive. Some teams have argued that only the best definition is reasonable--that it shows little reason to accept an inferior definition. Clearly there has been quite a bit of disagreement as to what is entailed by a "reasonable" definition. Some debate critics have responded to this dispute by throwing up their arms and calling for the abandonment of the concept of reasonability as a topicality convention altogether. While it is very easy to respect and have empathy with such sentiment, it seems prudent to attempt a less radical solution by constructing a more useful and practical convention of reasonability without ""piffing" the concept in its entirety. I would suggest two steps in construction of a workable reasonability convention. First, we must agree upon what makes a definition acceptable. Keeping in mind the goal of high quality debating, two criteria necessary for an acceptable definition should be (1) Does it tend toward focusing debates on timely and relevant policy advocacy? and (2) does it allow the negative sufficient ability to be prepared in both analysis and research? A definition which failed to meet either of these goals would not seem to he an acceptable approach to interpretation. Secondly, the actual debate over topicality should center on the question of whether or not the affirmative interpretation actually did meet both of these criteria. In this sense, the "threshold" for when a definition became "reasonable" would be raised well above the currently less rigorous approaches, yet not overly restrict the affirmative initial and presumptive right to define its terms. The burden would be on the affirmative to explain, wren challenged, the implications of its definition, thus reviving the concept of an affirmative burden on topicality, without making the burden prohibitively heavy by making them refute any conceivable negative alternative definition. In an effort to supplement the convention of "reasonability," "standards" of definition have been offered which the affirmative should meet in order to be considered reasonable. These standards could potentially be used to discern whether or not the affirmative approach met the above two criteria.

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